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Sl'X:TIOlJ ONE 
1.1 Terms Of Reference 
The intention of this dissertation is to att empt to project the 
theoretical c onc ept of Corporate (or I,ong-Ranee) Planning into the 
reali ty of one of ~~o llth Africa t 8 m~jor motor vehicle monuf8cturing 
company's task environment . 
It is a sad fact t ,1at there are no universally - appl icable practical 
plannine "laws" ( a:-J :..lr(~ pI'c:-.;cn'L within th(~ rli:.:cipltna of , ~Jny , Phyuicr; ) 
amidst the ev.or-chrul(;inC hurly-burly world of modern commerce and ind-
ustry. Accordingly, there are very real distinction s between distilled 
Corporate Planning theory, as it is propounded in the many availabl e books 
and articles, and Corporat e Planning practice as actually implemented . 
'L'his is true l £l l'gely b:; \' irtue of the fact that in the same way as persons 
differ in their ph:-sical and mental make-up, so too do individual companies; 
even to the extent of acquirin;:: a distinct corporate "personality" of their 
own. 
In this light, therefor e , we shall attempt to illustrate, against the 
background of the "ideal" Corporat e Planning process , some of the motives, 
constraints and opportunities surrounding the planning efforts of one of 
this country ' s most exciting , troubled, complex, inhibited, controlled and 
potentially prosperous industries . 
This work will, firstly, seck to establish, in broad terms, what is meant 
by "Corporate Planning ." IV ~ will indicate both its purpose and some of 
its more sali ent features. A deliberatc effort will be made to avoid 
, 
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, 
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moving away from the overal l strat eeic plrumin[ issues down towards 
intensely detailed tactical plruming considerations . The rationale 
behind this intention is that tactical issueD are , by their very nature, highly 
individualistic . This means that at a tactical l evel even companies within 
the sam/) indLw try may be vastly diff erent from one another i.n the manner 
in which they operate on a dail y basis. Ao a consequenc e no broad picture 
of generally applicoble planning y8rd~ticks Ina), be readily extr8cted . 
By d evoting our attention at a higher plane focua iG automatically directcd 
upon the two plarul ing concerns which are universally applicable in both 
the theor etical and prac tical world s. In essence , the statement that a 
, 
commerc ial enterprise ahould make u profit hold S Good for both the tex t-
book and for the manaGing director of Unil ever whilst the means by which 
that profit is generated ar e common to, and do not differ marked ly between, 
Angl o- American , General Motors and the cor ner cafe . 
" 
To r ecapitulate, our first step will be t o present the overall theory of 
Corpor ate Planning with emphasis upon the joint roles of profit and 
strateGY development. 
That done, the second element of this work will be in t roduced, namely . to 
t ake a local motor manufacturer and to pr esent, i n fair detail , an overvievi 
of its Corporate Pl anning activities whilst indicating the opportu.~ities and c 
constraints which surro und i ts opera·tions . I 
• 
In overall terms, it is hop ed to inculcate a sense of "building-up" to this 
l atter concern. The first sLaee , by vlhich Corporatc Planning easentiala 
are filled in, merely serves to set- the- scene for the second , practicall y -
ori ell tc. ted anulysi8 . 
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1 . 2 Introduction 
The importance of the motor indus·tr y rests in its being a major economic 
and social fore e wi thin the past, present and future South African 
societies. In economic terms, it is the direct employer of upwards of 
36 000 persons within the purely assembly/manufacturing field. Employment 
l evels expand to roughly 180 000 persons if all dcaler sales and service 
nctworku arc inc I ud (;u . 
of this paper alone placed into the economy of the COU.'1try a sum Vl ell in 
exceSS of R70 000 000 during 1977 i n respect of materials purchased . 
Although , as an industry , molar manufacture is of no mean size, it is 
t he composition and structure of the industr y which gives cause for 
concern. The total motor industr y is characterized by a marked degree 
of d e- concentration , duplication of investment and over-competition 
relative to the total size of the South African neW vehicle market . In 
overseas markets having sal es volumes many times greater than that of 
South Africa , industry competition is concentrated in the hands of a 
rel atively limited number of major manufacturers. For exampl e , the 
United Kingdom 1977 n ew c a r market totalled 1 323 524 units * sold by 42 
manufacturer/importers (of whom only Pord , Leyland and Vauxhall (GM) 
attained the lion 's share). By way of contrast , the total South African 
1977 new car market was but 166 764 units """· marketed by 12 manufac t urers . 
* Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders - January 1978. 
Nlu\N[1A - January 1978. 
,. 
, 
, 
! , 
l 
I 
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Henc e the raw average sales for each British company equals 31 441 units' 
whilst that for South Africa in but 13 897 . + 
Structurally, the South African car market lllay be divided into the 
following classes: 
High Volume Popular 
Ford 
Volkswagen 
Datsun 
Sigma 
General Motors 
Medium Volume Popular 
Peugeot/Ci troen 
Toyo ta/Renaul t 
Low Volume Popular 
Leyland 
Fiat 
Alfa-Romeo 
High Volume Specialty 
Merc ed es - Benz 
BMW 
Percent 
1 ')'7' i ]11a1' !cet l.'elle tra Lion 
16 . 6 
15.0 
11. 5 
11.1 
10 . 7 
7.3 
8 . 5 
4.6 
3. 7 
64 . 9 
15 . 8 
n. o 
8 . 3 
100 . 0 
-----------------------------------------------------
+ At the time of writing the merger of Si,,'11la with Peuseot/Citroen and 
Leyland has just been announced which effectively reduces the number 
of local companies to 8. 'l'he irnpac t this will have upon the industry 
structure is currently unknown largely b;i virtue of the fact that Sigma 
has yet to 31mounce what its future product lines will be . 
I. 
, 
I 
• 
, 
I. 
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Accordingly, five companies: Ford, Volkswagen, Datsun, Sigma and 
General Motors compete wi thin the top - volwne end of the market 
accounting, as they did, for no less than 64 . '1;; of the 1977 industry 
sales . To a lesser degree Peugeot/Citroen and 'l'oyota/Renaul t compete 
wi thin the m~diwn volWlle oegment whilst at the lowest popular - car 
volume end of the market I,eyland , ~'iat and Alfa - Homeo lead a twil ight · 
existence . In passing, two points are worth noticing. Firstly, ther c 
is a strong pull for the mediwn-volume producers to move into the upp er 
end of the mar ket whil~t, simultaneousl~', they are conscious of the fact 
t h a t it is an easy slip downwa.cds into the lowest "olwne class . Moreover, 
both mediwn-sized producers have been bro,~ht about as a result of mergers J 
• 
. whilst Sigma waS also the r esult · of Chr;;cler c..nd r.~azda merging ... In 
addi tion, the future of the lower- volume sellers appears gloomy, in 
particular Leyland, a company whose plant capaci ty i s such as to place 
it, potentially, wi thin the high volume end of the market. A sec and 
point of note is that an outright wi thdrawal from t he car market has r 
only come from Volvo (during 1976). A common argument is tha.t there 
a.re too many manufac turers wi thin the local market . Viewing the above 
figures in an obj ective light it appears likely that any withdrawal is 
only likely to corne f rom the likes of Leyland, Fiat and Alfa- Romeo - who, 
in total comprised but 1 0 . 9)~ of the market during 1977. Thus even if all 
three were to withdraw the r esultant ga in i n industry effectiveness and 
reduction in industry costs cannot b e expected to be great . 
Even so , in terms of pure economics it may well be true to say that the 
local motor i ndust ry is a giant but a rather inefficient one in the sense 
that a markedly high degree of duplicated effort and investment exists. 
This is at no time more obvious than during periods of s l ack retail sales 
\, 
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and swollen inventories when resultant prod uction cut-backs give rise 
to an under-utilization of industr y plant and , in a broader context , a 
r 
less- than-optional application of the nation ' G economic resourc es . As 
one industry spokesman expressed it: 
"It is difficult to see how anyone in the market today is really 
making any moner. Certainly on our cm'u s id e \'Ie ' re aiming to 
break-even acro:::::J the ran.18, even making a Ions on the lOVler -
pric e lines. Where we do score is on our high-markup truck and 
spare parts operations . These l ast two at least keep our heads 
above water .!! -x-
(Appendix I detailo , for 1977 , the sales volume performance and market 
penetration of each South African motor manufacturer within the passenger 
car , light commercial and heavy commercial vehicle marke t s - i n addition 
to further industry background statiotics . ) 
As a social force, the industry and its product ' s impact may be viewed 
not so much in terms of the very fact of its and their existence or 
economic composition but, instead, in terms of that unique sociological 
and psychological niche occupied by the motor vehicle within a modern, 
developing society. 
L 
I 
*Conversation with industry spokesman , Port Elizabeth 1977 . 
- 7 -
MCi'::'fCED r,iOTOH Vl':HICI,Ef, DY rOl'lf1!:no; r G1WUP - AS AT J1JNE 30 , 1 977 
CAI ·~--; MHII Inr.~ !,:r; "1)1 I. ~ !'~J (! IIf.1. V!'~I In: r , i'~j '.110'1.' /\:1 t
GROUP mlITS , I UNITS ' , UN 1'1'8 ", UNITS UN I'l'S ,A !l. L <- .' !.!. ~
White 1 622262 54.3 32 ')64 1.1 5222 0 . 2 H 7469 14 . 8 210791 7 70 . 4 
Col oured 962G4 3 . 2 2400 0. 1 64'f 0 , () ,~ 26828 0. 9 1261 36 ,~ , :5 
Asian 78694 2.6 2159 0 . 1 98) O . O -~ 22795 0 . 8 1046 31 3. ;j 
Black 1 60725 5 . 4 1037;: o " • J 1 'l9,~ 0 . 1 1051H 3 . 5 278532 9 . 3 
N/A 1 9003G 6 , 3 S5 :~~ 0. 3 94)'1 0. 5 L\.)ul~O ? ~, 5'(11jU L! , 'f 
TO'rIul 1'114 '1 901 "!l.CI 5CH O 1.9 H32!JO o. r·, '(l)UC; ~ 3 ;:~ . 5 2 9913~4 100 . 0 
* Less than 0 . 1,:' . 
I' ~m CfLFITA MCl'Cl{ VEHreT,!': O:IITERSHIP - 19TI 
( , (lO() ) ( , (J',l il ) 1 .; 2 
GHOUl' (1 ) VOPULA'l:JON ( C2) Vi':ruC J.Io: ()WNI':h~~IlJT' .I )I'~t ~ Cld'I'TJ\ OVIN io:r\fi 1 lIP 
---
White 
Coloured 
Asian 
Black 
TOTAL 
Sources : 
4421 210C 2 . 09 
2498 126 19 . 82 
763 105 7 . 29 
19156 2' / ') Gll. 65 
26838 261 8 
Depar'i.. of :3'~at istics, Statistical ~r 0W.o Pelease , Statistic s of 
Moto]' <'u1U Othgr \" ,l'Jiclr;;: , P.::bru:"_ry 9 , 1978. 
rl'''c . ,T.J~ . :~",li" - rro j r'ctiotl Dr tt" :'outJ1 Af:ri~= l'opul at i on 
1 0)70 - 2020. 
Dur ing mid - 1 977 thETG VIUe! all eDt.i:ma'tGd Gotal of slight1:' und er ) million r egi stered 
motor veh icle.::; ( e:xcludin6 t r ac torfJ , motoT-c./c l(":J an d governmen t vehic les ) . Of these , 
no less than 7 i n ev ery 10 wer e owneu b:; Wh i tr.::":: whil:::;t I'ou.r;hly 1 in fJVcry 10 were in 
t h e hands of Blackr; . flo L surprisingl:! passenger- cnr owner ship compr i ses the bulk of 
all c l asses of motor -;8hiclec ~ her e [l.8,' of all motor vehicl ec were c ars f ollow ed 
by c orrunercj a1 vehlcl (J~"'; ~ . ~ ?'J . 't, ;. 
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Expressed in per capita terms, again in 1977, there Vias approximately one 
motor vehicle between every 2 I~uropeans, a ratio followed by that of Asians 
where one motor vehicle is shared by 7 persons. Moreover, roughly 20 
Col oureds shared each licenced vehicle Vlhilst there Vias one motor vehicle 
to every 69 Blacks . 
Accordingly , it is poociblc to Gtute tllat 'Llle w :ace nud oWllership of motl)r 
vehic l es is commonplace within nou'Lh Africa . ,r.rhis, in turn, gives rise ~o the 
further ramifications of ; firstl;· , the Qxistence of a well- developed motor 
t r ansport infr astructure (which would include roads , traffic management , sales 
and service facilities and the like) . ~econdly , that there exists free scope 
• 
(within the limi tations set by aspir ation and ecollomic status) for the indi- I 
vidual to have a free rein to enjoy the psychol ogical stimulati on and personal 
sa tisfac tion that moto r vehicle owner ship both impl i es and, ind eed , eng end ers 
wi thin this society. 'I'hu freedom unleaGhed by v ehicle ownership is amply 
,. 
described in the fol l owing quotation. r 
"And unlike any earlier age, the common man can and does move 
a r ound and is no longer rooted to the small valley of his birth . 
The motor vehicle has given al most everyone the power of mobility , 
and with physical ability to move around comes a new mental out-
look and n new social mobil ity . The technological revol ution on 
the American farm began in earnes·t when the farmer acquired wheels ; 
he irmn~rjtately became mobile , too , in his mental habits and accessible 
to new ideas ffi1d techniques. The beginning of th~ Negr o drive for • 
civil rights in the American South came with the used car . Behind 
the wheel of a liiodel T a Negr o was , .s powerful as any white man, and 
his equal... . . . .. lIe has tasted the new power of mobil i ty, a g r eater 
power thffi1 the mic;h ti es t kings of yesterday could imagine . It is no 
\, 
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accident that roung peopl" everywhere dream of a car 01' their own; four:-
wheeled mobility is a true symbol of freodom from the restraints of traditional 
au thori ty . " .* 
There can be no argwnent about the Simple fact that motor road transport; 
be it of a public or private class, constitutes a necessity within any 
economically devclll1'0<1 ~:l)cioLy. 
development, or the LYP 8 :::ought by :; ouLh Africa cmmot occur in the ab:::ence 
of a motor industry whilst, conversel", a motor industry cannot exist Vii thin 
a stagnant, retrogressive society lacking a. motor transport infrastructure. 
Socially, the freedom of movement engendered by motor transport creates a 
sense of indep endence and individuality amongst, particularly, private 
owners. This ma.kes itself felt in terms of the type or make of cars 
sought, the attributes souSht from particular models and the usage patt.erns 
to which the selected make ffi1d model of vehicle are put. In short, the 
car becomes, for many, an extension of self . 
Given an lmderstanding of the classic Marketing Concept , it is, in pure 
marketing terms, the individual car-buyer's personality traits, proposed 
usage and economic status which come together to dictate, ultimately , the 
type of car products which should be on offer in the market and, which in turn, 
determine the actual manufacturers who shall c omprise the society's motor 
industry. 
* P . P . Druclc~r - Tec hnology , MarlG.gullent and Uociet;>· 
Pan Books, London , 1972 pp 85-86 
\, 
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Technologically, the motor industry .vi thin South Africa is entirely I , 
imported in that, since its inception as an industry in the early years 
:1 
of this century, technical development has remaj.ned in the hands of Overseas . 
countries. The fact that South Africa has made no significant technical 
contri bution to the indue try evolves from its r elatively small Gize in 
relation to the North American, Japanese and European markets. This small 
size naturally limi t,; both nva:Llnbl~ :rosearch i'tU1(]S r.U1d teohnioal exportise . 
Even so, South Africa has an established history of successfully adopting 
overseas technology to local operatin.:; conditions: suspension, drive-train, 
and coolin3 systems being obvious examples . Moreover, there is no logical 
reason why this teclmology importation and modification should not continue. 
Of note, however, is the eventual promise or such development (as has been 
the caSe in the recent past of manufacturern in South America and Austral asia) 
by establishing embryonic product development operations. 
Finally, in terms of ownership structure there is a clear division between 
those manufacturers having Overseas parents and those who are wholly South 
African. (Ownership and control notWithstanding, anomalously all remain 
dependent upon overseas parents or suppliers ao sources of product and 
t eehnology. ) Onl:, three of the eleven established local manufactures are 
entirely South African owned; viz, Datsun, Toyota/Renault and Sigma. 
The balance all form part of multi-national chains based, in the main, in 
Europe. Only two such manufb.cturers - Ford and General Motors - are 
American-owned . Of note is the fact that the prime utilizers of Japanese 
product/technology; Sigma, Datsun and Toyota are all locally-owned . 
- 11 -
souaCE OF PRODUCT/TECHNOLOGY BY MANUFACTURER 
PASSEllGER CARS 
Total 4- 2 3 3 2 I 
* Pre-merger 
Thus it would appear that German product/technology is, at this time, the most 
well established. However , in time, the above array may be eXpected to contract 
in response to tile elements of the Local Content Programme . Rather than tool-
up to produce unique, particularly mechanical, components there may come about 
a gr eat er commonality b etwe£fi manufac t urerS . Already, for example , Peugeot is 
-supplying a competitor with diesel engines, the same company was a large-scale I 
shipper of engines to Chrysler f or fi tment in the Hill man Vogue and Avenger car-
" lines whilst in addition, Datoull, at its Steelmobile plnnt, cUITently produces 
body- pr essings for Leyland, Ford, Sibilla, Peugeot/Citroen and Alfa-Romeo as well 
as supplying its own needs. 
I. 
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Summarizing the above, it should be clear that, in South Africa, the 
motor industry possesses the following pertinent characteristics: 
(1) It is a consequence of and a key factor in the nation's economic 
develop:uent. 
(2) The exact structure of the indust:q will be shaped by the tempo 
and direction of the 2ociety's economic deyclop.nent and that 
society's particular motoring requirements. 
(3) The industry is currently an economically inefficient, loss-making 
uni t whose target markets are too small to support , in profit , ~ I 
the present number of manufacturers. 
(4) Ownership and control of local motor comp~nies is clearly divided 
into those having overseas parents and those who are wholl y South African 
but whose products and technology remain fastened to overseas sources. 
(5) The basic underlying technology and the bulk of on- going technical 
r esearch has been and continue, to be imported . 
Accordingly, therefore, Corporate Planning, as practised by any South African 
motor manufacturer, must see!, to come to grips with each of the five industry/ 
market elements above . 
A sixth point which should be brought to light is the relative ease and 
facili ty ' by which it is possible for the Go vernment to regulate and control 
- 15-
the motor industry . The extreme sensitivity of the industry to such 
intervention and manipulation is not surprising in view of points (1) 
and (2) on the previous page. (This is not to saJ that South Africa is 
unique in this regard, General Motors in the United States has gone 
on record as stating that an averaee of H174 .. was charged to every car 
and truck sold in that country during 1977 to cover the research, develop-
ment and administra ti ve expcn3es or me eting govermncnt pollution and 
safety regulatiolliJ - a 3taGe0ringly hi" h wnount even allowing for natural 
partisan exaggeration· ) In other ,;ords, depending upon Government social 
and economic pJlicy, the motor industry is a useful instrument by and 
through which socio-economic change ma"- be fostered . Ey, for example, 
encouraging the development of a local component industry imports may 
be reduced, consumer demand may be raiGeo or dampcmed by nmending hire-
purchase minimum dep .lsi t and maximum P'lY-back periods whilst overseas 
local investment may be turned on or off by raising and lowering the 
volume and timing of dividend transfers . 
Indirectly , the industry is influenced by other Government control s of 
which restricted petrol sales hours, speed restrictions, import deposits 
and limitations up0n local borrowin:,; are but merely a few. Later in this 
paper, when we come to discuss a specific manufacturer, we shall seek to 
illustrate how what have been termed "diplomatic" controls are used by the 
Government to pressurize the industry in certain directions in the absence 
of otherwise formal legislation . 
" Reported in Time ~lagazine, June 5, 1978 pp 45 
" 
• 
• 
• 
t 
\, 
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The type of motor lllanufacturer we sholl discuss is a highly complex 
organization having an overseas parent exercising riGid control over 
local ac tions on a wide-~anging front. More specifically, the overall quest-
ion of its organization structure and control is diVisible into four quite 
distinct sales and marketing divisions ',vhose products share little commonali tj', 
viz; ;l9.ssenger cars/light trucks , heavy trucks, parts and tractors . In 
addition, four specialized service divisions exist, these being; <t comp::n\y 
finance/credit house, a government and fleet sales deportment, a dealer 
management/financial consultancy department and a dealer workshop service 
de partment . Each of the above may be cast in ·the role of being engaged in 
customer- orientated activities (as opposed to purely company/product focused 
• 
operations such as pm-chaDing or manufacturing) and , occordingly, may each 
rightly demand a quite unique 101~-term strategy tailored to their particular 
customer- class . 
External to the actual manufacturing compr-.ny, per se , is the fact that no 
local manufacturer (with one smRll exception) acts as both manufacturer and 
distributor of its products . The distribution task is undertaken by a varying 
number of franchised dealers who, themselves, range in size from establishments' 
quoted up'Jn the Stock Exchange (e . g . William Hunt, Robb 's, McCar thy, Eriksens) 
down to fin~ncially unstable sole proprietorships operating in the rural areas 
of South West Africa. As may be expected, the welfare and pror"it- status of 
the manufacturer is in no small way a function of that of his dealer network. 
The planning and management expertise of the manufacturer and his top two or 
three (typically urban- based) franchise- holders tends to falloff precipitiously 
the moment the smaller, less sophisticated , dealers are considered. (Small, 
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typically rural, dealers present a major headache to local manui'acturers, on 
the one hand they , in total, may contribute as much as fift. percent to 
retail volume yet, individually, display no evid enc e of even basic m8118,3cmcnt 
skills. (For instance one new franchise-holder evinced no knowledge of 
simple book-keeping and required a week of D1tensive coaching to establish · 
and maintain a set of books . ) 
Hence it is by no means unusual to attempt to reconcile Corporate Planning 
activit ies at a ·manufacturer l evel with these of probably a hundred or more 
franchise- holders. Most large dealers are either subsidiaries of parent 
companies quite divorced from the motor iridustry (and are, accordingly, 
subject to Corporate Strategy demands remote from those of the manu- • 
factureI') or are capable of prepar ing and adhering to their own Corporate 
Plans whose objectives and operating goal s may be at distinct odds to what 
the manui'acturer would ideally like to See. Further down the scale , of 
course, individual small dealers generally tend to plan no further ahead 
than one to six months. 
I f it is accepted that a company's product or servic e represents the major 
means by and through which environmental change is fir stly communicated to the 
business and secondly through which the company seeks to create a positive 
impression upon its environment then it should be clear that motor manu-
facturers e}q,erience great difficulty in planning for both its markets viz; 
its dealer networlc and its ultimate final customer. 
• 
To conclude, although the specific company featured within this paper will 
remai . '1 unnamed, the Corporate Planning tasle for arly local motor company will 
approXDnate to that of the ::mbject manui'aeturel' . Indeed, if the affects 
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of its being subject to an overS0as pa:c ont are discounted then a reasonably 
cl ose- focused illustration may be constructed of the Corporate Planning 
actions of its wholly - South African competitors such as Sigma, Toyota or 
Datsun . 
,. 
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SEC'l'ION TVIO !I'HE CORPORAl'!': PLANNTlm PROCRSS 
• 
2.1 · Purpose 
The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the sal ient features 
of Corporate PlarJling thereby permitting the process , as a theoretical 
concept , to be compared a."ld contrasted with prac tical planning prac tice 
as performed by OUT selected ma.Yluf2ctUTer. 
2.2 Definition And Comnosition 
Corporate Planning may be regarded as pertaining to business firms 
having, as their overall objective, the generation of profit . 
The role of profits wi thin Corporate Pl anning will be given paramount 
importaYlce in the following pages. .This stance vis- a-vis planning 
do es not conform with that adopted by a number of distinguished 
authors, who have diluted · the key role enjoyed by the pr ofi t motive . 
Warren, * for exampl e, considers planning as an end in itself by making 
the company ' s operations more efficient and more broad ly-based i"l respect 
of time . 
*E . K. Warren Long- Range. Planning - The Executive Viewpoint 
Prentice - Hall, 1966 
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"A process directed toward making today ' s decisions 
with tomorrow in mind and a means of preparing for 
future decisions so that they may be made rapidly, 
economically , and with as little disruption to 
the business as possible." * 
Hussey, one of Britain's foremost Corporate Plarilling practitioners, 
describes the process in more pointed and well- rounded terms although, 
again, the role of profit is not given the exposure it deserves: 
"Corporate long range plarming •.••• is not a technique. 
It is a complete way of running a business . Under it , 
the future implications of every decision are evaluated 
in advance of implementation. Standards of performance 
are set up beyond the time horizon of the annual budget . 
The company clearly defines what it is trying to achieve . 
A continued study is made of the environment in which the 
company operates so that the changing patterns are seen 
· in advance and incorporated into the company's decision 
process ...• • •.• Corporate Planning is a way of keeping 
the company's eyes open." + 
Warren, op cit, pp 18 . 
+ D.E . Hussey, Introducing Corporate Planning 
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1971 pp 5-6 ' 
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A d efini tion which highlights both Warren 1 s and Hussey 1 s views in 
addition to placing the part played by profit wi thin its justified 
context is ventured as follows: 
Corporate or Long-Range Planning is a methodical, systemat ic 
and disciplined proc ess whereby a " CO~p_aI'.,yl s long-term profit 
objective is identified, goals determjL~ed and strategies gen-
erated to attain those goals which take into account probable 
chang es in the task environment whilst the whole is made action-
able via meaningful feedback of results . 
Objectively dissecting the above definition, it is possible t o isolate the 
key components of Corporate "PlBnning. 
1- Corporate Planning is profit orientated . 
2 . Corporate Planning is concerned with the long- term future of the 
business . 
3. Corporate Planning is a systematic process . 
4. Corporate Planning recognizes the opportunistic and threatening 
nature of the corporation' s environment. 
5. Corporate " Planning is conc erned with the development of strategies . 
6 . Corporate Planning includes a feedback control system . 
In its very essence the rationale for any corporation to plan beyond the 
near- term future rests in the concept of an established business having 
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the desire and potential ability to survive and exist for some 
considerable time. Assuming this desire remains 'steadfast , the 
element coming to the forefront of any concern is that of the company ' s 
fitness and ability to ride over and upon the pressures (both threaten-
ing and opportunistic) present within its enviro~ent to wrich it will 
be exposed . 
The point is easily made that aDY business environment is in a state 
of continuous flux. From the businessman ' s point of view past change 
i s hi story and is , accordingly, unalterable . (Even so , past events 
will have created and moulded both'his present organization and its 
pr esent environment.) It is the future which demands attention . 
Generally, when viewing the future, what can be said of it is that i t 
i s l argely unknown , different from the present and, to some extent, 
different f r om present expectations. ' However, the basic , most funda-
mental planning principle is that which states ; if it is trne tr..at 
past and present events affect part of the future then, logically, by 
making and ,implementing decisions now (snecifically desi!!!led to influence 
the pattern, magnitude aDd direction of f uture- eve!lts) i t follows that the 
f uture will, to some greater extent, be more predictable than would have 
been the case had such decisions not been made at all. 
Environmental change is divisible into three classes, viz; 
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Positive Change, Negative Change and Neutr'al Change. Posi ti ve Change 
has the affect of assisting, bolstering and benefiting the business, 
Negative ChanGe confines, inhibits or attac.ks it whilst Neutral Change 
leaves the org~~ization unaffected. 
Logically, the concern of Corporate Plannir~ is to maximize Positive 
Change , and minimize Negative Change. Expressed another way , 
Corporate Pl~~~ing sctions seek to, firstly, all ow the company to react 
more effec ti vely to its environment and, secondly , to itself inject change 
into the sel f - same environment. 
To plan on a limited and myopic short- term basis is inadequate . It is 
an unhappy fact that major environmental element shifts and movements aevelop 
only in the fullness of time . Drucker * illustrates the consequences of 
pl anning myopia with his customary brilliance: 
"But tomorrow always arrives . It is always di fferent , and even 
t he mightiest company is in trouble if it has not worked on the 
future . It will have lost distinction and leadership - all that 
will remain is big company overheads. It will neither contTol 
.* P.F . Drucker, Managing for Results 
Pan Books, 1967. pp 220 
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nor understand what is happening; not having dared to take 
the risk of making the neVI happen, it perforce took the 
much greater rislc of beinG surprised by what did happen." 
An illustrative example of a motor comp~~y which has tended to be 
so content with today for so long that whim its "to:norrow" eventually 
arrived it took on the term 'sick old-~~ of the industry ' is to be 
found in Leyl~~d cars . Here, despite the fact that it competes within 
a market where it s rivals oake major new-model introductions every five 
years or so, Leyland today still markets a rang= of cars lS years old 
(Austin Mini), 7 years old (lCarina), 6 years ol d (Austin Apache) and 6 
years · old (Triumph). The ages of some of these car-lines' major com-
peti tors (as at mid-197S) are as follows; Ford Escort, 3 years; Ford 
Cortina 1 year; Chevrolet Chevair, 1 year ; lI!azda 323, 1 year; VW Passat, 
4 years; Datsun 160/1S0U, 5 years; Sigma Gal~~t, 1 year and Toyota 
Corolla, 3 years . The correlation between the poor performance of Leyland 
car sales and its ageing mod els relative to competitors offering continuously 
r e-vitalized ranges is too close to be COincidental. 
Upon the introduction of Corporate Planning it must be understood that 
subsequent planning activities will evolve from the foundation that is the 
business as it stand s at that moment of time. 
The current business will possess what may be termed "Momentum~_: Logically, 
a company pos s essing ·a capable management group, well-balanced product lines 
• ,
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and r eady customer acceptance thereof cannot have fOQ~d itself there 
overnight . Its current status will have been brought about by "correct" 
earlier decisions; hence its current , positive momentum. Expressed 
another way, earlier innovative decisions provide the company with its 
present-day positive momentum, the durabil ity and str ength of which is 
a func t i on of the forces of Negative environoental change . The corporate 
momentum generated earlier provides no guarantee of perpetual SucceSS . 
The concep t of a Corporate Life Cycle * is a useful elabor ation of the 
underlying status of the business v~s-a-vis its momentum quotient and 
environmen t . 
During the Maturity Phase of the cycle, the corporate growth rate 
(measured in terms of sales , income and profitability) levels off by 
virtue of i ts environment featuring saturated markets , technological 
decline and by a willfull relaxation of the thrusting aggressiveness i t 
displayed during its Emergent and Growth phases. In shor t , the business 
undergoes a s l ow- down in the innovative momentum with which it was injected 
during the ~vo earlier cycle phases . 
"The company cannot maintain its existence for any period of 
time in the mattITity phase as natural increases in costs , 
together with stabilized income , will eventually , er ode the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*ll.G. James, The Theory of the Corporate Life Cycle 
Long Range Planning - The Journel of the Society for 
Long Range PlannL~g , Vol. 7, No . 2 , April 1974 , pp 45- 55 
• I 
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profit margin to such an extent that equilibrium is lost and 
the company goes into the declining phase of its life cycle."* 
A powerful argument exists, therefore, in favour of generating a 
continuous stream of future-effective innovation . Provision and 
maintenance of such a stream is ~~ unshakeable rationale. for Corporate 
PlanniI>.g • 
Having established the .principle of "planning for survival" it must be 
admitted that the company must survive for some purpose, to attain some 
result. Simple survival for survival ' s sake is illogical. 
The fundamental purpose of any commercial organization is to survive to 
provide a reward (or profit) for its owners. This reward constitutes 
a return for their having accepted the risk of investing within the 
business. 
Hence, the company's overall objective i s to survive to earn a profit. 
Corporate Planning is the means by which these objectives may be sought. 
* James, op. cit . , pp 52 
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2.3 The c\ystematic Nature Of Corporate PlaTh'1ino; 
Implicit to the generation of profit within a hostile environment 
is the desire to make the most efficient and effective use of the 
.company's . available resources; an ambition hindered by the 
difficulty attendant upon resource- allocation towards recognised, 
viable opportunities. 
In the absence of ~~y unambigious, overall direction as to what 
exactly the business is to achieve with its resources, it is even 
more difficult to perceive how rational resource assignation may 
occur on a continuous basis . In other words, where an overall 
busL~ess objective does not exist (or ~here it exists but in ·a 
vague, undefined form) there is no way by which the relative 
importance of the company ' s individual elements and activities 
may be prioritised. Instead, eac~ functional area must , of necessity, 
seek to assign its own priorities on the basis of its own , invariably 
sel f-centred, perception of i ts objectives and those of the 
organization as a whole . Quite naturally, such departmental 
objectives may run contrary to the genuinely desired direction of 
t he business·Vlhilst the individual assertiveness or meekness of 
functional managers will create a departmel1tal orientation around 
personal (comp~~y-divorced) objecti ves . 
Thus , expressed as a Corporate Planning task, planning demands the 
cont inuous, urgent allocation of corporate r esources in the most 
effective possible way thereby directing and focusing the · efforts · of 
the total organization upon long-term profitability . 
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"Corporate planning is a total process, it must involve the whole 
company " * 
In other words , Corporate Planning must combat inherent organizational 
pressures to shift the application of its resources away from its 
true objectives , to persue independent courses of action , to evade 
accountability for decisio~s and to drop away into an embr oilment 
in short- te'rm concerns . To attain this, the process seeks to create 
a state of unified, directed action via the pr ovision of a corporate 
objective capable of being broken down into logical, cohesive 
departmental objectives and by the creation of an orgaP~zation 
structure staffed by personnel ori entated towards the attainment of 
such objectives. 
2 .3.1. The Unsystematic ;.!anager 
In the practical world , the major sour ce of Corporate Planning failure 
l ies not in the concept of such plap~ing per se ; rather lack of 
success stems largely from the fact that the business is seeking to 
blend t wo elements Vlhich do not always work well together . 
On t he one hand , there is the hi.ghly systematic discipline imposed 
by the Corporate Plan whereby all functional efforts are directed 
t owards relatively inflexible, pre- determined objectives . On' the 
other hand, the implementation of the Corporate Plan's demands rests 
* Hussey , op cit , pp 19. 
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in the han,ds of the company ' s , human oomponents who, by ci.efini tion, 
are basically individualistic in outlook, personality and in terms 
of their own ~bitions or objectives . For this reason it is of 
crucial importance to be ever- alert to the dangers which attend any 
attempt to blend Corporate Planning and managers . 
Expressed in the most simple of terms , people dislike being regiI:1ent.ed 
and will fight clumsy attempts to do so whilst Corporate Plalming can , 
via its poor ly formulated i,ntroduction and operation, be perceived 
as a deliberate attempt to dragoon managers into " to~ip~ the company 
line I I. 
For ewarned of the danger, the corporate planner must take active 
steps to ensure that , firstly, his plmL~ing efforts include the 
means by which the company's organization structure is compatible 
with the Corporate Plan ' s demand s and that, secondly, the personal 
. , 
obj ectives of employees are linked to those of the ,or ganization. 
In this last regard, the technique of Management by Objectives has 
proved most successful . 
2.3 . 2 . The Specialised Manager 
Of special and particular concern to the corporate planner is t he 
existence wi thin the organization of "Specialised" personnel who, by 
virtue of their background , expertise and or ientat ion work out on a 
l imb of t heir own . Although it is admitted that most managers could 
be regarded as specialists , there will be found a small group of 
who cannot readily operate effectively outside the present confines 
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of their job - it is this group with whom we are now concerned for 
~ley represent a particQlar headache for the corporate planner . 
Specialised personnel typically display a strong measure of loyalty 
to their own area of expertise even to the extent of evinciv~ 
suspicion and intolerence towards other areas of the company . 
In the absence of any Corporate Planving objectives (or in the 
event of their being r ejected) the only alternative is for specialised 
functionari es to each emphasise their own importance. Pure chance 
dictates whether or not such self- imposed objectives actually work 
t owards the maximum benefit of the busin~ss . Indeed , it is not 
unlikely that the most probable outcome is the specialist individual's 
work becomes , in his own eyes , an end unto itself . In other words ,' 
the performance criterion he applies to his work is not the contribution 
made to the company but rather his personal evaluation of that work's 
meaningfulness measur ed in terms of his personal habits , visions , 
value s and ambitions . 
The more complex the firm and the larger the number of employees 
there are, the greater is the probability that a numb er of " total" 
specialists aI'e employed . That they present a Corporate Planning 
difficulty must be recognised from the very outset and particular 
efforts implemented to bring their activities in line with the 
company ' s true needs. 
, 
" f 
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Le Breton and Henning* express the characteristics of specialist 
(staff) personnel as follows: 
* 
His technical knowledge is rather peculiar to his person and not 
generally sbared by other specialists or . non-specialists. 
His function is primarily investigatory and advisory although 
he may exercise considerable personal influence. 
His training, exper ience and general attitude frequently cause 
him to view his activities as ends in themselves rather than 
mea'1s to an end. 
His formal education is usually extended beyond the level of 
others at the same level in the organization and significa'1tly 
beyond most who will furnish data to be used in the performance 
of his task. 
He is most frequently assigned as an assistant to a line officer 
or a member of a high level staff unit. 
Usually, he is appointed to his position immediately upon 
graduation from college or after having served in a similar but 
subordinate role . 
He is more likely to have had experience in some other form of 
acti vi ty before joining the company than are other staff or line 
perso~~el. (For example, he may have been engaged in college 
teaching or government research or administration . ) 
He is less likely to have had extended experience in operating 
departments (for example, marketing or production) than other 
staff or line personnel. 
P. P . Le Breton and D.A. Henning, Plaru1ing Theory 
Prentice - Hall , 1961. Chap. 7, pp 231 - 232 . 
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Frequently, his association with the company is not viewed as a 
long- run aosociation but rather as a temporary, semi-perminent 
association . 
His initial motivation often is to gain experience , to experiment , 
to use equipment and facilities not otherwise available. 
Because of his technical knowledge, hi" advice may be tantamount 
to an order since the responsible authority may not be able to 
pass int'elligent , independent judgement . 
In the above regard, it is effectively a means of highlighting the 
essential difference between the more generalised line manager and 
his, invariably, more specialised staff counterpart. 
"The line executive is convinced he has a "responsibility" while the 
staff officer merely has a "function" . One has to pay- off directly 
and measurably. ~~e others ' impact may only be felt only over the 
long pul:!!' ~ 
Moreover it is interesting t o observe the close degree of similarity 
between the characteristics mentioned above and the typical qualifications 
and outlook of the personnel actually entrusted with the Corporate 
Planning task i n our selected motor manufacturer's overseas parent . 
In this instance, however, the planning "staff" are separated- from 
the local "line" managers by approximately six thousand miles - a 
'situation which, through sheer physical distance, greatly aggravates 
a recognised functional division . 
* S. T. Tooker, "The Attitude of the Line Executive" 
Long Range Planning for Mnnagement D.W. Ewing ed ., 
Harper and Row , 1964 . pp 169 . 
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"Planning a.nd doing are separate parts of the same job; they are 
not separate jobs . There is no work that can be performed effectively 
unless it contains elements of both ... advocating the divorce of 
the two is like de\Jlanding that swallowing food and digesting it be 
carried on in separate bodies ." * 
."1- P . F . Drucker The Practice of Management 
Harper and Row , :feVi York , 1954 . pp 284 . 
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2.4 The Corporate Profit iV10tive 
Al though a sellsi ti ve issue, the most fundamental obj ecti ve of a 
capitalistic business enterprise is to earn a profit. Whilst a 
detailed discuss i on of the rol e of profit is unnecessary for the 
purposes of this paper it may be useful to crystallize the issue 
by making two informative quotations: 
"The word 'profits ' has many different meanings in everyday usage. 
From these different possible meanings, the economist, after careful 
analysis, ends up relating the concept of profit to dynamic innovation 
and uncertainty - bearing ,,* ....... 
"Profit as the paramount considerat ion Vlithin Corporate Planning, 
is something fundamental to the nature of a company and 
which distinguishes it from other types of organization: it is 
t herefore'something permanent and unalterable. It is the reason for 
the very existence of the company, that for which i t came into being 
and, what i t is noVi. It is that which, if the company fails to achieve 
i t , t he company itsel f fails. It is a permanent unalternabl e purpose , 
or raison d ' etre."+ 
What Vie shal l endeavour to perform is an act whereby a Simpl e , 
dir ect expression of profit-generating intent is placed within the 
context of wide- ranging implications of intense inter est to the 
Corporate Planner regardless of the business on whose behalf he acts . 
* P.A. Samualson, Economics 8th Edition 
McGraw-Hill, Tokyo, 1970, pp 593. 
+ J. J\rgenti, Corporate Planning, A Practical Guide 
Allen and Unwin, 1968, p 28 
- 33 -
As a starting point two issues will be. examined from whence the above-
mentioned implications ere sourced, viz: 
(1) If it is agreed that the business's objective is to earn a 
profit it is necessary to determine how profits are to be 
generated - PROFIT POLICY •. 
(2) Recognition must be paid to the size of profits - PRO? IT SPREAD. 
2.4 . 1 . Profit Policy 
An investigation of the schools of thought which concern prof'i t . 
po~cy will expose three common attitudes, as follows : 
(a) Corporate Profitability . 
(b) Profitability Within Environmental Constraints . 
(c) . Economic and Environmental Equilibrium. 
2. 4 .1. (a) Corpor ate Profitability 
As a bold statement of intent , this school upholds the concept 
of corporate profi tabili ty as being the sole corporate obj ective 
worth contemplating. 
Although the broad wisdom of profit's beL~g a key factor in a 
business ' s survival and growth cannot be faulted, flaws exist 
in respect of the manner in which that profit is to be earned 
which serve to limit the concept of Corporate Profitability's 
practical appeal . 
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Firstly, no distinction is dravm. between short and long-term 
profitability. Inevitably openings will be perceived permitting 
quick and substantial gains. However, short-term harvests may 
work to the detriment of future, longer-term prosperi ty . 
Secondly, the concept of Corporate Profitability is closely 
linked with the classical maxim of "Profit [~a.ximization" 
whereby the business will seek to earn the greatest possible 
return under all circwnsta.clCes. No concern is paid to any 
other concern than to profit generation. Naturally, such 
conduct runs contrary to the norms and ethics of society whilst 
the precise quantification of profits cannot be ascertained . 
Corporate Profitabil ity is, essentially, too simplistic for 
practical application whilst an attempt to conform to i t 
automatically opens the door to justi fiable charges of ecqnomic 
exploitation. Accordingly , wi th the notable exceptions of a 
corporation motivated by either ethically- tainted speculation 
or naked survival this concept is, practically, an unrealistic 
alternative. 
2 . 4.1. (b) Profi tabili ty Wi thin Envirorunental Constraints 
The view taken by this or ientation is that the busL~ess must 
generate a certain target level of profit but that it must do 
so within the coMines of certain internal and external 
environmental constraints . 
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Such constraints serve firstly, to limit ,the total p~ofitabili ty 
of the business and, secondly, to inhibit the attaillment of a 
given target profit although that target may have been drawn up 
paying close heed to environmental, constraints • 
• 
Including envlXonmental constraints within the plD.."ll1il'.g equation 
directs attention towards the impact the compan,;'! S environment 
may have upon i ts operations, the setting of its profit target 
and the attainment of that target . Recognition of environmental 
barriers leads to the avoidance of a profit maximization policy 
over the long- term whil st exposing the need ~o plot a course 
, 
for the company between environmental barriers towards a profit 
target all the time paying assiduous attention to the exact 
character, diversity and magnitude of such environmental limitati ons. 
In this way, Profitability Vlithin Environmental Constrai.YJ.ts 
must be regarded as being immeasurably more realist i c, valuabl e 
and practical than simple Corporate Profitability . 
Environmental constraints may be cl assified into two broad types . 
Firstly, there are constraints wi thin the company 1 s market an9. , 
secondly, social constrai.YJ.ts within the non-business sphere . 
Market- based constraints are recognised by the presence of , for 
example: rules and customs within the market, the size and 
quality of competiton and the number, value, location and attitudes 
of target consumers . As a general rule such limitations bear 
most heavily upon small, ineffective businesses in heaVily 
competitive, well regulated markets . Even so, comp:mies which, 
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although small, seek to compete within a competitive market 
dominated by larger rivals are only able to survive and prosper 
via their seeking and establishing , enduring market niches. 
An example of such a small motor company is Alfa-Romeo whose 
• 
market niche within South Africa was the supply of sporting, 
"exciting" cars to reasonably well- to-do car enthusiasts. 
Regrettably this company ' s stand is currently somewhat slippery 
by virtue of a co~bination ef price increases placing most of 
its mid and upper range cars out ef reach of the earlier lew 
range buyer group, preduct quality deterioration and the steady 
erosien of Alfa-Remeo's core of make-leyal customers by larger 
rivals offering lower priced, better built, better serviced cars 
having superier engine performance than the sole remaining low 
range Alfa Sud derivatives. 
Non- business secial constraints possess almest limitless variety 
- often overlapping with the abeve market limitatiens. 
Essentially, two. classes ef social constraints may be identified ; 
firstly" these cemprise Fermal Constraints and, secondly, Informal 
Censtraints. The former take the guise of legislation whilst the 
latter has its foundation in the norms, customs, standards and 
attitudes of seciety . They share a consi.derable degree of common 
ground; laws, afterall, represent the simple edi.fication of 
theretofore social customs and standards. Both have the power 
to channel behaviour in certain, defined directions with resistance 
or evasion of chalmelling pressure rewarded by punishment. Moreover , 
vdthin a society of creeping governmental contrel, the informal 
constraints ef today will, to some extent, be numbered amongst the 
formal constraints of tomorrow. 
, 
, 
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Corporate Profi tabiJ.ity Within Environmental Constraints is not 
an ideal profit-policy guide. In its purest form it must adopt 
an essentially negative stance towards environmental constraints 
by regarding them as threats to be either reluctantly complied 
with, as would be the case versus formal limiiations, or evaded 
and ignored vis-a-vis informal constraints . 
2.4 . 1. (c) Econonic And "'nvlrocoer..tal 3auilibrium 
At first si&~t, the concept of Economic and Environmental 
Equilibrium bears a close resemblence to that immediately 
outlined above . 
A marked distinctio:1, however , must be noted in the marmer and 
attitude displayed towards the environment between the two 
approaches . The premise is that a business is likely to be 
influenced more readily and profoundly by its environment than 
it is to influence the environment itself . Moreover, by viewing 
environmental constraints within a positive light it should be 
possible to guide the course of the business via a planned 
sequential compromise between profitability 0:1 the one hand and 
social and formal constraints on the oth8r . 
Expressed a'1other way, this concept of profit-policy represents 
a genuine attempt to create a state of equilibrium between the 
methods employed to derive a reasonable level of corporate 
profitability and inhibiting environmental limitati ol18. 
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If constraints are v}.ewed posi t i vel y, the business will be not 
only be better able to def ine the actions or implicatior~ of 
constra ints but i ts most potentiall y attainable , realistic 
~ 
profit target too. Tr anslated into actionable terms, a state of 
• 
equil ibrium may only be attained following an exhaustive search 
and measurement of all environmental constraints actL~g upon 
the profit creati on process . 
Logically, therefore, enviror~ental constraints (and opportuniti es) 
exist for each area of the business. In turn, the business may 
be considered as a unified collection of areas or enti ties . 
Movi ng a step fur ther ; just as environCle!1tal co!Cstraints a"d 
opportunities exist for each element of the business, so too crust 
there be an objective for each organizational ele~ent . 
The pi cture now created is one of a cluster of objectives which 
have evolved from the single corporate objective (profit) , 
attainable only after environmental constraints pertinent to 
both the whole and the parts have been accepted , quali fied ~~d 
pl anned for. In other Vlords there is Equi librium between the 
economic demands of the firm and i ts envi ronment , the structural 
components ' sub-objecti ves (or departmental goals) and the 
particular constraints directly pertinent to both the total 
business and its departmental functions. 
It should now be clear that a business firm's profi t po l icy 
requirements are not v'holly met by the earlier discussed approaches . 
They ignored the idea of the business having to operate withL~ 
" 
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its environment and that profit is merely the end result of the 
co-ordinated activities of all the various elements of the 
organization stnlcture, each operating within the ir own 
environments. 
• 
Before considering the question of corporate profitability it 
may be pertinent to pay brief attention to some of the more 
salient formal and inforual constraints against which the 
typical motor cot:lpany is likely to come into contact with in 
South Africa. 
Formal Constraints 
Local Content Programme 
The main objective of government policy vis-a-vis the motor 
industry is to foster the growth of local component L~dustries -
(for strategic, social and ~conomic reasons); In essence, as 
a manufacturer raises his local content of passenger cars 
produced, within established guidelines excise rebate 
incentives are granted . Constraints are present in those 
instances where locally manufactuIed components are, by virtue 
of tariff protection, more costly to buy locally than to 
i mport from overseas suppliers whose production runs , being 
longer, have lower unit costs . A fu.rther issue is that, in 
some instances, component supplier ' s technological skills and 
experience are not equal to the task, resulting in quality 
shortcomings. Finally , as the Local Content Programme is 
composed of three phases (at the end of each the manufacturer's 
product must contaL~ a certain specified minimum local content 
by weight to qualify for a rebate ) , the t:iJne is reached when 
.-
, 
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,Y"" 
to meet the requirements of the programme high- mass components 
(such as engine and drivetrain) must be produced locally . 
Naturally the investment costs, for .each manufacturer, of 
equipping to produce such assemblies are astronomical wpich a re 
no way negated by the relatively 101V sales volUl!les acting to · raise 
• 
unit costs to intolerable levels . Moreover, the diversity of 
product in the market m~~es rationalisation difficult or-ce ) 
• 
drivetrains are considered . That is to say Peugeot engines , 
transmissions and differentials only fit Peugeots , not Perds , 
Rovers, Passats, Chevairs and Valiants . Tnis precludes Peugeot 
establishing itself as an engine supplier to the industry, 
Ford a gearbox supplier , V'll an axle supplier and so forth . 
Massive duplication of investment and insupportable investment 
overheads are both industry and manufacturer headaches of nO 
mean size . 
ImportDeposi ts 
At this time (mid-1978), in addition to any normal import duties, 
manufacturers importing components must lodge a deposit on the 
value of the assemblies brought into the country. This measure 
was introduced in the 1977 budget and was described as a 
temporary measure designed to dampen t~e flolV of imports . 
Naturally, the funds tied up in this provision must be financed 
and are , accordingly, passed on to the vehicle buyer in higher 
prices. 
Fuel ConserYation Measures 
Introduced following the 1973 Middle East crisis, initially as 
a means of saYing a strategic connnodity and quickly adopted as 
a device whereby rj.sing import prices of fuel may be financed 
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and reduced, these measures govern both the availability of fuel 
and the rate at which it may be consumed. Al though 'greeted wj,th 
mixed feelings amongst consumers, manufacturers are worried for 
a number of reasons . F-lrstly, there is evidence that slower 
speed limits and restrictions on weekend motoring have, to some 
extent, slowed the motor vehicle replaceme!lt cycle ( especially 
passenger cars) resulting in lower retail volumes . Secondly , the 
ease and r apidi ty with vihich such measure s may be tightened or 
released he,s lead to a tardiness of respo!lse, based upon caution, 
on the part of manufacturers . Questions such as fUel tank size , 
engine size availability , pOl"ler output, transmission gearing, 
interior comort an<;l. trim levels all relate back to slower 
maximum speeds and restricted fuel sales and all concern 
investment decisions . 
Labour Legislation/Manufacturing Legislation 
In addition to the above constraints, the average motor company 
to which it mus t recognise, interp~et and conform to all manner I is a business of no small complexity. Accordingly, the extent 
of legislation gove~T.ing its day- to-day manufacturing, fina~ci!~ 
and trading operations is similarly complex. I,<ul ti-nntional 
manufacturers have a particularly unenvi£ble position in that they 
must be "good citizens" of two societies. Often this r esults 
in their having to operate within the bounds of social and leGal 
1 
requirements locally which, wi thin the eyes of the societ:o of 1 
their overseas parent compp.ny, a!'e reGarded ' as both obnoxious arld I 
rul i nsult to human rights. Indeed, there is every reason to 
believe that such companies' "balancing act" between local and 
overseas requirements is likely to become increasingly difficult. 
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cost Pressures 
Again, by virtue of the compl exity and diversity of a motor 
company's operations it is subject to more cost pressure s than 
is the case in many other more simple businesses . Given a 
grov~ng market of a substantial size, component price increases 
• 
are diluted over long production runs . Locally , the market 
is both small relative to the level o'f industry investment end 
has contracted painfully . Costs cannot be easily absorted by 
a business under such conditions ~~d must , in consequence, be 
passed on to the consumer via higher prices at a retail level -
all of which serve t o limit even further the ability of another 
slice of marginal buyers to acquire a new vehicle. The rising 
cost/declining revenue squeeze thereby becomes progressively 
wo=ying. 
Competitive Pressures 
Given the exis tence of an over-traded local new vehicle market 
not surprising that market competition becomes increasip~ly 
intense . Moreover , this competition is not based wholly upon the 
ideal "marketing concept" stance of superi or pr oduct features 
relative to rivals. Instead , price becomes the parrunount trading 
platfonn via dealer-offered "discounts~ ' to prospective buyers. 
Continuous price-wars are fought at a retail dealer level . A 
point of note is that dealers themselves lad, the required funds 
to offer such disCOQ~ts. Instead, manufactur ers provide dealera 
wi th "playing money" simply to close deals and keep their plant 
volumes up to cover o~erheads - the r evenue squeeze deteri or ates 
further. A manufacturer unable to reba.te dealer sales cannot get 
into t he game and suffcrs accordingly. However, any r etate 
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policy is equally certain to depress his ul tima,te revenue flow . 
Moreover , it is not un.loeard of for a dealer to divert rebate funds 
into alternative directions, away from the showroom bargaining 
centre, thcreby enriching himself at the expense of his s\),pplier . 
• 
Market Stagnati'on 
The market growth prospects held out during the 1960s and early 
1970s, have given way in the post 1973/4 period to what is , in 
effect, market stagnation characterised by aLnor rises and sudden 
declines in retail volumes . Vehicle markets are easily segmented 
i nto t\"10 broad classes; viz. a Growth Segment and a Replacement 
Segment. The Growth Segment comprises first-time and additional 
vehicle buyers whilst the latter is made up of buyers replacing 
an earlier vehicle . The market will , of course , ei ther expand or 
contract at the rate at whi ch first-time buyers enter i t, 
existing buyers buy second , third or fourth vehicles ' and at the speed 
at which they replace their current vehicle . Under current 
condi t ions every class of buye'r has been subj ected to depressionary 
inf luences . First- time buyers , who traditionally comprj,se young 
earners, have been tiITning to second- hand vehicles or new motor 
cycles i n response to the price of new vehicles rising out of 
their gr asp . Additional vehicles are 'essentially luxuries wi thin 
t he private sector and are acquired by businesses to augment and 
expand operations - economic conditions have cut these back . 
Finally , as has been mentioned, replacement buyers have tended to 
keep their present vehicles l onger - thereby slowing down the 
replacement cycle whilst others , faced with the realisation that 
their chosen vehicle is now out of their reach if bought new, 
have moved out of the new vehicle market g,ltogether by acqu,irir.g 
t heir chosen Yf,hicle used at a lower price. 
4' 
In1'ormal Constraints 
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Essentially two key informal constraints are present wi thin the 
industry at this time. The point to recognise is their extreme 
closeness and inter-relationship with one another. 
Social Consciousness/Overseas Poli t 'ical Pressure Avoid2!1ce 
This constraint relates exclusively to those motor manufacturers 
having overseas parent compa.'lies. As Vias mentioned earlier a 
finely held balance must be maintained between the legal 
requi rements of both host and parent societies. Given the 
unpalatability of much of South Africa's social organisation 
to overseas public opinion, parent company m2!1agement is open 
to irrege - damaging publicity of the worst kind. Overseas 
directi ves to local management therefore give rise to a number 
of actions ranging from the genuinely beneficial at one extreme 
to questionable corporate window- dressing at the other . Each 
must be considered upon its merits but examples of both types 
include, provision of low-cost Black/Coloured housing, subsidised 
canteens, donations to the Urban Foundation, sports sponsor-ship, 
scholarships and the promotion of Blacks to supervisory positions. 
This l atter is a controversial i ssue even when measured in terms 
of simpi'e economics . In many instances even Black graduates 
lack the essential background and 'breadth of worldly experience 
found in comparably educated Europea.'ls. As a consequence, on-the-
job creativity and initiative is, in many instances, lackir~ 
relative to a comparable European, whilst training ti"Jle until 
competence is acquired' may be prolonged. !':ven so there is the 
real danger that an indifferent Black i119.Y be promoted. into a 
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"" managerial function thereby fulfilling the window-dressing 
requirement but bringing i n his wake problems of sub- st8.."1dard 
performance and subordinates resistance. Finally, corporate 
philanthropy on the part of local members of multi- nationals is 
expensive, dOLlbly so when the depressed conditions of today 
• 
prevail. In essence, such operati~ns are burdened by additional 
overheads lI'nich are entirely absent from wholly local rivals 
thereby providing the latter wi th an operating advantage . (An 
example of typical corporate Black employee benefits of the 
types discussed with useful guages of the costs incurred is 
gi ven .for General Motor s in Appendix II.) Finally , if the true 
objective of such actions is to appease the indignation of 
vocal protest groups overseas (and such corporate concern for 
employees 'is suspiciously high when voices are raised most 
stridently in protest) there is no evidence that such actions 
are genuinely abl e to sway t.>te opinion of foreign pressure groups. 
south Africa, rightly or wrongly, is cast in the role of the 
world 1 s Vlhi te over Black bogeyma"1 and it will take more than 
golf courses amongst the Port Elizabeth municipal dump and 
night clubs to change that status . 
Pol itical Uncertainty/Economic Threats 
Finally there is the very real issue that the local motor 
manufacturing industry has i nvested many millions of rands in 
a society which the events of the l ast three years have shown 
to be deeply divided on racial grounds and increaSingly isolated 
from the benevolence and tolerance of traditional allies and 
trading partners. The time is not feu' distant when South -,\.frica 
will remain as the sole Vlhi te- r uled nation ir:: Africa - a hi&>tly 
exposed position indeed. Accordingly, a motor mE,nufactUJ.'cr 
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faced with Phase III of the Local Content Progrannne to ' invest 
RIOni in an engine block plant with an economic life of 20 years 
faces a very real dilemma yet one in which the exact form and 
magnitude of the known threat continues to evade full perception . 
There are few industries wi thin South Africa ID()re susceptable 
than the motor industry to the implementation of a United 
Nations tro.de embargo, chc.efly via components a11d oil imports. 
Althou?~ so~e form of hybrid vehicle could continue to be built 
from the output of established plant, the austere petrol 
rationing which would, of necessity, be introduced would 
effectively dismember the industry as it is known today -
quite literally Vii thin a few short weeks. Even ' in the event 
of such sa~ctions not being forthcoming there is still t~e real 
prospect (admittedly long- term) of a smouldering situation 
across five main borders and fierce flashes of urban terrorism, 
all of which viewed through the telescope of an overseas investor 
do not make for a comfortable sensation. 
In overall sU1IUllary of this passing review of motor industry 
constraints to Corporate Planning it may be stated that the major 
limi tations over time will be as stated below. 
Formal Informal 
Local Content Programme Political Uncertainty/Economic Threats 
Competitive Pressures 
Market Stagnation 
I 
. I 
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2.4.2. Profit/Risk Spread 
Having outlined various prof'i t policies and environmental 
constraints with reference to the motor industry it is now 
possible to direct attention towards the remaining open question; 
viz. the size of the compa!".,)', s' profits - in othler words its 
Profit/Risk Spread. 
In posing t..l:lis question, the l:'ost ready 8.."lswer nay be sought 
amongst only one group of persons, namely , the owners of the 
business, However, when determining the specific level of profit 
the business should ean1 , t..l:le most senior management group 
(assuming that o\',nership and management vests in ,tVlO distinct 
bodies ) possess the power t o manipulate the f orm corporate 
profits may 'take. 
Corporate investors, in effect, purchase or require an expectation 
of a future stream of returns . Accordingly, it must not be 
considered amiss if an attempt is made to quantify these 
expectations . Expressed as a conjtL'lction between the profit 
motive and the corp,orate objective the issue may take the form of 
the statement appearing immediately beloVl . 
The amount of profit which must be generated by a business 
concern must be of such a magnitude that the reasonable profit 
expectations of the concern's O\'ffiers are fulfilled , Hence 
any profit target will be a direct consequence of that body ' s 
ambitions. • 
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/my investment alternative creates a trade-off situation whereby 
measures of return are traded- off again3t measures of ' risk. At 
one extreme , low risk mar be sought at the expense of low returns 
whilst at the other, high returns at, the cost of high risk are 
co\xrted . The attj.tudc adopted by any single investor 'hill, quite 
naturally, be a dired function of; his ability to perceive 
al terna ti ve in ve stment opportlmi ti es, hi S "g8!llbling instincts" 
development and reward needs. 
In graphical form the attitude towards Risk and Return for a 
typical 'investor group may be couched in terms of the diagram 
appearing below. 
'.0 
RISK 
O ·7S -
0·1$ - - - - -
0,>5 - --
+---~ ______ L_ ________ ~ __ _L __ L_ __________ _ 
0 ·0 >< I )(~ X'r X S 
RETUt<N 
The horizontal axis exp2'esses units of Return attached to 8Jl 
investment alternative. Vertically, a subjective measu.rement of 
Risk is stated whereby such risk is expressed in terms of the 
probability of that risk occurring . 
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At level 0.25 on the Risle axis, investors would be prepAred to 
accept a 25';; chance of not receiving a retrn:n of Xl •. Stated 
another way, a return of Xl must be offered to induce these 
particular investors to talce up an investment bearing a risle 
burden of 25%. Similarly, at point 0.5 (the chance of gain or 
• 
loss is 50 - 50). the return- inducement lies at X2. 
Of note is the fact that as the risle- Ioading is raised to or 
in excess of 0.5, an over-proportionate increase in return-
expectation will be der:tanded. 
. 
Beyond a certain level of Risk it is possible to hypothesize t hat 
no increase in Return will cause an investor to accept the 
investment. The curve will, as a consequence, approach but never 
touch the level of 100% Risk which, by definition, offers no 
chance of any Return - as would be the case in respect of pre- 1917 
Imperial Russian railway stocles. 
Having now established the broad constraints of an investffient 
model it is possible to introduce the idea of there being a range 
of investment alternatives open to investors and that the investment 
attitudes held by multi- national corpor~te investors differ, to 
some degree, from those of the general class of investors discussed 
up to this point. 
An available range of investment may comprise "Safe" (e .g. gilt-
edged securi tie s), "Moderately Safe" (e . g. maj or and continuing 
plant investment wi thin the existing sphere of operations) and 
"Risle Bearing" (e.g. the investment in and creation of a new 
branch of operations within a heretofore untapped and largely 
unqu£l.'1tified market) al ternati ves. The issue is of some im!Jjrtanee 
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by virtue of the fact that the motor industry is, by nature, 
capital-intensive involving the continuous weighing and sifting 
of investmcnt- profi t opportunities. (Few areas of the world have 
l.abour-intensive automotive assembly operations - two of the most 
well-lmown are Malasi a and the Phillipines where. labour costs are 
low and market volumes too low to warrent a high degree of E.utoLlation . 
Modifying the diagram appearing on page 48 , the three- fo l d array of 
investments may be depicted thus : 
' .0 
BI --1-- - I 
I 
0 ·7$ 
o ·~ 
II 
O ·.l.S 
8:1. 
A 
I 
I 
I 
--j 
I 
_ _ I~ 
I 
Ao RI R :I. 
The relationship between A and RI illustrates that of Safe 
~ETURN 
investments Vlhere the Risk (A) is knovm to be present at exceedingly 
l ow l evels whilst (B, R2) portrays the positioni ng of Moderately 
Safe investments. 
Once the level of Risk present is perceived to lie in excess of B 
the opporUL~~ty becomes increasingly reg~xded as a speculative 
venture where high and quick n,turns are prized . A new company 
will, inevitably , find itself vQthin the risk range in exc~ss of 
B and its risk-loading will only decline once that company has 
successfully proved iteelf. The new-comp=y inv(:Etr:lent bcdy will, 
accordin,cly, be forced to accept two clas.scs of Risk. 
, 
I 
! 
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Firstly , there is the Risk of business failure wi t!lOut the saving 
grace of a high Return expectancy . Risle will be of the order of 
Bl which rhould be compensated for by Return expectancy Rol ; in 
fact, Return expectancy may only be RD . 
• 
Secondly, the new-business investment body accepts the Ris}: that 
if the business does establish itself , its risk-loading lIill 
actually decline to en acceptable l evel. Such an acceptable level 
rests at B2, R implying "that " investor ' s t§>.rget return is R which, 
if de Sired , =ust be weighed against a perceived level of Risk 
equivalent to B2 . 
The above discussion of new-business investment is offered as a 
"br oad guide to the issues and concerns facing" ~ business " enterprise 
in its early dBYs. Its inc1usion is intended to rel ate not so 
much to new motor manufacturers I . entry to the "industry but, 
r ather , to those circumstances which may be expected to prevail 
when a "new" company is created by the merger bctween or acquisition 
of t wo or more existing m~~ufacturers in r esponse to the earlier-
discussed pressures towards rationalisation within the i ndustrJ . 
(The creation of Sigma out of Chrysler and l':azda is a case in 
point and will, in time , make an int eresting study in its own 
right . ) " 
In the case of an established m~~ufac turer i ts current investor-
body will formulate a broad policy to come to terms VIi th the question 
of its prospective Return/Risk relationship. Assume , for example, 
the company is extremely cautious and conservative . For oajor 
investment opportunities (for example , totnlling in 8xcess of Rl m) 
, 
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its Return/Risk curve ma.y adopt the form depicted below, 
0 ·5 -
• 
B A ' 
O 'L - - - - - - -,;:...-,------ --------T\'----
A 
0·0 
• Xl. 
c. 
. I 
. I 
Any chance of failure in excess of 20% ~~ll be rejected irrespective 
of attendant Returns . Investment 10 is, for example, too risky 
1 
whereas any investment at or under AA would be considered . 
Naturally, most favourable consideration Vlould be given to 
' opportunities within the bounds of AIBCn (with a hypothetical 
ideal at n) . 
When choosing between alternatives, that opportunity lying clooest 
1 2 to D will , all things being equal , be selected e . g. I over I . 
Translated into a Corporate PlruLDir~ mode as it applies to cur 
sel ected motor company the emphasis and criterion involved in 
investment selection is predOminantly one of risk avoidance . That 
is to S~T the curve A B A' does not envelop high levels of risk. 
Extreme cE.cltion charactel'iSes "-:t.ts attitude towards investment 
projects - even to the extent of placing risk- evasion before 
return-eApectation. For example, any investment project which is 
likely to have a pay-back period in excess of three years is 
a.utomatically eliminated from further consideration . 
I 
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Rationale for such a policy is as f ollows: 
Investment projects of the type under discussion !O.re enormously 
costly and whose ' econom:i.c life may not be very l engthy . To 
tool-up to produce a car-line, at 1978 prices, may r un to anything 
up t o R10m to' be recovered wi thin as little a space of t ime 
as 5 t o 6 years . Yet the investment decision may be a cracial 
one. By' not investing the company may, in effec t, be opting 
out of an entire segment of the market . 
Under current economic conditions sources of loan funds adopt 
a highly cautious stance when dealing with motor companies . 
Accordingly, there is a continuous effort on the part of the 
latter to appear prudent, stable borrowers, 'a posture 
reflected in the type of projects undert~~en . 
A major source of local motor industry finance, to those 
manufacturers having overseas parents, i s their parents 
themselves. Again , stringent evaluation criteria are applied. 
to all requests for finance from such subsidiaries towards 
Which senior local management react by adopting only the most 
careful and level-headed of attitudes in ~0 e~ort 
to ensure that their request for funds will be readily 
granted . 
The motor manufacturer forming the subject of thi s paper, ~~en 
setting corporate profit objectives, s eeks to find and maintain R 
fine balance between Risk and Return ~ich reflects its'particul= 
desire to minimise the l evels of Risk which it perceives to be 
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present within the investment alternatives it entertains. 
Expressed another way, the solution to the problem or "What profit 
must be generated?" lies in a more precise problem definition -
"What is the maximum return and maximwn risk corporate investors 
are prepared to accept?" In this way not only it: ·:an· exact profit · 
objective derived but an indication is given of ·the lEmghts to 
which it is necessary to go to secure that objective . 
2 . 4 . 3. The Corporate Profit ' :otive - SUJr.lllary 
The concept of profit generation forms the very foundation of 
capitalistic business enterprise . For this reason it becomes the 
prime, unalterable objective towards which the Corporate Plal'lning 
process is directed . 
Moreover, the fact that profit is the incentive motivating 
investors means that the t,,·o key practical concerns of How 
·and How Much profit is to be generated· demand irwestor ' s l'isk and 
reward expectations be considered. 
Profit Policy, provides corporate guidelines as to what are 
and what are not acceptable methods by which theCompany's 
profits are to be earned. Such policy depends upon the economi c, 
social, legal and moral constraints of society. A policy attempting 
to create a positive bala."lce between environIllental limitations and 
constraints on the one hand and its profit objective on the other 
is not only optimal in a moral sense but also in a workable sense 
too. 
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Profi t/nisk Spread seeles to de t ermine the size of investor's profit 
,. 
expectations . Two issues are of importance. Firstly , the level 
of Return (for a given body of investors) is largely a f unction of 
the degree of Risk investors perceive to be attached to the 
• business . As the level of perceived Risk climbs , so too must 
Return - often to an over-proportionate degree . Secondly , the 
business must take steps to entirely uncover investor expectations 
as t hey' exist amongst the bodies of current a~d potential 
investor s ~~d then adopt a suitable stance. 
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2.5.1 ~rhe Concept of Strate(i.t 
A corporate profit objective constructed on '~he basis of a sound 
Profit Policy and in acc ordanc e with an investor - d eri ved Profi t/ 
Risk Spread represents a major Corporate Planning step • 
• 
The simple description of a task or objective, hcvlever, does not 
systematically indicate what actions must be coc::nleted or YI~J?.t 
efforts expend ed L~ order to attain it. 
If it is accepted that to fulfil its profit objective the business 
must act aYld interact with its market then what is reauired is a set 
of guiding pr:i.!cciples, drawn up in l:i.!ce with co'"porate Profit Policy, 
which serve to direct the particular st~ld to be adopted vis-a-vis 
t:1e market . 
------
Profit objectives will be sought and fulfilled l'Iith:i.!c a highly 
complex market environment through effective product positioning 
wi thin vi.able, defined markets . 
An accurate expression whi.ch denotes the broad, overall Corporate 
Pl anning action for both the location and quantification of viable 
markets and the positioning of suitable product lines therein is 
"Corporate Strategy," 
" In the absence of strategy, there are no rul es to guid e the 
search for neVi opportunities, both LTlside ar..d outside the 
firm. LTlternally, the research and develop~ent department 
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has no guidelines for its contribution to diversification. 
The external acquisition department similarly lacks focus. 
Thus the firm as a whole either passively waits for ~pport-
unities, or pursues a ' buclrnhot! ,search technique." * 
Corporate Strategy atteillpts to answer the ~Iin questions facL~g 
the business, namely; Vlnat product? and Vlhat market? Together 
these issues beco~e what may be called the StrategiC Question 
which floVis from the fact that corporate profit potential is present 
witljin an infinite array of product/market opportunities. The 
effective util ization and exploitation of each opportunity is , 
naturally, limited to the company ' s ability to apply adequate 
resources to each. 
Expressed another way, the answer to the co?':pany ' s Strategic 
Question will lie in its adoption of a discriminatory stand whereby 
scarce corporate resources are concentrated upon a relatively small 
f i el d of opportunities which, at one extreme , are gambles merely 
holding out the promise of adequate profit, and at the other, 
r epresent genuine, rational ventures allowing the fullest use of 
the company!s best strengths . 
Whatever strategy is adopted will have its roots firmly embedded 
within the past and current structure ~~d status of the busir-ess . 
* H.J. Ansoff Corpo!ate Strateg, 
Pelican Books, 1971. pp 102. 
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In other words, there will al\"lays be some "common thread" 
between the old and the new strategy. The greater the width 
of that thread, the more secure a~d less risky the strateGY venture 
will be, assuming the old was to some extent viable: 
In su=ary, it is possible to state that "Strategy" involves: 
(1) The acceptance that a corporate profit objective merely 
indicates the results to be obtained; no direction is 
prov:ided as to how this task is to be accomplished. 
(2) Profit results may only be forthcoming from t he application 
of a company's resources to market opportunities . 
( 3) The linking-factor between a c·ompany and its market is its 
produc t line . Accordingly, the key strategic concern 
centres upon Produc t and lilarket consid erations. 
( 4) The range of product/market opportunities i s so broad as 
to deny any firm the chance to follow each. Selec t ively 
is requir ed . Strategy provides the parameters of the 
selction process. 
( 5) Every strategy will share a viable common thread with the 
company's past and current malee-up. Absence of any such 
common factor creates a speculative situation with steep· 
odds against success. 
2.5.2. 
2.5.2. 
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Strategic AlternativeG 
There are four basic product/market alterations, viz: 
Existing products in existing markets 
(MARKET PENETRATIm) 
Existir,g products in new markets 
(MARKET DEVELOP.!E'TT) 
New products in existing markets 
(PROWCT DEVELOE.!&'fT) 
New products in new markets 
(DIVERS ll'ICAT ION) 
• 
All hil1ge upon the idea of a company's product strengths 
and marketing expertise forming a common thread between 
the present and the future. 
(a) Market Penetration 
Such a strategy commits the business to earning its 
profit objective via the dint of increasing its profitability 
within its present market with its existing product lL'les. 
Bra'ld share must be conquered from the shares of rivals. 
Ri sk .. levels are low for no strategic change is c«lled for 
whilst a very strong common thread exists. 
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A major drawback of ouch a strategy is evident where 
the market is a well- established one having a high degree 
of competition - brand share conquest is both expensive 
• 
and transitory. Moreover, a common compounding hurdle to 
success is found when the company ' s , product line has lost 
its first f l ush of youth or is well adva'1.ced j n the growth 
phase 'of its life cycle. (The import~'1.ce of this,fact 
will become evident when Corporate Strategy vis- a-vis the 
motor manufacturer is discussed.) 
(b) Product Development 
This alternative will be adopted in response to the expectation 
of profits derived from the introduction of new products 
serving to replace and/or. surpass those within ~'1. existing 
market. As such, it is a common, successful strategic option 
whose attractiveness is enhanced by the r easonabl e levels of 
risk present. 
Product Development represents an acknowledgement that , with 
the passage of time, even the most carefully marketed products 
begin to enter the maturity phase and decline phase of their life-
cycles. A competitive market will be characterised by rivals 
introducing a continuous stream of revised and innovative products 
which force established product lines into obsolescence. Moreover, 
buyer attitudes and pm'chase preferences shift with time; facts 
which further serve to dampen and depress the sales growth of out-
of-turJe pl'oducts . 
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Aga:in, this strategy is pert:inent to the motor :industry 
and will be referred to later. 
• 
2.5.2. 
(c) l.Tarket Develop:nent 
Here an existL'1g Product is directed towards a r-ew market 
thereby expand:ing the physical number of prospective customer~ . 
The def:inition of a "new" market varies greatly; ra.'1ging from 
simple geographic or regional dist:inctions through to and :including 
the demographic, attitv~e and benefit segmentation of buyer clusters . 
Risk burdens present will tend to be a function of the degree of 
similarity the new market has to the exist:ing one . Naturally, 
the more similar a new market is to the old, the less incremental 
risk (and sales volume) .there is likely to be. Even so, 
relative to Product Development, this strategic alternative 
may be regarded as bear:ing a heavier risk of failure by virtue 
of its reducing the strength of the corporation' s common expertise 
between the old and the new ventures. -
As before, this strategy is pertinent to our later discussion. 
I ~ 
, 
Diversifica.tion 
In spite of its endurLYlg attraction to manage~ent theorists ann 
practitioners, the very fact tha.t this stl'ate.:;y launches tile 
business :into a positio:1 Vlhere both product and market are rlew 
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demands of it the highest of risk-premiums. 
Attendant risk is the single over-ridL~g consideration in 
respect of a diversification opportuni~!. So much so that, 
bearing in mind the motor industry's essential prud~~ce a~d 
ca~tion, this strategy really has no place withL~ our current 
consid era tion. Indeed, it is true to say that whereas 
businesses may diversify into the motor industry (e.g. !~essina 
(Transvaal) Development Compa~y and DatSQ~) it is rare for the 
motor industry to move outside the bounds of its current operations. 
(Ford tiotor Company in the United States diversified into electronics 
(Philco) and mass urban trrulsport during the 1960's but, illustratively 
enough, axed both ventures L~ the wake of the 1973/4 rec ession .) 
By virtue of its variety, special nature a~d total absence from the 
history of the chosen local motor manufacturer this strategy will 
not be given any further attention . 
Recognition must be paid to the fact that the distinction between 
strategic alternatives is by no means clear-cut . At what point 
does Market Penetration become Market Develop~ent? or Product 
Development , Market Penetration? The issue is a crucial one 
by virtue of the fact that their differing natures and implications 
demand quite a Q~iquely different orientation and focus. MoreoveI', 
of added importance is the question of a stratebY's lifespan. That 
is, the expected dUJ:ation of a partl.cular strategy's appropriateness 
L 
i 
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ru1d effectiveness before environmental shifts render its 
replac ement mru1datory. 
• 
2.5.3. The Stratep,ic LifesDru1 
Mry compru1Y ' s planning period must not be thought of as a rigid 
apportion::Jent of the future without attention being directed to 
what might be termed "strategic decay." 
From the very J:1oment that a strategy has been adopted it will be 
acted upon by both favourable and adverse environmental circlm-
stanc es. Add,i tionally, the implementation of a partlcular strategy 
brings in i ts train sets of circumstar-ces whose influence reac t 
upon the environment even to an extent well beyond the strategy's 
effective life. (As would be the case where a 5 year strategy 
causes the establishment of pla'1t having an economic life of, say, 
8 years. ) 
To elaborate, it may be said that a Corporate JOllan (and, hen-oe , 
Corporate Strategy) has ar- involvement with two time-spru1s. 
Firstly , a Primary planning period of, for example , 5 years 
within which time a clear set of intent ions , relating to the 
near future, are transmuted into operating pl~ns for all 
functional areas. 
This, Primary, period' s concerns relate to typicall y I , 
• 
• 
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The presentation of an action-orientated plan detailing 
that which is to be performed in the near ·fUture • 
• 
Identifying annual goals • 
Establishing control, "perfOl'lllanCe to objective" yardsticks. 
Ace ept&'1.c e of a l oss in flexibility. 'The business becomes 
locked · into the actioning of earlier strat~gic planning 
decisions which it . is powerless to override in the short 
t erm. 
Allocating resources to de'inite activities, for example, 
annual departmental budgets, trainjng schedules, product 
development a'1.d competitor - action monitoring; 
Administration of a capital expenditure and investment programme. 
(A programme prepared in great detail and which is possibly the 
most precisely described area of the Primary planning period.) 
Product management action . Product life cyles are understood 
and their product-implications mapped. 
Resear ch and development goal-setting. 
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Capital and financial structuring includjngj dividend policy, 
loan financing , creditor policy, debtor policy, share issues and 
so forth. • 
Secondly, the business may pay heed to a Secondary pl~~~1g period 
following the Primary interval. 
'Dhe Secondary plann:Ll'lg period ' s importance is often over-looked. 
The ilIlmediate reaction, when planning, is to discount the necessity 
of considering the seemingly U1l'luantifiable and uncertain future 
existent beyond the Primary period . Our belief is that to do so 
is a grave error. 
Consideration of a Secondary planning period is justifiable on 
t he groQ~ds that , although it is not a field for the formulation 
of detailed planning , it does represent an unlimited expa...'lse of 
time within which corporate planners are free to consider anything 
likely to have a bearing upon the business beyond the currently 
'luantified planning horizon. 
As has been stated, the buSiness, as 'an est.a~l~shment, is intended 
to be a long-lived ~nstitutiQn capable of growing and adopting 
ceaselessly within an ever-changing series of environments. 
Logically, therefore, although a 5 year Primary , planniilg 
consideration may be adequate for detailed operating planning, 
attention mus t be devoted to the even longer-term. 
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Moreover, by becoming limited to a Primary plmming time boundary , 
there is an automatic reaction to ignore or playdown elements 
present within the present task environment whose.potential to 
foster or limit the com:'!;'}fY ' S operations will really only be 
felt 6," 8 or even 10 years hence . 
As a hypothesis it may be ad vanced that whereas companies and, 
in this case, the motor industry have been fairly successful in 
c oming to" grips with Primary planning, it is Secondary: planning 
considerations which get ~Iept under the carpet. For exampl e , 
"the typical motor company tends to link its operating strategy 
to a five year cycle which, in this co~~try and Europe denotes 
the model life of a particvlar product line . Beyond this 
time-sp~~ the major concern of most manufacturers would appear 
to relate to those of styling. For exampl e , vehicle stylists 
in 1978 may be expected to be working upon styling alternatives 
for the 1988 model year . Engineering development, on the other 
hand, i s not so outward looking. Although it i s t rue to say that 
the ~rious manufacturer's engineering research operations are 
. - . 
working out to 10 years or more ahead, their orientation when doing 
so i s rather upon how' to produce, more effectively , at_lower costs 
the same basic product as is made today. In addition , 
by far the majorit7 of such work is actually directed to immediate, 
short-term correction- of defects present within the current product; 
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" 
What is beln" :L£jJ:lOrcd wi thill this industry is the actual future, 
not of the ina ividu9.1 separate compa.'1ies, but of the industry as a 
whole. All visible planning efforts are of · the .Primary kind being · 
based purely upon limited 1'eactions to lmown future trends. Cars 
are being built ar.d designed so as to be mor e economical, more 
comfortable a.'1d les s costly to run and more competitive vis-a-vis 
rival's similar efforts. There is little evidence of any serious 
consideration of Secondary concerns. Theodore Levitt ill his classic 
Innovation In ;,:arketing exposed the need to overcome self-lilniting 
"Management IJyopia". Vlher eas Levit t was writing in the early 1 960 ' s 
in an effor t to make companies plan their products wit h the market 
in mind and whereas today ' s corporate planner has taken this lesson 
to hearti what has generally been overlooked i s that Levitt Vias not 
speaking of individuaJ. compa."lies. but of the future viability of entire 
industries . The future of an industry is not secured by the dL"lt of 
its members imple~entL"lg five-year Pr~~r plans but, i nstead, by an 
an active , obj ective assessment of the L'1dustry's future. 
"It's a simple fact that in twenty years t here won't be any oil 
l eft ." 
"But hasn ' t your company sought to diversify L'1 to other interests? 
Didn't Shell, for example, advertise a while back i ts new involvement 
in coal?1I 
"We haven't and yes they did. We 're trying though and I'm not 
sure that Shell have been too successful. The whole industry's 
• 
in the same boat, we're too involved in a dead resource and we've 
left it too late to get out. :' Maybe five, ten years ago there'd 
have been a chance." * 
The above conversation crystallizes the urgent requir,ement for 
Secondary planning within all industries and amply describes the 
chronic inadequacy of the motor industry to even consider the 
broad environmental trends affecting it. Having beautifully 
styled and low fuel-consuming vehicles is a laudable Primary 
objective but at a higher plane, in Doomsday terms, may cause 
the demise of an entire industry within a petrolless society. 
Clearly, for an industry as sensitive as the motor industry, 
Primary planning is little advance over the annual budget . The 
true requirement is for genUine "long-range" planning and planning 
Implementation. 
In concept the idea is to cast into the future as wide a net as is 
huma~ly possible to identify anything which may, firstly, be 
relevant to the L~dustry's purpetuation and only secondly, to the 
longevity of the business. Once the types of time ,horizon pertinent 
to the business are identified it is then possible to project the 
strategic implications of such findings into the dimension of time. 
----------------------------------'------
Personal L~terview with e. senior member of a l",ading oil compa~y, 
Joha~esbvIg, June 1978. 
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The all-encompassing nature of a strategic decision, whereby 
ground rules are established for the thousands of decisions, 
actions, problems, opportunities and day- te'-day. concerns which 
flow from it, renders it very much a long-term entity . 
Strategy cannot be changed, amended or reversed as the de~Y)ds 
of the moment dictate. 
Conceptually , a corporate strategy is capable of enduring for 
a very long time indeed. Wi tness a business having a diver si-
fication strategy ; once a merger with a second company in a 
different industry has gone through, the acquiring business 
will be tightly locked into its strategic option . At the 
concl usion of its Primary planning period, the affects of the 
merger will continue to shape . and mould the corporation I s 
structure, strengths and weaknesses . 
In the long-ter m any cor porate strategy will become part of 
what might be termed a "Strategic Revolution" by being subject-
ed to a process termed "strategic decay" . In essence, this 
process serves to describe the movemen~ of the firm ' s strategic 
direction from an initial strategy to a second strategic stance 
and hence switching to a third which may, conceivably, be 
identical to that adopted in the first place. Moreover , the 
strategy towards which the business is most likely to return 
is that of Market Penetr ation - to an extent that this strategy 
may even be described as being an " equilibr·ium" strategic option , 
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meaning that any movement away from it is an abnormal ac tion 
which is corrected by environmental pressure. By drawing 
upon exampl es from the motor indus try and oil indus try an 
• 
attempt will be made to show both the form of the Strategic 
Revolution as it occurs in the practical world and t hat it is 
a flow of action-inducing guidance rather than a series of 
discontLYluous decisions. 
Firstly a natural corollary of the StrategiC Revolution is the 
concept of the Product Life Cycle where the decay of a product ' s 
appeal is replaced by the switching betvleen strategies. 
Diagram A will be us ed to illustrate the process of a Strategic 
Revol ution . On the horizontal axis is plotted Time whilst, on 
the vertical, is a scale of 0 ~lOo% whi ch denotes the degree of 
familiarity, novelty, or , by implication, risk-uncertaulty present 
within the minds of plannir.g management when dealing with any 
particular product/market str ategy . Step One is to ascertain, for 
the plannipg group, the company ' s Uncertainty Threshold . That is, 
the division which identifies a product/market stance wherein they 
feel that there .is no major uncertainty present. Typically, all 
strategies of Market Penetration, whereby an establ ished product is 
marketed more intensively to an established buyer group, will fall 
within the range 0 - 25% as this strategy provides a product/market 
stance with which the company is most familiar and is less open to 
major risk. Accordingly, therefore, during the period A, B a strategy 
of Market Penetration prevails. 
In Step 2, during the period B, C a new strategy (e.g. Product 
Development - NeVI Product in an Existing Market) is formulated and 
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and implemented launching the company into a new set of circumstances 
- , 
which are rapidly perceived to be significantly different from those 
experienced during A, B - new ways of doing business must be learnt, 
new ways of communicating with consumers must be triea and a speedy 
appreciation of the "newness" or novelty of the implications of t.l-je 
revised strateeJ become apparent amongst members of the company at all 
levels. Between points C 8-Yld D the novelty of developing and marketing 
new products is most marked. The two problems to overcome are, firstly, 
t o ensure the product is acceptable t o consumers and, secondly, to 
communicate to consumers that the company now makes products of this new 
type - effective, thrusting marketing is required . Step 3, or the 
per iod D, E is evident when the first flush of newness has worn off the 
strategy, the market and the company's efforts are beginning to make 
sense to management and the strategy has now established itself . 
Step 4, period E, F sees a return to a strategy of Market Penetration 
and exposes the full cycle of the Str ategic Revolution . During E , F 
the business will have steadil~come to grips with the marketing of its 
now-establish~ "neVi" products to the extent that there are no surprises 
l eft whilst natural compl acen"y has whittled down the earlier aggressive 
st8-YlC e. That is to say, durjng A, n the company sought to market more 
hand toothbrushes to mor e people, during B,C" Ii strategy of moving int'o " the 
manufacture of el ectric toothbrushes was introduced which brought the 
company into a field where both product technology and competition 
(househol d durables) was new, C, D, E; finally, during E, F the 
c ompany's strategy has reverted to one of Market Penetration - the sale of 
more electric too thbrushes to" more users. 
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Examples drawn from real -worJ.d cond i tions are present in respect 
of the ~ternational oil companies who, during the past fifty years , 
have followed strategies of market penetration and pr0>1uct develop-
ment. Ther e have always been new petroleum pr oduc t users on tap; 
be they rrew car buyers, cOll!I:lercial aviation or oil-fired ships . 
StrateGies have always been relevant ; more opportunities to sell 
and new products to sell . In all l i kelihood the next f ifty years 
wi l l witness a change in strategy wi thin the LDdustry as changes in 
t he industr y substratum r ender tradi tiomiJ. strategi.es· out--of" step 
wi th constraints imposed by dwindling oil suppli es . Eventuall y, a 
new industry market· development or diversifi cation strategy may lead 
the industr y to an involvem~~t in coal technol ogy to the extent that 
t he pr edominant strategy wil l be one of market penetration again -
. the sale of more coal- based products. to more existing buyer s . By the 
same token, identical str ategies have been present within the motor 
industry except that by virtue of the lL~ted l ife span of any particUlar 
vehicl e line the strategic cycl e f or anyone company will continuousl y 
move f r om Market Penetrati on to one of Product or Market Development when 
a new product- line is introduced or a new ~ket is exploited back to 
Market Penetrat ion once the product- line starts to become obsol escent and 
t he market fully establi.shed . Again , major environmental constraints 
existen t outside the PrL~ry pl~~ing period may force a major strategic 
switch in f uture - even to the extent of a wholesale diversification 
action . 
). 6 . Feedback Of Results And Pla=.inp: Control 
This section will attempt to describe two elements of the Cor porate 
Pl anning process. Firstl y, the requirement for plannL~g control 
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Vlill be reviewed. Secondly, the feedback ffild control systems 
utilized by the motor manufacturer :formi~ the subject of this 
~issertation will be critically appraised . 
• 
2.6.1. The Need for Planning Control 
Accurate, timeous feedback of operating results created by 
plans which have been transmuted into .action is anundoubted 
planning nece~sity . Corporate Pl~~er s must be able to assess 
the degree to which tl:eir efforts have been successful in meeting 
their company's objectives. Some yardstick must exist whereby 
results may be measured and expressed in some qua~titative form 
which will clearly and IWBffibigiously indicate whether a given 
objective ' s requirements \';ere me"t, surpasse'd of uncompleted . On 
the other hand, the ever-flui d nature of the corporation's 
operating environment demands that the company ' s planners must 
be able to read and monitor the same . By so doing their plans 
and contingency pl~~s will make it possible for their company to 
react quicy~y and appropriately to changed circumstances on an 
on-gOing basis. 
. 
In short a Corporate Planning control system i s both predictive and 
explanatory by nature and purpose . Predictive L~ that environmental 
events are monitored and assessed as to , their ability to influenc e 
the company's current planning actions and explanatory in that 
deeper inSights are gained in respect of; enviro~~ental circlmstances , 
such circumstanc 65 ' joint and individual impact upon planned actions 
and the actual results plans achieve. 
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At first sight it may be felt that the predictive and explanatory 
elements of control are quite remote or independent from one 
another. Conceptually they are; in practice, however, they 
• 
are unified via the medium of what may be termed corrective 
"corporate reaction". For example, .if it is clear that the 
company is not going to meet its target profit its control 
system should be able to provide ~~swers to the ke~ questions 
of, ":By how much will the target be missed?" and ".Why were our 
plans inadequate, what happened to cause this planning failur e?" 
Once these answers are forthcoming the all-important corporate 
reaction may be implemented; viz, "Now that it is known that 
profits will be down by R10C 000, what must be done to 
ensure that our efforts in the remaining eight months of the 
year make up for the inadequate performance in the first quarter?" 
In other words simply to l earn why plans went astray and by 
how much is insufficient . The information provided must 
l ead to some form of corrective action. (By the same token 
merely to act without information feedback is, in effect, to 
gamble ineffectively). The s equEnc-e-- 8J.ways remail'.E the same . . 
, 
--
~ 
Resul ts i-'> Explanation of f--'> React ion Feedback Results 
. Profits under . Entry of new com- . Advance launch date 
target by R100,000 petitor and con- of planned new 
sequent loss of product 
market penetration 
\ 
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The system of control outlined above has been termed the "Feedback 
Control Loop." A loop exists by vir tue of the fact that a company's 
Reaction in Period I is evaluated at the end of Period 2 i.e. the 
• 
results obtained by that reaction are fed-back ~~d deviations 
explained, in consequence a sec ond reaction on the part of the company 
then occurs which, in turn i s later assessed in Period 3. 
Engineering applications of the control loop principle to machines 
and processes are commonplace. For clarity a simple thermostat 
controlling the heat output of a domestic electric heater will be 
briefly described as a means of illustrating the loop principle 
in action . The thermostat, having been set to a standard temperature, 
measures the temperature of its surroundings and in the event of its 
being less than standard (a negative variance) switches the heater on 
( interpretation more heat is required and reaction':' switch the element 
on). Conversely, a greater than standard temperature (a positive 
variance) will cause the heater to be switched off. Thus, over time 
a standard temperature (profit, cost or revenue target) is attained via 
a series of on-off-on-off actions . 
As may be deduced, the two key requirements in any control system of this 
type are accuracy and speed. Accuracy ensures that the best possible 
information i s provided such that corporate reactions may stand the least 
chance of being misguided. Speed ensures that corporate r eactions may 
be implemented to correct or t ake advantage of a variance in as short a 
time as possible. 
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In practice there are very often situations whereby a trade-off must 
be made be,tween the need for control information accuracy and the 
need for quick reactions. In other words there will be occasions in 
which the maxim "It is better to do something now even if it may not 
be the right thing rather delay until better information is to hand " 
is applicable. This type of crisis reaction is undesirable but it 
i s frequently adjudged even more undesirable to delay reaction, in the 
mid st of a worsening Situation, until more and more accurate facts 
become available, the rationale being, that the delay between the impl ement-
ation of action and the feedback of results may be such that the postponement 
may render the awaited information obsolete anyway. 
An example of the above exists in respect of VolksVlagen I s actions during 
May - June 1 978 . Volkswagen had recently launched an all-new Audi 100 
r ange of cars. Their market surveillance, however , indicated that One 
of their major r i vals, Ford, was expected to launch an all-neVi Granada 
capable of competing with the Audi in addition to two additional market 
segments which the Audi, as i t stood, did not cater for . In consequence , 
Volkswagen rushed into production two additional revised Audi 100 models . 
Firstly, a version 1;0 compete with Ford's cheapest Granada and secondly, 
a super-luxury Audi 200 to counter ti1e Granada Ghia. In essence, 
Volkswagen ' s control proc ess was so finel y tlmed that the company was 
able to act quickly merely on the basis of leaked information concerning 
a rival ' s intention. 
Notice that the appropriateness of intr'oducing two new Audi derivatives 
I 
I 
I 
,I 
I 
I 
I 
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was not considered in the liGht of buyer wa~ts per se. Rather the pr:iJne 
consideration was to capitalize upon a rival's creating a stir of interest 
in the market before that stirring action had even been made . In other 
words, the control loop was short-circuited by moving directly from a 
Results Feedback (Ford's product plans) to a Reaction (introduce two 
Audi models). Notice too that the real impact or effectiveness of 
Ford's plans was not assessed; a gamble was taken in that because one 
of the largest of Volkswagen ' s rivals was planning to act this way the 
gamble would be successfully ·underwritten. (Naturally, when considering 
such defensive .or opportunistic reactions there must be 001 awareness on the 
part of the company's Corporate Planners that such short-term actions may 
bring about such a divergence from the Corporate Pl= as to actually work 
contrary to the best long- term interests of the comp=y.) 
To conclude, it is no exaggeration to. say that, for the motor manufacturer, 
possibly his most import=t control medium is that which pertains to product 
actions. This is so by virtue of the fact that the product represents 
the interface which exists between the comp=y =d its environment. 
Through this interface the bulk of a comp=y ' s threats, opportunities and 
controlling actions are communicated. Moreover, the actual control 
system must possess sufficient sensitivity to :iJnplement the required 
degree of reaction; too little will be ineffective whilst an excess will 
force the business from its plotted course. A further =d final control 
difficulty exists where the business is so highly structured =d central-
ized that the control administration machinery unduly rais es corporate 
r eaction time such that reactions are poorly tailored to operating needs . 
, 
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Organi zational complexity 8lso makes the reporting of performance 
deviations subject to levels of 'abstraction sufficient to strain from 
the live environment many of the shades and nuances of meaning which fully 
define and clarify the cause and extent of result-deviations. 
2 .6.2. A Motor lla'1ufacturer ' s Control System - A Description And Critique 
Two themes will be developed within this sub-section . Firstly, there 
is the s ituation whereby the major portion of Corporate Planning control 
is product orientated. Secondly, a review of the overall Corporate 
Planning control system will be attempted. 
As was stated above the manufacturer's product lines assume an important 
communications role. A market opportunity will be exploited by a product 
amendment whilst a threat will be met by some form of product action to 
which the market will, it is hoped, react favourably. At a Corporate 
Planning level, the Q'1derlying concern of this manufacturer relates to the 
product life cycles of each and ~ll of its vehicle models. 'This beine so 
the manufacturer will attempt to des i gn its Corporate Planning controls 
around the life cycles of its product lines as they may be expected to be 
influenced by changes in buyer preference and by compehtive c<ctions . 
The small family car market may be taken as an exampl e. L'1tense competitive 
pressure i s a notabie ,characteristic of this market segment. ~nolesale 
profi t margins are not great and no less than etght manufacturers offer 
comparably priced and specified products. In consequence the effective 
life-cycle of any .product te-:''1ds t-o be somewhat b:!'"ief. Once launched 
to the public a mod el moves swiftly through the growth and maturity 
stages to the decline phase of its life cycle. Typically, the decline 
phase is relatively prolonGed - the model is bolstered by retail discount-
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ing, minor re-styling and promotive actions. Of note is 
the fact that, in the majority of cases, a model's maturity 
phase is exceedingly brief. 
Diagram B is presented as a typical scenario which will be 
considered by Corporate Planning management when reviewing 
the performance of a small family car during its life. 
Eight control decision-points (A - H) are featured in the 
illustration, each will feature a Results Feedback, Explanation 
or Interpretation of Results and ,Reaction element . Naturally, 
in the diagram We shall be viewing the key control concerns of 
a product marketing plan with the benefit of hindsight . 
Sales 
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Penet-
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, 
, 
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1975 1976 
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Taking eauh identified decision-point briefly in turn 
A The previous model is withdrawn from t he market, its saJ.es 
drop rapidly as the manufacturing plant ceases production and 
dealer inventories are absorbed'. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
There will be no large stocks of ol d 
model s. 
Serious loss of profits will result if 
adequate stocks of the new model are 
not for thcoming. 
- Manufacturing plant is put on overtime to 
attempt to supply dealer inventories . 
B ':ehe situation all motor manufacturer s dr ead - a market gap , 
dealer stocks are totally inadequate and customers turn to 
rival companies . 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
An estimated loss of 1 0% penetration has 
occurred. 
Dealers are extremely disgruntled. 
Two major rivals are exploiting the situation 
by promotin,g heavily . 
Gap i s caused by supply shortages of components 
and ma.'1ufacturing problems. 
Establishment of a product " task-force" to 
solve ma.'1ufac turing diffj.cul ties. 
Supplies of compor.ents are airfreighted i n from 
Europe. 
• 
! 
! ; 
' i , 
I 
I 
i 
! 
I 
1 
I , 
, 
c 
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The situation begins to resolve itself. The shaded area 
represents the difference between what was orie inally planned 
and what actually occurred. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
Six months profits have been lost from the 
profit target. 
Manv£acturing difficulties are solved. 
- Difficulties remain in resp ect of component 
supplies. 
Wholesale margins must be raised on other 
product lines to maintain corporate profit-
abili ty. 
Wholesale prices on alternate products are 
raised. 
D Product supply is now free, the product finds a ready market 
accept.ance in line with its original forecast. Full maturity 
is only attained during the 1st quarter 1973. Thereafter the 
decline phase begins. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
Product launch expectations are fulfilled 
although delayed. 
- Pricing revision is required. 
Wholesale margins are raised on the new model 
and reduced on alterantive models . 
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E The post-launch plateau where the novelty of the product has 
worn-o:t:f but is still fresh enough to draw and hold a consistently 
high number of buyers throughout 1974. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
Stable product demand and free supply_ 
- No major rival actions expected during 
1974. 
Product i s at maximum potential profitability. 
Wholesale margins are rai.sed. 
F Impending rival product actions towards the end of 1974 threaten 
to reduce the products' market penetration . In addition, month 
over month penetration figures reveal a distinct downward dri:t:t. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
Loss o:t: penetration. 
Threatening competitor actions. 
Product has entered the decline phase .o:t: its 
lile cycle, ito decline will from now on become 
more rapid and pronounced . 
In terms of sheer product attributes it is no 
longer as attractive as rival o:t:ferings, it is 
becoming uncompetitive . 
- Reduce wholesale margins . 
Raise promotion expenditure. 
L~plp~ent a merchandis~~g prograw~e featurinC 
cash awards to dealer[, for units sold . 
, 
G 
- 83 -
The end of the product's effective product life cyle. Its 
r eplac ement is in an advanced state of development. 
Feedback 
Interpretation 
Reaction 
Dealer stocks are adequate to last until 
the new model 's launch. 
A product gap must be avoided. 
All in-plant inventories must be ~leared . 
Implement a mercha~dising program to encourage 
dealers to take on additional showroom inventories. 
H The launch of the new model. 
Feedback Buyer demand commenced and is bell~ maintained 
at a high level. 
A member of small er dealers are under- stocked 
to the extent that a slight loss of penetration 
occurred during the month after launch. 
Interpretation No direct action required. 
Reaction Implement a merchandising programme to r eward 
dealers for concentratL~g on existing al ternative 
mod ellS as VI ell as the new mod e1. 
(Two points of note emerge from the above series of events viz the actions 
and concerns r elate primarily to the company's product and the "customer" in 
whom the company is most intcrested is its dealer body rather than fL~al, 
retail buyers. This is, we believe , one of the major characteristics of 
a motor company's planning efforts.) 
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In Corporate Planning control terms it should now be clear that this 
motor manufacturer's control system is very closely allied with the 
feedback control loop concept . We have chosen the key concern of 
planning in the field of products and markets to illustrate the applied 
process in this instance. By the same token, Diagram B could have been 
utilised in respect of a five-year sequence of capital investment, cash-
'flow, materials purchases, laboOQ' turnover, advertising expenditure and 
research expenditure. Whatever is considered, the principle remains the 
same. All Telate to a standard or objective which may be ultimately 
traced back to .the overall corporate profit objective and all are evalua-
ted via the control loop. 
One fact which must be Q~derstood is that the control system must be 
applied to a unified "cascade" of objectives. For e}:ample, the corporate 
profit objective provides sub-objectives in respect of marketing, product-
ion , finance, purchasing, research and development, service a~d personnel. 
Taking marketing in isolation; to attain a target profit of Rands X, Y 
percent market penetration must be attained by three car-lL~es zl, Z2 and 
3 . Z , in turn this means that Rands A must be spent on advertising, Rands B 
on merchandising, Rands C on sales training and Rands D on researching 
buyer wants. Rands A, B, C and D must all be allocated and spent L~ the 
most effective possible ways. (naturally the sarne cascad G occurs L~ 
respect of production, finance, purchaSing, research and development, 
service and personnel.} 'I'hus the manaGing director's objective is to 
earn a profit of Rands X, his marketing director's objective is to attain 
a market penetration of Y percent, each product division manager must gain 
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a market penetra tion for h j.s car-line of Y/3, the advertising department 
must spend Rands A supporting these objectives whilst the same applies 
to the other supporting marketing staff functions . 
Accordingly, the control system will be applied in turn to the corporate 
profit target, the mar ket penetration objective, the car-line penetration 
objectives, the expenditure of advertisL~g funds, the effectiveness of 
merchandising actions , the impact of sales training and the value of 
research direction provided. 
Being a relatively small subsidiary of a large multi-national corporation 
means that, in practice, planning c ontrol s assume a high degree of 
formality and rigidity. Essentially , the company is highly structtITed on 
a strongly centraliz ed basis . The planning control implications of this 
f act are two-fold. Firstly, much of the control admL~istrative T~chL~el~ 
i s in the hands of highly specialized . overseas staff departments. Sec ondly, 
local operating management is limited in respect of the degree to w'1.ic'1. 
t hey may react to indicated variances in perfonnance without referring 
to the Overseas staff for approval. 
In order to fully understand the r ole of plarmj:ng controls, the type of 
planning concerns and the action overseas staff personnel have upon 
planning operations and control syst ems, it is necessary to consider the 
following three areas of interest within the subject company, viz: 
, 
I 
• 
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Ten Year Departrrle!ltnl Plans 
Annual Departmental Plans 
Annual _ Opera ting Unit Plans 
However, before specifically covering these areas a useful purpose 
may be served by clarifying what is meant by "departments" and 
" operating units." Essentially, the subject company possesses 
a three-tiered organization structure which is outlined in the 
diagram below. 
Managing Director 
Marketing f,Ianufac turin Personnel Parts 
Advertisini;' 
Merchandising 
Car and Truck Strategy 
Market Research 
Sales Training 
Dealer Vumagement 
Government and F-leet Sales 
Car Sales 
• Truck Sales 
Product Distribution 
Product 
Develop-
ment 
Finance 
-r-
lIDEPA..~T:.S~~IJ..\S 11 
"UNITS" 
I 
\ 
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Accordingly, six main departments (each of which is composed of 
various operatin~ units) are co-ordinated by the managing 
director. 
The three types of plan mentioned above form what may be termed a 
"family" of plans by virtue of the fact that they interlock with 
one another. In addition , they are all built into the overall 
Corporate Plan. The diagram bel ow attempts to illustrate this 
r elationship for the Marketing Department. 
Corporate Plan 
i 
t i T 
Marketing Manftg. Personnel 
Long Range Plan L.R . P. L.R . P. 
~ Advertising L.R. P. 
~ Merchandising L~.P. 
0-- Car & Truck L.R.P. 
q--- Market Research L.R . P. 
~ Sales Training L.R.P. etc 
T 
P & A 
L.R. P . 
i T 
Prod . Dev . FL'1a...YJ.C e 
L.R. P. L.R.P. 
Departmental Long 
Range Plans 
OperatL~g Unit Long 
Range Plans 
; 
I 
'1 
, 
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This company's Corporate Plan works upon a ten year pl a'1l1ing cycle . * 
This ten year period is comp osed of two distinct time sequences. 
Firstly, there is an annual operating planning period which consumes 
Year One of the cycle. Secondly , Years 'I'wo to Ten concern essential-
l y, financial and strategic planning considerations. ~'he diagram bel o',' 
endeavours to illustrate the total relationship between the Corporate 
Plan, Ten Year De-partrriental Plans, Annual Departmental Plans and 
Annual Operating Pl ans. 
Years 
Overall 
Corporate Plan 
(Marketing) 
Department 
10 Year Pl ans 
Annual 
(Marketing) 
Department 
Plans 
, (Marketing) 
Annual Operating 
Unit Plans 
Adver t i sing 
Merchandising 
Car & Truck 
Mar ket Research 
Sal es Traini.'1g 
etc 
1 2 
{:-;/J {Q]' 
{,/«1 ~ 
13 
If/til bJ 
'i/ ~6 
3 4 
i0 , , 
W 11,(1';1 
1( /1 d ' I t'i/ 
t0J ' It" ~ i~(1 
( * Refer page 89 ) 
5 6 , 7 8 9 
@j W GLJ " ' Vi;1 [" / 8m 
j; i//;'j 1i'tL3 j;i/; 1 ~ 
0,ill ((/;;,,1 
~ ~~ UkJ (.~/~··;·1 
VilA V01 ~ 
10 
I 
\ 
~ '\ ~ , 
&~jj 
i2'i&1 
t&] 
Y/1I1 
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E£fectively therefore true long-term planning exists at corporate 
and departmental levels. _ Here the _main strategic concerns are 
formulated and projected. Within each year the broad task of the 
department is broken down into the task the department must complete 
during that year which is, in turn, broken down into the sub-tasks for 
each operating vnit for each year. 
Before consid ering departmental and operating unit planning control it 
i s appropriate to mention the prime a iff icul ties which attend this 
company ' s plaru1ing control efforts . They are as follows: 
1. At middle and lOVier (operating unit) management levels 
there is widespread antagonism to controls al'ld those 
who administer them. 
2. Successful resistance to and non-compl iance with planning 
• 
controls exists . This occurs not in respect of a few 
managers, but in respect of many and at all l evel s . 
3. Resistance and non-compliance invariably takes the form of 
colouring or t-wisting performance information whilst phrasing 
long-term objectives as loosely as possible . 
* Continued from 1st line on previous page. 
This may appear to be arbit.rary but it is, in fact, lil".ked to the 
typical life span of any Sll1cile product line. Five years are 
required to research, model, styl e, engjneer a.",d tool'-L<p to 
produce a car which will be on the market for a sales life of 
five years. 
- go -
4. Knowledge that this resistance exists creates a counter-
reaction whereby control administration procedures become 
increasingly tiGht over time leading to a dilution of 
operating delegation and a corresponding rise in resentment . 
5. 1~agerial efforts are wasted where managers must provide 
unnecessarily lengthy and detailed control input which 
relates to what is or what was rather than what should be . 
Their vision is forcefu.lly direc-ted away from long- term 
planning horizons. 
Final ly, it must be remembered that two parallel control methods are 
to be found; firstly, there are budgetry, financial controls and 
secondly, there are operating controls which relate to the degree to 
which actual objectives are met . 
Ten Year Departmental Plans 
These plans operate in close step with the overall Corporate Plan . 
They seek to translate the Corporate Plan L~to a series of sub-
objectives whj.ch are pertinent to the particular department in 
question. The Marketing department, on being supplied with profit 
targets for Years Two through to Ten; will be able to calculate, for 
each year, what levels of market penetration must be attained to 
generate these levels of profits. Once the target market penetrations 
are understood it is then possible to determine what actions will be 
required from the marketing department ' s operating units in order to 
support target penetrations. 
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A simple example to i llustrate this process i s given below. 
Year 2 
(1 ) Target Profit R500,OOO 
(2) To attain Year 2 ' 8 target profit market penetration must 
be rais ed by 2 percent. 
(3) To attain an incremental 2% penetrat ion the following 
operating units actions will be . implemented: 
Launch a new car-line (Car Marketing Unit) 
Intensive tel evision promotion (Advertising Unit) 
Dealer sales inc entives (Merchandising Unit) 
Raise calibre and skills of dealer (Sales Training Unit) 
salesmen 
Natural ly, (1) and (2) above are purely strategic concerns whilst 
( 3) is highly tactical by nature . Thus i t should be clear that 
, 
the Ten Year Departmental p l ans comprise both strategic ~~d tactical 
elements but that the former (in the form of profit , market penetration , 
product strategy and investoent decisions) over shadows the latter. 
At this poL~t it must be understood that although the Corporate Pl~~ 
may provide ~~ L~dication as to what it is to achieve during the 
f orthcoming ten years (in the form of a profit or market penetration 
objective for each year) and what budget may be provided fo r each year, 
very little else is present . At a tactical level for Years Two to Ten , 
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for example, a v/ide variety of alternative C01U'ses of action may be 
identified. Continuing with the above illustration, what actions 
should the Advertising Unit plan to undertake in Year Three? In 
practice the statement that in Year Three a target profit of 
R580,OOO and a market penetration increase of 1.5~ do not prove to 
be very useful aids in the preparation of advanced plans within the 
Advertising Unit. Compounding this difficulty is the very real fact 
that amongst department heads day-to-day, immediate-term ·concerns 
consume by far the most hours of their working days. At an operating 
uni t level perso~~el, such as the advertising manager, are so hard-
pressed that they will freely admit that to look beyond six to nine 
months is exc eed ingly d ifficul t j - for them to logically review and 
decide what will be done, two, three, four or more years ahead 
simply cannot be done in any mea~ingful way. 
As a general rule only two things work· to induce a departmental manager 
to realistically plan beyond the immediate future . Firstly, he will 
consider Year Two in some fair detail when the time comes (between 
August and September) for him to prepare his budget for that year . 
Secondly, when he must forecast the outcome of actions which will 
culminate in some objective's attainment within Year Two . (Examples 
includ e the construc tion of some item of plant and the prediction of 
market share for some new products.) 
It must therefore be assumed and deduced that markedly effective 
long-range planninc does not exist at a departmental level. Instead 
the overall Corporate rla~ merely serves to provide a broad outlL~e 
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of the company ' s direction over the next ten years whilst the various 
departments and, in turn, their respective operating units plan for 
relat i vely short periods of time to the exclusion of most concerns 
beyond twelve to fifteen months . 
being maintained are given below. 
Major reasons for this circumstance 
The concept of long-range Corporate Pla~ing is poorly developed 
amongst managers in all departments at all l evels . Certainly 
there is little awareness of or interest in the long-temm future of 
the business. In many personal conversations it was clear that 
even the terms "Corporate Planning" or ' ''long-range planning" were 
inperfectly understood by m~~agers at middle and low er levels of 
the organization. As a consequence little time or attention is 
devoted to any attempt to improve planning quality. Two quotations 
aptly describe hoVi this ignorance and apathy becomes built into the 
practical plapning task. 
On one occasion a manager stated, "I don't think we really have to 
plan around here . This organization ' s so big we're successful L~ 
spite of ourselves. Any foul-up anyone makes is so relatively 
small that it soon gets flatt ened out by this corporate steam-· 
roller. " 
On a second occasion the issue of the following two year's budc;ets 
Vias under discussion between m~~acers A and ]3 . 
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A. "v/hat ' ll you. need :Cor ' 79 and ' 80?" 
B. " I ' ll have to sit down 6Jld think about it for a while." 
A. "Well C wants aYJ. estimate before lunch. 
got for this year, R68,OOO?" 
What have you 
B. "Yes, but I ' ll have to speak with D and E to give you that 
sort of forecast, to be reasonably accurate an~vay; if I 
don ' t I' ll just have to guess . " 
A. Could you live with R68,000 plus 10~ for inflation year over 
year? I t would keep C happy this afternoon and besides if 
you later find its not enough we 'll make a pitch to get some 
more money. Would that suit you for now?" 
B. "Why not?" 
Internally mRYJ.agement rotation at all lower and middle level s 
is relatively rapid. An operating unit maYJ.ager can expect to 
change to a'1other area of responsibility within an average of 
between 17 to 24 months . Departmental managers rotate on a 
slower cycle but few remain within one job for more than three 
to three and a h".lf years. As a conscque!lce, few expect to be 
held accountable for planninG efforts vlhich will only come into 
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fruition outside their term of office within their current job. 
Instead there is evidence that plans are made which will do so 
whilst the manager still is within his curr ent job for in this 
way he collects the credit for his ' plan!1ed ' actions . ;raturally , 
this tends to L~duce managers to choose in favolrr of easily 
achievable results. Na"t'.ll'ally, there is no guarantee that such 
short-teI"ill planning automat i call y benefits the company over the 
long-term. 
Managerial workload s at all departmental and oper ating unit l evels 
are heavy, largely as a r esult of sub-optimal mar.2gement skill s and 
understaffing in critical areas . Consequently, m~~agers have little 
time to thinl~ through the muddle and confusion of current deadlL~es 
to the long- ter,n future. lloreover , even if they have .the will and 
understanding to so , they recognise that very few of their fell ows 
will ; accord iP~ly they futher realize that their individual effor ts 
may be, ult ioately, rendered worthless. 
Pl anning decisions made at an operating unit l evel are continuously 
subject to arbitr ary ~~d unexpected cOQ~ter-d ecisions made at more 
senior l ev.els. Evidence exists that in a number of such L~st~~ces 
the counterm~~dL~g decision Vias not made in response to some i.'!lproved 
, 
overall opportunity but , in fact , flowed from some anticipated short- 1 
t erm gain and/or corporate-political adv~~tage . 
• 
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At no time are any departmental or operating unit managers 
held accolmtable for long-term planning results. All, 
however, recognize that a very close watch and record is 
made of their work performance over the short-term in 
pursuit of limited range objectives. 
In terms of planning control therefore, there is little that is 
genuinely effective outside the scope of one or two year planning 
considerations. Once tactical level focus is shifted to beyond 
two years little Or no control exists by virtue of the fact that there 
is simply nothing .to control. At a strategic level, however, plar~ing 
controls are exerted in respect of gauging the appropriateness of 
intended future profit targets, product strategies and market penetration 
forecasts. 
At this strategic level and as part of a multi-national corporation the 
local company's ten-year Corporate and departmental plans are subject to 
the controlling jnfluence of a Corporate Planning staff department 
attached to the overseas parent ' s head office. In .practice it is 
they who have a major share in the task of weighing and evaluating the 
suitability of the South African company's true long-range strategic-
based plans. Their local contact is strictly confined to the local 
managing director and senior department heads, as a result they do not 
and cannot directly work to improve the degree of tactical departmental 
planning. 
• 
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The diaerap~ below attempts to ill ustr ate the position 
and span .of respons i bi lities of thi s Corporate Pl anning staf f body 
in r espect of its L~ternationally spread associates . I t is :i1lJ.port-
ant to r ec ogoize that t his body does not conf ine i ts attention ex-
elusivel y to South African affairs. Ins tead i t s t:i1lJ.e i s appor t i oned 
by t he rel ati ve :i1lJ.por t ance of each overseas l ocation , the availability 
of local pl anning exper t i se and parti cular special c ircumstances • 
. 
Over seas Parent 
Staff Pl anning Department 
I 
I 
Overseas 
Staff Pl ruming Department Staff 
I 
Europ ea"l 
Pl anning Staff 
Britain* 
• Germany* 
Spain* 
FraYlCe* 
Italy 
Scandinavia 
Portugal 
Belg i um* 
I 
I 
Latin America. 
Pla~ing Staff 
Brazir * 
11exico'* 
South Af r i ca* 
Argentina + 
Venzu el a + 
I 
Australn:; ian 
Pl anning Staff 
• Austr alia* 
New Zeal and + 
• Phillipines* 
:.Ial asia + 
Singapore 
• Japan 
Oc eania 
I 
Domest i c 
Pla~ing Department 
. U.S . A.* 
. Canada* 
Swi tzerland 
Netherlands 
North/Central 
Africa 
CORPORATE PLiJTHllm ST;'.FP ORGA1UZA'!'TQl: 
* Denotes manuiacturin3 operati ons 
+ Denotes l ioited manl~actuTL~g/assembly operati ons 
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Organizationally, South Africa ' s automotive operation reports to 
a plaIming staff department based in Rio de Janeiro which , in 
turn, is accoul'J.table to a department ·in the United States hav:i.nb 
overall responsibility for planning affairs in all overseas sub-
sidiaries. 
In practical terms the relationship the South African subsidiary 
enjoys with i ts Brazilian planning masters is both cordial and 
broadly fruitfuJ.. At the same time however it must be admitted that 
a degr.ee of under-performance is t olerated which flows dir ectly 
from this relations~ip. Firstly, separated by time ~~d distance 
t he Brazili~~ staff have proved consistantly incapable of fuJ.ly 
appreciatL~g the multitude of fL~e details which so ver y often 
shape the content , direction ~~d structure of local pl~~ing 
efforts . In short, the Brazilian and South African operatL~ 
envir onments are quite different. a."ld there is evidence that cert8.L~ 
uniquely South Africa.'1 circumstances are interpreted L~ the lig:>.t 
of either the staff controller ' s Brazilian or American experience . 
Such an undesirable L~fluence may only be diluted by freque!'J.t 
detailed, written and telexed memoranda which are never Vlholl; : 
satisfactory by virtue of the L~herent shortcomir~s of these 
communications devices. Telephonic exchanges of L~formation 
a r e not only exp&'1sive but can sOEletimes prove unrewarding in 
unexpected ways; a local departmental mrulager telephoned a member 
of the Brazilia:.'l pl~_'1ing staff only to .discJ)ver that this indj.v-i.dual 
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could only speak fluen t Portugese - a language the local manager 
did not understand. Secondly, thel'e is the fact that there is no 
10callY-9ased Corporate Plannlllg funct ionary. In practice this 
means that Corporate Plannlllg actj.ons lack a local co-ordlllator for 
both plannlllg (per se) and contl'ol purposes. A loosely formulated 
committee QDdertakes the preparation, implenentation and control of 
local long-range plans. Thus both local and overseas plannli1g 
control at a departmental level is further weakened. 
Annual DepartJnen tal Plans 
Essentially, these plans seek to set out, on an annual basis, three 
classes of plannlllg and control data. 
(a) The key objectives for the year for the department as 
a whole aDd for each of its operatli1g units. (As will 
be reme~bered, these objectives flow directly from the 
ten-year departmental plan.') OBJECTIVE FORMrJLATIOH 
(b) As a conseqU8.DCe of understaDdlllg the department's objectiyes 
ac tual ac ti vities wi thlll each operating unit may be formulated -
TAB K FORiillJLATION' 
(c) Once the department has determlled what it is to achieye and 
how, its total budget for the year may be drawn up Vlhich will 
consist of a sL=ation of the funds required by each of its 
operatlllg units - BUDGET ALLOCATION 
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A poL~t worthy of note is the fact that there is a clear distinction 
in practice between objective formulation and task formulation on the 
one hand and budget allocation on the other. (Theoretically each 
should lead logically from one to the next.) Instead when preparing 
its annual budget estimates a department will review i ts forthcomi."lg 
ob jectives a."ld determine t,.l-je necessary tasks required to ful:t'il then 
and as a consequence complete its estimates. However, these estiuates, 
on submission for fina."lcial approval, are invaTiably prtL"led or reduced 
to such a degree that the actual departmental budget for the year is 
less than that required. L"l turn this l eads to circumstances where 
certain objectives (often having a key long-term impact) are either 
altogether eliminated or are effectively crippled. Rationale for 
this harsh view of budget estimates i s difficult to uncover, however; 
this fact may, tentatively, be described as flowing from a combination 
of: abuses by earlier managers who asked for, received and mi s- spent 
budge t allocations; final allocations being deter'mined by financial 
personnel who have little direct understa."ld:L"lg or experience of 
departmental circumstances and a seemingly unquantifiable reluctance 
to tailor budgets to actual operating needs - the gold en rule applied 
is expressed in the form of "This year's budget plus I e(, for inflationll . 
Control, at a departmental w.nual level, exists in two forms. First ly, 
there is a simple vari.ance a."lalysis of forecast monthly . expenditure 
versus actual monthly expenditure. At the beginning of the year the 
depar tment's plrullled actions -for the year are set out by month . That 
done, the f:L"lancial implications of completing these tasks are deri-red 
by month. In this Vlay, it is possible to determine what funds will be 
spent monthly on vlhich projects or tasles. A sample budget/t:.sk a;:,alysis 
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for the mcrketing department and for one of its operating units 
(advertising) is given below . 
1978 (R 10~0 ) 
Funds Allocated 
J F ,. A M J J A S 0 ". 
Marketing 
Department 200 800 400 500 600 800 800 300 600 500 
Advertising 50 60 80 70 20 30 30 70 20 15 
Product A 10 10 10 10 5 1 0 10 10 
B 20 30 30 60 5 10 10 30 10 
C 20 20 40 10 10 10 30 10 15 
N 
700 
30 
30 
Revi ewed on a monthly basis , a statement of year-to--<late expenditure, 
D 
100 
30 
30 
expendi ture. commi tted* =d forecast exp<;nditure out to the end of the 
year is extracted which will expose for connnent any positive or negative 
varience~ . (F or example, an amount of R90,000 expressed against April 
in the above tabl e will innnediately require a satisfactory answer on 
the part of the advertising ma."lage/,) 
'Detailed, vITitten supportip~ rationale are demanded f or both the original 
bUdget/task analysis and in the event of there being any requirement to 
amenc1 that analysis. Thus, the advertising unit will need to provide 
an acceptable set of reasons why Product C will be the only one promoted 
---,-_._------_._--
*Consisting of expenditure which the company is contractually 
Obligated . to pay but which has not yet been invoiced. 
Total 
7,300 
505 
75 
205 
225 
. 
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during October, Hovcmber and December. Moreover , once this decisian 
has been made, if it is then fel t that Praduct B shauld als o. be 
included wi thin the year-end advertising plan the same detailed rationale 
must be pravided. In this way a fair degree of flexibility is passible 
but only if there exists saund reasans far switching fram an earlier-
determined caurse. 
The sec and element of cantrol exerted at a departmental leyel is present 
in those instances where the departmlilnt in quest ian fulfills essentiall y 
a staff functian. Far example, within a marketil1g department, t-lle 
results af that department may nat be capa.ble af being evaluated whally 
in quantitative terms. Althaugh, the department ' s task may be to. 
permit the campa~y to. attain a market penetratian far the year af l2;6~ 
if its actual perfarmance was to. reach 13.2% there is no. lagical way af 
equating this desi:rable result with the aut put and perfarmance af the 
department's companents. To. what extent was this due to. the mercha'1dis:L.'1g 
unit launching a new praduct to. the dealer salesmen? To. what extent 
was this due to. the adver tising unit experimenting with televisian as 
opposed to. press and radio. cO!lllllercials? To. what extent was this due 
to. the market research unit providing data an buyer characteristics? 
All these staff functians are controllable in respect of their task/ 
budgets but the actual wisdom and success of their tangible actions 
r emain illlJlleasurable · and uncontrollable (at l east in a formal sense) . 
In addition to the monthly task/budget varj.ance analysis (a control 
element which equates closel y with the earlier mentioned feedback 
contral loop) a major review of each department's perfarmance towards 
its objectives and i ts budget status is undertaken every three months 
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by the managing direc t or a'1c1 t he overseas planning staff. 
Organizationally it i s important to note that although each department 
conducts its internal review every month 'it is, itself, reviewed 
each qunrter by a further control device which, is quite independent 
of any single department , its management, operating staff 
co~ponents a'1d the overseas planning staff. 
the company's fllla'1Ce division. 
This add i tional device is 
Local fina'1c ial management, whilst bearing the responsibility for, inter 
alia, corporate profi t and l oss analysis, also act as a cross-check upon 
the claims, excuses and performance of other department ' s whose operat ions 
have some budgetry or financial implications . In the case of the mark-
eting department, the financ e department would cri ticall;)' appraise the 
intended pat t ern of expenditure for the year . As outsiders they may be 
incapable of comprehending the fL'1er details of a'1y department's plans 
but they serve to inject into the control mechanism the val ued attribut es 
of non-partisan , keenly critical independent minds which, in turn, does 
much to foster and enhance a spirit of care and prudence on the par~ 
non-financ ial operating managers . This financial cO!l t rol is cont L'1uous 
by virtue of the facts that all disbursements have t o be approved by 
the financial department and the company ' s budgetry system is comput-
erised in such a way as to provide a current budget status of each ~'1d 
every department and operating unit . 
As may be deduced, therefore, financial controls are riej,dly enforced 
and are h i ghly developed. In many ways they cO!lsti tute the prjl.1e 
component of on-goL'1g Corporate P18IL'1L'1g control especially in respect 
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of staff departments ruld operatiDg,line, units. 
Annual Operatir.p; U,,-it Plans 
It will be remembered that each major functional department is 
divisible into numbers of operating units (The marketing department 
comprises units in respect of advertising, merchruld ising , car and 
truck marketing strategy, government sales, fleet sales, dealer sales , 
truck sales ~~d dealer planning.) Moreover, each department and 
each unit will possess its own budget, the latter coming together to 
total that of the former. To avoid needless repetition it is 
sufficient merely to refer to the section above (wherein the annual 
departlllenta1 pla.=.ing control system was outlined) in order to under-
stand both the type of controls which exist in respect of the operat-
ing units of each department and the manner in which unit annual 
plannL~g controls dovetail with those of the department. Accordir~ly, 
attention will be focused upon practical plannL~g control difficulties 
which manifest themselves at this level rather th~~ to re- state the 
monthly and quarterly review process . 
For control purposes each operating unit is expected to prepare a 
long-range pla.~ for a ten year period into the future taking its 
cue from the ten year departmental plan which is, in turn, derived 
from the ten year Corporate Plan. Where the operating unit is of 
a line-type (such as product eI'.gineering ) its long-range plans floVi 
in a short a.~d highly direct way from the Corporate Pla.'1. Staff 
units, for the reasons mentioned above, lack this direct guidance 
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by virtue _ of: their ess8ntially intanr,ible, unquBl1tifj.able output 
and contribution to overall performance. As a consequence staff 
units tend to express their 10ng-r8l1ge intentions in terms of loosely-
word od ambitions which they perceive to be in step with corporate 
reCluirements. For example, the Corporate P18l1 may call for a steady 
flow of research data concerning car buyer habits 8l1d opinions. 
The marleet research unit may interpret this to me8l1 the undertalei11g 
of a full-marleet coverage research project every two years amongst 
new car buyers. 
The actual contribution made by 8l1y operating unit is evaluated on 
a monthly a.'1d quarterly basis in respect of its budge try perform8l1c e 
and, wherever possible, at least some assessment is made of its 
tasle-result success. In the case of staff units this last invariably-
takes tl1e form of some highly Clualitative measurement such as the 
perceived "value" or "worth" of information and assistance provided . 
Although financial budgetry controls are strL'1gent it is possible for 
t he astute operatBlg Q'1it manager to substantially amend 8l1d revise 
his task obj ectj,ves for the year on the understa.'1dir.g that such revisions 
do not incur the penalty of a budget over-run. Thus, if a m8l1ager is 
faced with choosine between Project A and Project B both of which cost 
RIO,OOO (which is the budget available) he may choose in favour of A 
8l1d incur no budgetry censure" ( provided he does not over-spend) despite 
the fact that Clualitatively B may be adjudged the more desirable 
from the point of view of the comp8l1Y as a whole. Moreover, a 
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manager may switch f rom A to B and back to B again with reasonabl e 
ease at any time vntil he actually commits some funds towards one 
project, once t hat step has been taken the unit is totally committed 
to that deciston - the stringent financial controls demand that thts 
be so. In essence, therefore, at an operattng uni~ level, controls 
employed are dominated by fina.'1cial standards whilst functional controls 
are corrcspondint;ly weak, l acJdng as they do , in many instances, some 
tangible results capable of being measured . 
To concl ude , at an operating level pl anning controls possess two 
d efic ienc ies . Firstly, fina.'1cial controls ' are established without 
real concern for the functional objectives sought . Secondly, financial 
controls are, by implication , assigned a task which they cannot always 
fulfil, namely to assess the degree to which operating results are truely 
worthwhile. 
SECTION THREE COR1'OnATE PLANNIlfG PARAT,;"~TERS PERTUillNT TO A 
LOCAL MOTOR ~iANUFACTURER. 
3.1 Introduction 
Section Three of this paper will seek to position three key areas 
of concern of a local motor manufacturer when maintainjng a 
Corporate Planning cycle. 
No single area is wholly il'ldependent of its fellows - there is 
considerable interaction between them. Of note is the fact 
tha t all relate to the company's overall profitability. jr[oreover , 
they display intriging characteristics which are in many ways 
unique to the motor industry. 
The three areas are as follows: 
1. Profitability 
2. Capital L~vestment 
3 . Technology 
3.2.1 Profitability 
Profits ' role and nature as it related to the concept of Corporate 
Planning was discussed earlier. In consid ering the case of 
profi t vis-a-vis the selected motor company however , a number of 
subtle shades and tones of variation emerge as a consequence of 
industry operating realities . 
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It will be recalled that the generation of a reasonable 
profit represents both the reason for a company's establishme~t 
and the purpose for which it clings to survival. 
The selected motor manufacturer (in common with most of its 
rivals) is a private company and is, as a consequence, under no 
obligation to make public its profit performanc e. To all 
intents and purposes individual profitability of industry 
members ' prior to 1 970 remaL~s something of a closed book. 
Since that time there has been evidence that the· industry's 
profitability as a whole is largely either marginal or 
. unsatisfactory. This is not to say that L~dividual manv£act-
urers have consistently incurred universal financial losses. 
Indeed there is non-public evidence that in many respects certeL" 
companies have earned record profits in the face of severe 
economic difficulties. .We shall return to this point later. 
In all likelihood the profitability' of any sir~le major m~~ufacturer 
(manufacturers whose operating potential is severely under-utilized 
such as Fiat and Alfa- Romeo do not qualify) may be expected to have 
swung from profit to loss to profit over the past five to six years. 
In other words there exists a situation whereby profitability is 
in a state of oscillation around a profit-l oss threshold . 
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Rationale for opcrating losses essentially comprise two 
factors; firstly, low wholesale mark up combined with low 
turnover and secondly, fluctuations in international 
exchange rates . 
Manufacturers whose profitability one suspects to be parti-
cularly poor (Fiat , Leyland, Alfa-Romeo) will generall y 
have experienc ed declining market shares over time . 
short, their l ong-term profitability is in decline. 
In 
Their 
situation becomes even more desperate once currency fluctuations 
are added to the equation. In the case of more soundl y- based 
manufacturers (of Which our chosen manufacturer is one) who 
have maintained steady h i gh sales volumes and even enhanced 
market penetration performanc e , their profit trends may be 
either positive and stabLe or positive and rising . Even so 
a devaluation of t he rand may, quite literally overnight, 
change an adequate profit into a bitterly unexpected operating 
l oss . Our manv~acturer beLng Wholly- owned by an overseas 
parent is especially sensitive in this 'regard . 
Figures quoted earlier under score the voracious appetite a 
motor company has for capital investment in plant, equipment 
and limited-liJe tooling . By the same token, investment risk 
i s enormously high relative to other, less sensitive industries . 
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A curious question therefore arises. Gj.ven the company's need for 
on-going large-scale capital investment and high-risk expectations 
how is it possible to equate the WIO and derive a workable balance? 
In other words if profit expectations are so unstable and investnent 
so great what factor acts to strike the desired balance? 
In seeking the answer to this problem as it exists il1 respect of our 
manufacturer it is necessary to examine two things; firstly, the 
role played by the overseas parent and fellow overseas subsidaries 
and secondly, the profit-revenue-cost components of the local 
operation. 
Mul ti-Ua tio!lal Status 
When 'assessing the manuf'actux'er ' s long-term profit expec tatio!ls 
account must be taken of the fact that this business is but a 
relatively small subsidiary of a much l arger organization 
Accordingly, the South African operation assumes the role of 
being one very small "profit centre" (sic) amidst many others. 
Essentially the question of local profitability becomes one of 
geographic dispersion and economic li~~ges. The overseas · 
parent views the entire world as its market having what might 
almost be described as "bra.'1ch offic es" - the local subsidiaries 
in each SUb-market. The parents' Corporate PlannL'1g objective 
is to realj.oe, for the Total organization, a total, overall profit 
target year over year . 
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South Afrkan operating profit (or loss) in any single time 
period is consolidated with the results of the world-wide 
group to r un-out , on the bottom line, a total profit or loss 
for the period in question. The small size of the South 
African operation, relative to the Overs eas parent and other 
subsidiaries, ensures that the profit or loss for any on e year 
or time period has no material impact upon the organization's 
total performance . 
Vmat, in effect, this situation means is that the above-mentioned 
princ i ple of profitability is not strictly applicable to the 
South Africafi company . The compa~y ' s survival is not placed 
in jeopardy as a r esult of incurring lo"s es whilst its positive 
profitabilit:r is of no conseque::tce . 
When cons ideriP~ multi- p-ational companies the most commonly 
encountered view is as described by Wormald: * 
"The imposition of tariffs, sometimes in isolation or sometimes 
all ied to a government decision to See a particular industry 
established, is a powerful factor in impelling a ma~ufacturer 
with an established sales position to set up a manufacturing 
operation . In many cases it has been the only factor , sL~ce 
* A. ' Wormald · - L~ternational Business 
Pan Books, London, 1973. pp 31. 
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the·operation has been judged to be uneconomic even with tariff 
protection •••• In these cases, if the manufacturer sets up a 
facility he may do so only to conserve his marlcet pos i tion 
against the day when the position may change, either by the 
growth of the market or the el imination of the tariff , 
permitting a return to importing • •• • • • the threat of loss 
of a valuable market is a powerful incentive, in whatever 
f orm it may present i tsel f , and it may well be that this has 
been a major factor in determining businesses to establ ish 
themsel ves in thei r fore i gn market to manufacture: , whol ly or 
part i all y , products which t hey pr eviously imported . " 
In the caSe of our chosen multi- national motor company the above is 
not strictl y true . This is so by virtue of the fac t that the key 
wor d "market" is vi ewed in two qutte different ways and it is :i-'1 
t his perception wherein l ies the reasons why this manufacturer ' s 
parent is prepared to tolerate conSi stently low local operatL~g 
profi tability and high investment risk. 
Firstly, there is the fact that the overseas parent does not view 
the South African market as being composed of local motor- vehicle 
buyers. Instead, the South African "market" is only a singl e 
buyer _ namel y the local subsidiary itself . 
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Secondly, there is an element of profit-expectation linked to 
the existence of a potentially viable mass-market amongst this 
country's Black and Coloured communities . 
Viewed over a time-scale, the first is. essentially a short-term 
justification whilst the s.econd has yet to come to real maturity and 
thereby raise, to material levels, South Africa's contribution 
to global profits. 
Perceiving the local market as being confined to merely the local 
su.bsidiary creates an interesting insight into the operation of 
this multi-national company which is by no means clear to the 
outsid er and is certainly at variance with Wormold' s statement . 
Why then should the parent consider the subsidiary so and from 
what source does it gain its profits if not from local consumers? 
Essentially , this multi-national compa~y's South African profits 
are gained froIr. an i.l'lternal profit generated by the sale of 
components and sub-assemblies to the South African subsi.diary. 
Only ~IO factors are necessary; a steady or increasing demand 
from the local consumer market (thereby permitting the subsidiary 
to continue to manufacture vehicles and, of necessity, purchase 
components from the parent or another overseas subsidiary company) 
and the ability tp maintain a system of'differential priciP.g 
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between the Overseas supplier and the local buyer. In other 
words, provid cd the South African subsidiary's sales volume 
maintains local volumes at or even slightly above local break-
even and provided components may be sold at a substantial mark-
up to the South African operation, the system will work to the 
supplying parent or subsidiary's benefit and, in turn, to the 
benefit of the Total organization. The degree to which the 
local manufacturer and/or South Africa benefits is, of course, 
open to investigation and subject to question. 
Diagram C illustrates the impact differential cost-plus pricing 
has upon indi\~dual wholesale/retail elements. 
See illustrations on the following page. 
'. 
DIAGRAM C Impact of Manufacturer rebates on r,lanufacturer 
Profitability 
(1) Total Cost 
No . Units 
Mark-Up 
R9. 50 
37 , 000 
5" 1° . 
Net Pr ofit R1 7 760 
Land ed Unit Cost 
Var . Cost (Unit) 
Over head (Uni t) 
W/sal e l:lar k-U.p 
HIO . OO 
Rl. 1 5 
0 . 85 
5% . 
Over seas 
Parent 
~ 
R17 760 
, / 
Local 
Subs i di ary 
Rebate per 
3% ( 36c) 
unit 
* Ne t Pr of it ( 37 , 000 x 60c) 
= R22 , 200 ~,200 4,--FR13 320 
Tr ue Net 
Rl3 320 
Wholesal e Vni t Fric e 
Var. Cost (Unit) 
Overhead (Uni t ) 
Ret a il 1:ar kup 
200 -
R1 2 . 60 
R 0 .10 
R 0 . 30 
1 5% 
Ne t Profit ( 37,000 x Rl. 95) 
= R72 1 50 
* See page 116 for de tails , 
I 
) 
Dea l er 
Body 
I~ 
R72 ,150 
/ 
Consumer 
Body 4 
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Four elements are of importance, viz; the over seas parenti 
supplier, the local subs idiary manu:facturer, the local 
retailing dealer body and the local consumer market. The 
cost, revenue and profit flows set in motion by the sal e of 
an imported vehicle component will be described. 
For the purpose of this exercise the nature of the component 
i s unimportant. 
Stage One 
The component is purchased by the overseas parent from a 
supplier at a LL~it cost of R9 .00 to which is added 50c of 
variabl'e cost a.~d overhead. A mark-up of 5% (48c) is 
applied to derive a selling price of R9 .98 to the overseas 
(South African) subsidiary. An annual sales volume of 
37,000 units is attained . 
The profit, from the supply of this component to South Africa, 
by the (British) parent totals Rl7 760 (37, 000 units x 0 .48c) 
Stage Two 
The component 's landed cost at Port Elizabeth totals RIO (2c 
per unit shipping and insurance) . In local manufacturer and 
assembly RI.15 is incurred by way of variable costs whilst a 
further 85 c is charged to each unit in respect of overhead. 
, \ 
I 
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Stage 'rI'JO continued 
In deriving a sale price to the dealer the total cost (R12) 
is marked up by 5~ (60c) to total a R12 . 60 wholesale price. 
Subsidiary profit is R22,200 for the year (J7,OOO units x 60c) . 
Stage Three 
The R12.60 dealer wholesale price is built up into a R14.95 
retail price comprising - R12.60 wholesal e plus dealer variable 
cost 10c, dealer overheads 30c and retail mark-up (15%) Rl. 95. 
Retail profit accruing to the dealer body totals R72,150 p.a. 
Up to this time the two key factors of buyer/consumer demand 
and · competitive preSSlITe have been omitted from consideration. 
They will now be introduced . 
Buyer demand for automotive products is highly sensitive to 
shifts in the broad macro-economic considerations relating to 
buyer disposable L~come and economic confidence.* 
-------------------.-----
*An exercise performed by one local motor manufacturer sought to 
identify some' ecor..omic indicator whose reaction to macro conditions 
and circumstances would preceed (and be more sensitive to changes 
therein) that of the motor industry - thereby providing some meaSlITe 
of advance warning of a rise or dip in vehicle sales - none was found . , I 
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Assume, for the purpose of this illustration the l ocal 
economy is in recession and buyer demand, as a consequence, 
is at a low ebb. The vehicle market has contracted and 
individual manufacturer volumes have fallen . Under such 
circUlllstaYlces each manufacturer's prime concern is to maintaili 
market share whil st covering costs up to and including break-
even . PlaYlt operations must , ther efore, be geared to a cer tain 
minimum volume . In the absence of any wholesale orders manu-
facturers LYlventories wil l , natural ly , accumulate . Ac cord jngl y , 
there is a greater LYlcentive to "push" buil t - up units out of 
manufacturer and into deal er inventories who, in turn , Vlill then 
be' expected to malce super- human efforts to liquidate or turn- over 
"sticky" inventories of new vehicles/componen ts . Individual dealers 
wi l l both seek to evade carrying such inventories and will exl'lOrt 
salesmen to off-l oad units in inventory in exc ess of three weeks . * 
* Deal ers are charged , on average , 2% per month on each buil t -up unit 
supplied . Units are invoiced to ~~e dealers from the moment the vehicle 
i s shipped from the pl ant. A unit at wholesale R5000 will cost R100 per 
month to hold on the showroom floor . 
(a) The l onger the unit r~~ains unsol d the higher the final retail 
pr i ce must be before the full cost is recovered . Thus assume the 
l ist r etail price is H5 , 500 (implying a dealer profit of roughly 
R400 allowing for ill-dealership , cos1;s and a further R200 off l i st 
ill buyer discount) . This leaves a dealer pr ofit of :2200 which may 
fall to RIOO if the unit is only sola after a month . 
(b) High LYJ.vC:ltory costs caYlnot be passed ont o buyers by ra i sjl1g the 
retaj.l price by virtue of the intensely competitive nat ure of the 
ma.rket-plac e. 
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Thus under conditions of economic recession, the manufac turer's 
concern will be to balance inventories and production with dCr.1and 
whilst keeping an a.'L'{ious eye upon the plant's brenkeven volume 
and market share. In effect, his objective for the year is to 
sell 37 000 units to dealers - both as a related need to maintain 
breakeven and because orders of this magnitude vull be irrevocably 
in the supply pipe-line from the over seas supplier. In an 
attempt to ensure that t his si tuati.on is brought about there is 
the need t o raise (or maintain) dealer (\ ,holesale) volumes 
which, in turn, demands that dealer (retail) volumes are 
stimulated in sympathy . 
The most common method by y,hich the above are sought is via 
the medium of dealer and/or retail rebatinG. 
ASS\lllle a 3% wholesale rebate is applied to the component 
discussed above. This discount (36c) results in the SUl!! of 
R13 320 being passed by the manufacturer back do\'m the line to 
the dealer and/or the retail buyer . 
Thus, referring to Diagram C, instead of the manuf&cturer 
earning a R22 200 profit, his actual retu.rn will be in the 
region ~f R8B80. (Pre-rebate profit R22 200 less rebate 
R13 320 = R8 880) j compared vu th R17 760 j.n the case of the 
overseas supplier and R72 150 in the case of the dealer body . 
Taking ti:e exa.,ple a step furthcr, what would be the consequence 
of the annual oarke t falling by 2CJ1o - from 37 000 units to 
29 600 units? 
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(1) Overseas Parent's Pro£it 
29 600 units x 48c = R14 208 
Here no change Occurs in the parent's fixed costs as the 
component is supplied on a sufficiently larGe scale as to 
mruce a drop in orders of 7 400 units of no material 
consequence. 
(2) Local Manufacturer ' s Profit 
29 600 units x 62c = R18 352 
Manufacturer overheads rise by 30c per uni t as a result 
of the industry volume de91ine. 
'(3) Dealer Profit 
29 600 units x Rl .96 = R58 016 
Gi ven such tight market conditions t."'ere will be an even 
greater incentive for the mantlfacturer to provide wholesale 
rebates. Assume, therefore, t."'e manui'actllrer discount. rate 
is 3% on whole sale , his true net profit will be as follows: 
29 600 units x 37c = R10 952 (r~bate) 
. 
" 
R18 352 (Net Wholesale Profit) R10 952 (Rebate) 
. . True Net 'Wholesale Profi t = R7400 
In conclusion of this example the above illllstrations are 
summarised overleaf: 
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Parent Subsidiary Dealer 
Net profit at 
37 000 unit 
volume R17 760 R8 880 R72 150 
Net profit after 
2Cf/o decline in 
unit volume R14 208 R7 400 R58 016 
Rands decline (R3 552) (Rl 480) (Rl4 134) 
Percent change 2rf/o 17% 2Cf/o 
The 2rf/o decline in volume creates a proportionate decline in 
the profits of both the parent company and the dealer whilst 
manufacturer profits fall by only 17% , In real terms , however, 
the manufacturer's alr eady slim profit status (R8 . 880) is cut 
to only R7 400 - a degree of profi tabili ty sufficiently low to 
warrent the adoption, by the manufacturer , of either one or 
the other of two broad alternatives in an attempt to extricate 
i tself from this profit squeeze , 
Firstly , the decision may.be made to cease importing the 
component and , instead, manufacture it locally . To be viable 
the unit cost within South Africa must , naturally, be below that 
of t he imported version for o~ly in this way will corporate 
profi tabili ty be enhanced and dealer profi tabi l i ty maintained . 
(Such components as may be feasibly produced locally at lower 
cost will very often alr eady be done so - much to the di sappointment 
of the overseas parent.) However, in respect of many com!,onents, 
high tooling costs are necessary for t heir production which may 
only be recovered given lengthy produption runs . For example , 
the moulds required to injection - form plastic dashboards may 
be paid for after a yerrr or two ' s use iIl J<,'urcpe whil st the 8=e 
in South Africa would still be subject to depreciation after ten 
years. A second difficulty relating to local manufacture is 
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" 
that very often there is simply not the technology and "know-how" 
available to produce the required article to the required quality 
standards , 
Secondly, the option exists to cease importation of the component 
and to not seek a local substitute - in effect a total deletion. 
A number of specific examples of this practice exist, one of the 
most illustrative being that in respect of not merely a component 
but an entire vehicle range . 
Under the provisions of the South African Local Content Programme, 
commercial vehicles, during the 1960 ' s and 1970 ' s were and 
would be exempt from complying with the Programme ' s requirements. 
, As a consequence it was 'possible to import complete units from 
overseas sources without their bearing the punitive duties 
l evied upon unqualifying passenger cars. The subject ma.~ufacturer 
imported a range of large car-based pick- up trucks from its 
Australian co- subsidiary . ' (These units were complete apart from 
such items as tyres and glass.) Widespread market acceptance 
followed to the extent that approximately 2~ of all li&~t 
commercial vehicle sales consisted of this class of pick-up . Natural ly 
t he Australian source company practised 'the abovementioned 
differential pricing policy to its advantage 17hilst the local 
price structure permitted the South African subsidiary to earn 
a reasonable profit too. 
Following 1973 ,when inflatior-~ry pressures elevated wholesale 
and retail prices and fuel costs rose steeply, buyers ter.ded to 
switch away from these noVi expensive trucks to buy and run less 
expensive pick-ups. Moreover, the Austral,ian source company 
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maintained its export pricing and, indeed, begun a series of 
regLtlar, subst'lntial price increases which worked their way t hrough 
to the local consumer. COl1s'equently, the decision was 
made to axe the vehicle range as being totally uneconomic to 
produce locally . 
Profi t, Rev : nLte and Cost Components. 
Having now indicated one reason why the manufactLtrer's parent 
company may decide to maintain the exj.stence of a marginally 
profitable subsidiary, ' attention may be directed t;owards the 
second prime reason for doing so . 
In this instance the focus becomes more local in nature seeking , 
as it does, to identify the key cost and revenue centres of the 
business . In other words, in the same way that the parent 
compa.ny takes a glo(,.a.l view of" its operat ions so t oo does t.'le 
selected ma.nufacturer ' s top management except that their "global" 
view is confined to their oVin total organization. 
SUb-dividing the org"anization reveals the existence of certain 
highly profitable functions on the one hand and , on the other, 
operations whose massive losses cancel OLtt the good created by 
the former . Plru~ing-wise, therefore, the long- term aim of the 
bLtsiness is to maximise the return of the profitable operations 
whilst minimising, tLtrning aroLtnd or elindLnating the loss-makers. 
More specifically our subject manufacturer (and very much the 
same applies to all other larger motor compa.nies) is really quite 
a diversified business comprising, as it does, the following 
components : 
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Car/Li&lt Truck Division 
Heavy Truck Division 
Parts/Accessories Division 
Tractor/Industrial Division 
Financing Division 
A point of note is that each division caters for quite distinct 
and separate markets. Taking each briefly in turn: 
Car/Light Truck Division 
Sale and marketing of small, medium and large car lines . 
Sale and l!larketing of two ranges of pickups. 
Heavy. Truck Division 
Sale and marketing of two ranges of heavy truck . 
Sale and marketing of one range of bus chassis. 
Parts and Accessories Division 
Sale and marketing of brand name vehicle parts to dealers, 
parts wholesalers a.YJ.d independent parts stockists . 
Sale and marketing of accessories to dealers and independent 
stockists (accessories being essentially product options 
which may be fitted to a vehicle at the time of pllrchase or 
subsequently) . 
Tractor/Industrial Division 
Sale and marketing of agricultural tractors to the f~~ing 
markets (plus a limited industrial buyer group having need 
of such vehicles e.g. S.A. A. for baggage handling at airports). 
Sale and marketing of industrial equipment including eart~~oving 
plant, stationary and marine engines. 
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Financing Di vi sion 
MarketinG of an in-bousG financing or credit facili ty to 
vehicle buyers in competition witb other sources of bire 
purchase funding . 
Ranking the above in dGscending order of general profitability 
Car/Light Truck l)' 
~F~i~n~an~c~l~'n~g~ __________________ _ 
HGavy Trucks 
Parts/Accessories 
Tractor/Industrial 
Marginal 
, Heavy Truck and Parts/Accessories represent t he two most 
consistently profitable operating divisions . Rationale for this 
f act is tbat tbeir products .are sucb tbat higb mark- ups may be 
maintained even in tbe face of intense competitive pressure . In 
otber words the degree of profit built into the whOlesale/retail 
price is so great that a favourable profit status is struck 
despite the issue of substantial discounts necessitated by 
tight market conditions. 
Car/Li&~t Truck and Financing divisions may be considered to 
display a characteristic of marginal profitability . Car and 
Ligbt Truck wbolesale/retail profit margins are narrower than 
those of HGavy Trucks. This is so by virtue largely of tbe 
wider ranges of product offerings and thG extreme price 
sensitivity of these marke ts. (In this way a car buyer, for 
exampl e, is better placed to find the, exact vehicle he desires 
at the lowest possible price largely by virtue of the signific2'1t 
degree of substitutabilit-y between product makes and \'ritl>;n price 
b~ds. ) 
I 
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Accord:i.nGly, Car/Light Truck pI'ofi tabiU ty is large ly D. qUQsti.on 
of . industry volwues a'1d manufacturer market penetrnti.on . That 
is, profi tabili ·ty is enhanced priIDarily t.'1rough the medium of 
situple turn-over r ather than mark- up. Hence , a s l ump in 
car/light truck industry volumes immediately depresses the 
individual manufacturer ' s profit per formance whilst the resultant 
intensification of compet i ti ve pressure and the concolLllli tant 
need t o IeeeI' pla"lt in operation leads to a rise in di scounting! 
r ebating pr£ctice which places a further squeeze upon profits . 
Financing's market is, essentially ,. composed of the same class 
of persons as buyers of cars and light trucks . 'Its profit 
contribution is , as a result, in no small way dependant upon 
car and li~'1t truck sales volumes . Additionally , the financing 
f iel d is one which , again, di splays a high degree of competition 
such that returns cannot be enhanced by rai.sing financing charges 
upon paper issued above t he common mar ket r ate . 
Moreover, in the case of this particular ma"lufacturer , tr.e 
financing division is somewhat conservative in outlook - a fact 
which i s carried over into its marketing and paper- issue policies . 
Thus, no d~namic and creative marketing efforts are made whil st 
credit screens are fairly tight , to the extent of eliminating 
numbers of applicants who would be acceptl'.ble risks elsewhere. 
(An example exists in respect of financing vehicle purchases by 
Blacks - identical credit screens are applied t o Blacks as are 
applied to ',7hi t es . As a consequence the LIIlOlUlt of Black pape r 
on the books and pr ofits generated thereby is minimal - despite 
t he potenti&l of this market . ) Furthermore , the actual financing 
charges iL1posed are not .molly competitive "Ii th parallel finance 
sources . 
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A consistent loss-maJcer is the Tractor/InduGtrial division. 
Qui teO apart from ?ny competitive pressures (and they are great) 
the essential difficl)~ ty present is the fact that those products 
¥e almost entirely imported . Differential pricing exploitaticn 
on the part of overseas suppliers is rampant . On the demand 
side , increased importation costs cannot be passed on to the 
buyer by virtue of t he fact that tractor industry prices are 
artificially low. Any attempt to , raise prices to 
economic l evels will result in an immediate and substantial 
contraction in market "share . Dampening any move to raise 
industry prices is the intangible presence of governmental censure. 
Understanding the loud voice the agricultural sector has in 
government circles and" the government ' s sensitivity over 
agricul tural matters, any increase in tractor prices may prove 
unwise . 'Agricultural sales are further frustrated by 
seasonal purchase patterns whereby the level of sales are 
clustered as to time and whose intensity is a function of crop/ 
produce returns. 
On the industrial side, the continuing recession and differential 
priCing acts to depress profitability . 
To conclude, the Corporate Planning concerns of the Car and 
Light Truck division is primarily related to market (industry) 
size prediction and product planning. These attempt to maximise 
turn-over via the adoption of suitable product lines. In the 
case of He avy Trucks , long- term concerns are almost entirely 
related to product improvement and development. Financing appears 
" to display little long-term planning apart from reviewi!1g carl 
light truck industry forecasts and movements wi thi"n interest r ates . 
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Finally, the 'fractor/Industri' l division's Corporate Pla.'1!lin..; 
concern is, essenVially on," cc: loss-minimisation . The manui'acturcr 
remnins within this l,st market chiefly because the overseas 
parcllt dcm:mds that -t.hic be done (to 1'C;-'11 -Lh" lJ"ncIi-L oi' diiTerentlal 
pricing) lihilst the exiutence of SUlJSt311tial numbers of tractors 
and indu:> Lriul plants provides a lucrative opportunity for Parts/ 
Ar:cessory proi'i t.8 . Port::; and Accessories long-rffilge plans concern 
m:rrket dcvelopment actionG dcsigned to ex.pand the appeal and 
v:Jlu;nc of G~ch l'rodllct2 . 
3 . 2.2. Cnpi tal irl're ~tmen t 
As is t),C case with the majority of contempor&ry business 
enterpri ses the factor "Ce.pital" represents the most productive 
r esource a motor manufa.cturcr utilises . Moreover, as an indu.stry, 
motor manufacturing must certainly ra."';: nc one of the more capi tal-
in tensi ve. Certainl~' the operations wldcrkkcn ':Iithin such L. 
busi ness lend themselves to incr easillg measures of sophisticated 
automation. 
OVer3CaG '-lsscrubl y plants situated, for exmnple , in and :1round 
Detroi t in the United States have , in many ir;..;tnnces, attained 
a high degree o:f c'lpi tal intensity . (Ford I,qotor Compcny for 
inst3Ilco?, operates tUl engine plant r!ilOre the entire manufacturing 
process ie over Co,--; automated .) 
By way of contrast, mo tor assembly may also be highly labour 
intensive . Naturally t his situation only be com,,:.: feasible whore 
salce volumes are 101·', technology relativel;' primttiv'" Dnd 
lulJoLU' c111:;~V' (A uwnlJer uJ UlilIlul':lc"l.IU'(; r:fj vrlth IJl;'IIL:.; Gltuutcu 
in the l<'ar ],ast use la.bour illtCl'.~ :i.V0. nGr;cmbly me thods.) 
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Prom a Corporate Planning po.!.nt of view in respect of our 
local manufacturer, cssembl. oJerationc comprise a blend of 
capital ilild labour which, from Q!l investment and cost stance , is 
[]. workable optimum . Certain operation::;, such as engine manufacture , 
arc highly autom~ted Vlhilst trim fitment and painting tasks 
are perfun.leti entirely b: · h~~nd . 
Delving morc deeply into the role of capital investment it is 
possible to state that the ind.ustry (is a IVhol~ wi thin this 
countr} i:: noted for thc degree of duplicated investment between 
mEll1Ufacturers . As ""~ disc lr.sed carlier the relati vel;" large 
nWIIb"r of local manufacturers, each rlith their orm plant investment, 
has resulted in a subst'.ntial degree of individual under - utilization 
of resources . Moreover, there is evidence that this under,-utilization 
represents an overhead cost '.'Iho3e weight is felt in the retail 
price of vehicles produced - quite apart from the mis-direction 
of this cOLu1try ' s scarce resource~" Continueu buoyant market 
development and expansion dltrinb the late) 1960' s must be blamed 
for the entrenchmen t of tod:J.{ 1:.3 e7.cessj.ve nl.1!'lber of local 
munufDctllrcTs , As u consequence, only 11 rcduction in the physical 
number of manufactLlrers (.., process which connnenced with Volvo's 
wi thdrawal and r:hich is continuing via the recent Sigma- Leyland-
Pcugeot/Ci troen merger) and Elll exp=~ion of the vehicle marj,et 
(by Blacl,s r-n d Coloureds purchasing more new vehicles) will 
equate potential supply with demand in the fores" ,eable future . 
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r,ookinb into the acturu. car:l Lal structure of our (and an.r) locol 
motor manul'acturer it is pO;:;'.l c,le to identify three qui teo 
di::;tinet IlJld 8cparat" classes uf ":lp:i tal invcG "lmcnt cach of 
I'/hj ch possoss differlng dcgrecu und types of' lntcreot to 
Corporate Planning staff . These clRsses of investment are 3 S 
folloVJs: 
li'ixed Investment 
Product Investment 
Operating InvectTaent 
.iiach will ce discussed in turn . 
}'ixed InvtJstment 
Fixed investment represents a class of expenditure possessing 
the greatest me a sure of long- term orientation. Expenditure in 
i tsclf ic invariably concern8d with relatively large sums of 
capi t:ll ;:hich are sunk into plant and tuildine;s he ving economic 
li ve s up to and exc8ediu,:; periods of 50 to 60 yecrs , ( .. n 
example exists in respect of the manufacturer's assembly plant 
buildings and land, part of ':Ihich :l t Of.ns and part of which is 
hcld on ::. ninety-nine :rear lease:) 
B;' its n ' tllrL such investment does much to impress a seal of 
longevi ty and permanence upon the business. Moreover, . by its 
v ery nature the type of plant concerned is of a specialised 
nature such that its aliaptation to alternative production processes 
is not easy to accomplish - if at all . 
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The above trrin facts , the in',-estment' s lone- life and specialisation , 
in addition to its high cost n1lturally means that such investment 
is not to be made light- hcartedly. lIIisdirccted fixed invcstment 
innate caution with \"Ihich the issue of fixed investment has and 
is approached by the manufacturer's plill1Ilers is evident if the 
company ' s investluent history is reviewed. 
HistoricDlly, the sLlbject "olilpany'" fixed investment progralllme 
is divisible into thrce parts : 
(a) Pr~-lYorld WPr II 
Given the fact that ~le entire South Afric~~ market was 
in its infancy, fixed investment was sufficient to establish 
the embryonic core of a manufacturing opcration. Sufficient 
was sunk into the local business to provide plant capable 
of assembling Dupor ted units and components but little else. 
(b) 1945 - 1968 
During the Dumediate post- war period the company ' s 
planners were expectinG u rcpeti tion of thc economic slump 
which followed the 1914 - 1918 conflict . . Naturally, 
attitudes towards expilllsionary fixed investment were hard. 
Once, however, motor vehicles began to exist in a situation 
of free-supply during the late 1940 ' s the pent- up demand 
occasioned b;r the war years began to make itself felt. The 
net result was tile first truly significant fixed investment 
programme . Lruld was pLlrch3Dcd and a complete assembly 
plant and adIuinistration block constructed , Capacity 
was such th"-t it was able to keep pace vii th an expanding 
market for more than 15 ~-curs after i tG opening . 
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( .,) 1 '08 i: :"J68 
GXl1l"l3f-d prouu(; \;.i.0.."'. lJut-l.;lt:l.lccl(!; .... :ll i.dl COi..ll.l HOt 0C 
ri~C Lif-j cn 'fL L! lOut a co 4J~l1ly-v, :i_dc '1'..18n t,;wn (:!.vpanDion in 
rl~r.:pc c.:t of bot~: pT'oduc1; O! ... and 3.<1'!(lini~')t[' ~ tion .::::.cil:i. t.i::::":4 
At 1~ ~ ~.rr; time h"i ~:J :l:,r f;:,\ .) l '..-..... 3."ule J,,: :.l'kct C}:lV·n:..:.l.on for':) ca:Jt8 
were prep'u'ed ,111d in <lccord Inco r:it.h 1.J1e need. to tai lor 
e"pae i. ty to fnh.T" dcrn"lld t.he; 1m'. ; .. " t ri .. cd i.ltYcot.:lLcr,t 
1. l'(;vic\; vi ':;1 J' ';~r ,- n('i ri n t: .. , exn08C::: "the fnct tl-:at tt-.is 
.:!t. !··'li.:..( 1.:: -i.'l:Ler up tlllli:::.n \",':"1 ::: ::.l'C~Jtl:J- mj .3pl.3ccu_ 
I'on·;:'t l.h:.: La:1.l 1 n~ 1:11 (: f :. ct ihnt I:J1C C:IT mUl'l ~ct ulon3 c:prc-lcd by 
u n Livel" ; .... ) 1' G.r.,,1 per [I'1l1tlm t\Jt\':,~·u!.1 1965 OJ.:;.t'i 197!~ , the 
;tQ;.u1~;:tctu.:cJr .:. ctuall,:- lo:.; t Ifi: . ."-:l.'lceti cllDre tilrOuS~10ut t~le 3;".,rly 
l~J'I'Q T:-3 t ( ) :()re ... C(:.~~ iliC8.11;:t :_ d'\.r;::mcc~ : 'n:i cctt, r (;o~: .. i1~ructGd 
J LtpUnc.Gc-r;ourcGtl cOI:'.pctl tion. In D.llUi · ~iol' ... , tll~ po st 197~· 
ir~dustr,:.r sluJ:'1.p exposed ti:e S0vere eztclt tu nhich over- c::...pacity 
i:[,d boe n butlt into this third und l~Gt (for mMj' :;carz to come) 
f"L:':Q,] invc:;1:rnent ' etion. Aceordin(ly, therofare , ti ven the 
b~nt.:fi t of hindGigi.lt onl;r the fir;'3t b ,' J fixed invt.-stment undcr-
takiner3 i_:'lv~ beel! truly justified. :n the 3£IUfJ \'IfiJ that this 
]jl c.m'J f~ctu.r":l' i ::. l':l-~cl~F to c ull a .1l Dl-~ to fnrt:1~ ' r fixed i!r,-'::-stm t..: r..t 
durin; -t.tc fo:;::'es ~. E':Jtle iu l;ul'e ::111 :LU£ll tical Grit ntatiOl:l in likely 
to c.x.if:t in respect of it:- cvmp2ti't;;on. lndced, m--nuf['lcturer 1:::; 
actio!:, vi...;- a - viD fixed investment Dre n: ')st lil\:ely to ta~:e the 
form of the consolid,"tion and rationalisation of actual inve::1:ment 
- ].)2 
~J 1(: i'c n :..: i L Ll L VI \,) 1" uddcr L:;L i '~1,- ~ au.ell inver. t.ncn t und, if UPIH'ovcd, 
.i.n- u0pth D~ud.J" MorCO'le I',:.:Ie a d.Lrect <.;oi1sequcnce of the: comp:.nyl s 
ovcr-in7C:3 t.ment, "Lli c parent ec.lip:m;r i1:1r' dir0 ci;.;(L that nIl fi :xcri 
Finolly, :for the SCl!HC re :.: ZOll :J t~ ).:.t J .:n~Jy COr.lP'3·LLt.S Dre mnlcir_G 
i.; ... 1:;0 
local m::.c1O ~(.:n0nt. Ii"~!:l~ i ~ i~ posLible to h~-po the ,:ize tr~at even 
in the ev·..::nt 01' [l najur, c..u:;tu.ln·.d :ccr,C!1cro.t.:i.on ill indl~3i.ry 
I'(1)rescnts a major on-r:o i~ . : !lc"ld"'vclw :for aIl~~ metor .nmlv.iacturcr 
l ocatr.:d 2!1..; -,·;~ Ier;) in the world. i: i()reo·:~. r·, South __ frican condi tion3 
aTC sllch t!1at, Cl.t lL'1.~~ point in tihle, it is !10 real cxagceration 
to state that product inreS1;rlCnt is li!:cly to be the prim" 
conc·ern of e.ll local :no to L' comp3nier;. n: ' ti "m.l~ for thin 
8ssertion '.",'ill become clear from wh2.t follows . 
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E!;sJnti211y, t.;his cutcGo!"'y of inv~~:..,tl!h ... l:t cOJnprioc3 that which 
is sllnk ,~ ntu the jjC~3, toolint: unci pruLlllction pl~~nl1ir.z r:ccl...f..'::';·.l.('~ 
1..0 l'r'lducc a sinGL~ IT.aael I'[:.i:e.J. Pl'ocluc't D1Y(:S "m:n t, ti:ereforc, 
1::; indi..,t.;i.b]~.· p: .. ,:r·t of i~1 1 :: l i fe cJ.::'.lc c::  ULY V011.i.clc ll~OJ(.:J_ uuch 
t.i.~.3 ~ tlt tllC' COllcll1.s.i..on of t',ll:"lt cycle n lh.rij :Lnjoctiun of' 
1 ~ t nu.:f:}ct ~; .r· ""',,~.' -"i:l f u lIo:.' '.~ :. ?::; [t.[' l.if'~ (;;:,clf~ i'0T f:2.1;:t GiVL?l 
r:..!.!:,;c: (if r" :.:;;'JCr:~~:_' . c c: r8 "!:d . 'l.i~!lt C(F . ...::'f.;rci ~ , l Y8h.i.cl~ . -( Tha ~ 
i't'r trl'i c: :, 'J u:d tl'2.ctor::.: .i.~. :: 0! ' Le'N~ ~ t llin'.:;or c..Ling ro~ghl? 10 
1..0 J.~ ye:. l(':;: j.n dUJ':.itio!1 ~) 
Of note ~rc th r· fpcts that product l :~~'~ cycl~::; arc not ";~ .. 8d .... .; 
local m:lr~~ct considerations at all. Instc['d, r..oci.el deletion 
and introdl'ctio:'1 ae t10ns I"~r::lirl the p9rcGative of o-I,--erseas 
s.)urc ~ cOillltries wherefrom vcr...icle dezi.:;ns [1.1'::' ab ~!:>i!1cd. 
So'condl;;-, p::-oduct investmLlt is extre,"ely cxpcn~iV€, . Fox' 
cx~mple, tc rc-tool end set up the jJl !'It to produ ce a new car 
TI:odel ma~' .Lncur incrl.:nental product i~1VC3 r..llcnt of anything fror~ 
IllUm IIp\'i~rcls v'ho;:e r'osidn;:,l vall).o at the end 01 ,]:" cycle ';;ill 
be miuim .. !l. 11ablra~ .ly, the G'}precintlon and P'_:l- back .charcics of 
such var..t Gums mu.oi, bc spre:'.cl over the 5 J eara duri nG which the 
inv0stme_lt will bo pr oductive:. La view of tho lor,' indiYidual 
sales voILu.1':"z (re I n ti vo:.. to over[ e~G cO:..l!1tri '}s) recouping this 
j nvc:3tr1(.!1'L, :md llJ:J,;:iuG r: lJ r ofi t ~hereon, dcmf.ll1cic highly :J.cct.rr:J1;c 
J:l~l.rket <.lE'} peic.i.lle c'l.lclJ.L:..'" t;, f'jn~'; ·U.' ;:1.1: -"'(:} • .i.c;] I j.~ no t t'J hecome 
\,;as an opJn secret th::.t this qucstio:: c~' product invcstuent 
'. 
- lj.' 
il'!. Uiteriil,- ;~~c '::hen (;lj:!'..Jid. \~:L'i.1.1· ";·. ~lcthcr Ol' not 1·0 introduce the 
;.:"e-" Golf rrr.J8 to I'C:l)l -' ce HI- nbictui ti.CD.:' F'cetlt.: E..nd, if .J0, 0.t 
" !l~t price t , ) 1:-,.u~· ·::!1 tl::: -"'-::"J !:L..:l.e. 
::::0 '~'I£ll the qu.es ti.JTI o I.' or> Limnl proc;.uct invest;nunt. In essence, 
it is no :!):acgcr:::.tion to S'l;)' tlr:l.t t h e decision f.'lcil"!.G 'loll{S1',-oLer:.. 
.,':- ~ ODe o:~ '~he key milQ[3to{.J.('3 :"n i ts corporate i-.i::tory . I~troduccd 
ot.:.:!.'"-i.nl1 t.::~(.! miLl-19~~O 18 iJ::; Ii liT' 'lpor.:\Jd lu' :- co.::;t I1 peoplc I 2. cor" l ,y 
t!:c ::azi l'f:Cir:1C, the B.)ctll. ..;..~ it C::llJe to be e;alled \TJ .. S 
l'r.:.]lu'r£:c te;d ~~l' tor the Y!~ [' ~'t...'1d Il:..trj.ng the three fc110¥/in{,j de ca.des 
estn.tli s~'l ?: d a niche in the !Jo '~uri~g ': . .)rld L:: i:-IIPGr:'shabl~ as 
tlio.t of Ll~c i,' 0J.. ~ : I)~ Ptlrd. j., r·.:lui,ivc.:.;t un~cphlst..i._ co.tcd ~nGin(,crinc: 
dc:....ign it3 :"''Jxe_ ~·.vnc::; proCluc"L d0big.rl :cC:h.D.inJd lli1C:.C11Gc-d for Gver 
t":lirt~t year:- _ Dl:fL!.,J.ici t~: , rugged cuns'vT'uctiol1, C :.3e of repair 
~lti Jrui!ltcnwlce 2.l".ic. lOd i n iti:Jl priee lc ~;p'L the Beetle ct or 
uhrotl.:;l! to tl:c mid - 1970T s. :1 ",hin tl~ ~ e1v l-.:tl <..:ontext, thL 
c~olden ~'L·.'rs of t!18 Dc t18 ',!8rc, the 19GO I ~ c~ld c=ly .19','0 I s when 
recor d n'.1..ii.berG of I'c..:t1];; \".'L.rc export,;d uO the In:!.itcd StateG . 
ro .... ;ever, frura ~hc comrnclc..::m.c·nt of tho 1970 I G til.1 dc:-rce of 
competition \·tithin crav.itiunal sId1l1 c 'r!' mm"l':(is ',;';'S ri::;::"llg . 
J ap3ne:.:..·= Iu8::u~ac t nr,"!rb i!1 partieulGT ':;ere offel'ing .Am.erican 
tuyers c0I!lp-:-rLbly priccu C<.U'C ',.!1o c;e desiGn nad spccific3.tion~ 
rj.c;n t tiO\ ,n to the "eruditionru. Beetle qllnli ty of' relinbili 'ty , 
":cre ei '~:lc!' C01Hpeti Live.: v:.i. Lh 01.' :",;uIH!r.i.vJ' to the :]gcil1':'; VulkGVl8.£:un. 
I' 
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in conccq.lCll/:e, Volkn', iD,-:;ell r. :Y'_ forcel tJ conr:5td"::'r a :i3c ': tlc 
l'ep .1 UC~.!18n;" - the Ou.~(:OL':: or..' ':, ~:.icll "'-: .-'8 tJ':e Goll d8Sie:n. South 
4·.f'ric~m L:~~l(T3, in th0 intul"'iJa, Viere 3lso t€:ndins to sui tc:: 
tc':,'nrdL :I.Cr":: ~.Ittr3cti V8 C()J:i.~h . ti, ti;rc offL'ri:ngs. J·H.; 8tl~ \'1:),5 cast 
ir~ the role of c:heay 1 ;)p :.:: :rt~'!l l;.,:rtorin.:.; - n TInI'kc't niche "·: -lid!. W'-1.3 
c.:ontr<lC ting gruduall,,' OYor tiIn-: . C..;rtnl.:lly j LD k ey pureh 80 
mO'!.;.:.ve muot }}.lVC' bcol1 pi:'icc - :1 IfOOcc vBrGio~l ' .. "1.8 tile LJwcst 
priced mod .~l \'.i. tl: tJ'!:J.t CE;).P. _ size on thJ m::rr;cet \':r:ilst the low 
l'a.:.:gr.: }. )~l)(.! C clcrivaL.:.vt: "·;:c!; .~)l U - !.; .1( .. (, .I 0 :) ,j axpt:I~::;ivc t o uuy 
t!l[;l1 j. t3 rJj:_J..rc~· [. YO.LU!nf"; (; I)J"j le t i.. tor. 
R:::tiCl1&lc f ·).l' t~is !1r..Lce dJ.ffcrential cOl.lpl-'iscJ, in the I!"lln, 
t ho fuc" thr t the cl~r1'mc for large su,"." of incr1.l1Gnt,.1 prod:.lCt 
'for such toolir..:"': , 1-:.- J T\. ;'1["iHCU. uilclru-:: .3cc1 for :"ears , thus the 
Giv"n ell" f[Jct t;,,~t t olC deciGion ~o ini.rodLlce t ·. ,'" Golf v;ould 
nccL.sr::i ta tc L.13.ssiv£ product in'-t8::t.ltG-l1C, th~ t,t;O m3.jor l1rotlems 
f ac i!'lC \T·:Jl!c..:--::r.geI1 of ::Jou th .. :u.rica r;t:re, firstl~, to f und the 
.;E;condly , t:m.t S'i.nc 
invcs t:r.c..n ~ mu~t be depreciated over pro(mctiOi.l ';/hich !llG :I.nt that 
uni t costu (~l1d retail pricer) wOllld tD2\:c a ::mdd .... n Riplifica.."'1t 
le ap upr,·ordc . In tUl'!~ , :11i;; m8Dl1t thnt th: Golf would be quic~{ly 
rCll1.0Vl d, price- Hi ~c , ".lr:)m tlJC gr:lsp of the majority of penny-
cOl1cioUG c:x- 'P,ce tIc oaners . Ie a ~ll t f,l:lt.ll, Volk:;':J~.cen I s product 
.. !.nv (:ctmcnt eOnJmi tmcn L vlOuld l.Li.Gur tb:.! :-..:er iot~::i ri::;].: of [l sutstonti,:d 
10::'::::; of rctLt.i l" Ruleo ['t ju .--:t the :n0rr.eJ.1.t VltK:ll s\:ea.dy J.eLm1d was 
c:.a :J.c:ic:.l to the VC!1 Lu:cr; I s :::uecr' SG. B.e V " l"j L'ct th,..t Golf ,;as now 
corropeti.rg at the tel' enn (as o~)poseC. to the L:JttOffi e:cld) ;)f the 
~:ul.ll C"'l.l' market III ~ i..J.1"t tJ1Ht it '.vould ~)e fully exposed to similarly 
r 
A t the time cf "uI':L ';t);JJ G-olf i [; sli:Ll "~'ri thin t ile aro\.'th phase 
uf it: .. pus t-::!"~ ~un(!h c'yc~l"e . '.Ihe ce i t8 cycntl~['"l plr;tcD..u level vtill 
Y'I'htc:1: Golf ".v~""tl Lc al~lE~ to t ,· .. C:JC t in -LI1.: roll..' 01" a cur ~ :": 
i:unlortnl n::j the Doe tIc - rvtlJi.rin~ Ii ttlc incremcr.tcl product 
inveGtmcnt in tho YC::U'f) to CU'll(". On tJ1H bani:.; of the vchicle 
,IS "Lt ~,,;t~' ~l(i!', l!o,,-;cv<.!l"', j L ; pp..!ar :::: I jJ~eljr Lh~Jt \r0 1J·:':..l\,gl~l..1nt:,: 
!:')'C'ULlc t .i llVc.: ;.: ~;.:<.:n t rcquircl.l' .. nt ' .. ill 1'i ::0 ~iL-nii'icnntly rel.. .... ti vo 
to i tz pl'u-G'Jlf tJ.aYG. In ['U.~~· QV01lt, the inJ)rlCt product invoGtn::.ent 
T.i. i..",.Y hay"'" i,;,f'Ull DO 'r l "L. e [!"Iotor <;or:-:pw.l:r r S .,~::'''Tketin.: !..~, i~: .:t.ld product 
;~r~t1" ()11:; : "!": }uj, j nu \"! h.:. clc;.J,l:·, (Tn l.':--.'.. ~;:;:il)· ·· a "-rer,Y :.;-LroncJ.y based 
tl"er)l'J' llr,:..: .i L th: : L OIll.. uJ tl.!c: l·ua!.x'n:....: \"/l:;t Volvo ";;i·!.:,hd1'8V; fr01.1 
00\.\ th AfY'lc~ ',K .. 8 t.b.r~t 3~.ll c-:::: " c l wnes ·. ·erc -:'!1 _iJ.f.flci cmt to cUPl'0J.'"v 
~H'Ol~uct i!lY";f.-I tUL.Ht l1 o:!C CS:::;.i ttl ten bJ~ ~ .. r"Jdl~l c}:"o::'1i~(: in Sweden.) 
00rpoL< ... tt; 1'1,::.- nnin] concern eVe): prud:;.ct invcsi:J.~ent is relatively 
:::trr,iG':t for, nrd ill the s(mo;c that U.() !'equir8l'~nt for a,1d implicati,ons 
01 luture. product ::invLct,lcnt arc largely lQ"w":n . :The.:.: if :i.n 1980 
the TJ:1:l.111l.L";!.c:t:.::.ro:-:
'
8 source count.r:~ will "be introducj.ng [l totally 
1'(.;-::'; t;,.lt~d, .l'c - eic:.;iLrrlCU. lH'oduc"L li.ll '~ , the l((!~l COL1PW1:~ r r; plunfJ 
lC..1din[; L<p to ,'nu includ.int; th!.1t ~ l.:".£' ;:lv..st pEovitle for the . lays 
t::nd rne,'110 of fir.. C"illCine that 8yrl tch ( fll .... ;.:J:rs 3.s::ml:'ling the dr!sir ~ 
c '::i:.;tc t o rc'Lain ,\,ilat model line). 
NaturalJ.,)" the de sir .... of all local IiJr 'nLlff'"cturcrs is to reduce ' .. 0 
the lo"west POS8:i. ble level t:18 rlC[;r:)8 cf sG.per-fL.loU3 prod.uct 
j".l.lVI .. :...t:.1eni;. ~eo a-tt,'1.in thi~ objGct:iv8 three al";,;er2.1a."tives c"xi::;t , 0ne of 
I' 
p r ounc Lion for ct:1 j.nuQfinite p\.~I'iod of Gi1.1Cfeaturin.:; bu t 
rr.i nor detail ;,lDLn6ml):r!tc. (VolkGwn301l ' G }i .etle i:3 pos~ibly 
(I.razil T s Voll:srJ2gen. 
OP(;!" tiuY! prod.u ce:.:' 13Qctl(;3 fl .. YJ.d I'l c· tli!l ,~ r.c,nbis uoing tooling 
irlvEstmcnt ::I. ,. di:::cOlU'O,3'"!Q, nmv vericle pTices :::.rL inflated 
mD.r~:t::t coml')cti tic'n is 10"': this i:'1vestment ~,iT!1i t ation rr .ctice 
1rvill vlorl ...  , r:.nd. 'lio:d: nell... the m&rket in " , ~ ,I.,\.. 
cj'lOi ce (mo:::.:t of v[hosc producer::; feature pl'udu.c"t Tepl:"lCeL"J. Ont 
cycles) i ~ nut the iu€:al wi trJi.l \'ihlch to G.dopt '"'n au~t8~i ty 
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(i~) A '::ol'La11~ cumprof!1is(: ( lL. first 0:' t v.v) i::: a !:itret(:.:..;~" of 
il1- hol.;.se product iny(:sT:'.lJ(l t reduction · .. l:er~. L1y as much us...; o.z 
is fO; ~2ible in !Uf!de of CZi:.:t1.115 ncn- oboolete invest:n( r..t. 
en the ~·.'l101_ the l1WUbUl.' of oppurtul.:.i tie:..: fcr duing 30 are 
llJ,s:ine und po,,:rn.· train co; .. poaents. In this '.'18.~ ~ tr.e cubj eat 
:.l J:'cvi:;ed cvcr:J(;:..:~~ uod.-- :;t.yle . d.ll be r .. dol'tc.d but the 
ove t'S(;3.S cngin8 "I.nd po .:cr train vrill U(: TO j 0(; ted. Inotcad 
:3uch C0lJ . .0oncnt~; an :n:e aJ..LU,uf-:c:ttlt'cred loculI:, ' mId for which 
p e:r:L'cctly Gound pro(l.;.ct jr.!ve:Ti"!!18nt exists r:ill be utilised. 
Uce Jf tj'.ls devicr~ i:; widespread Dnd i";; doc::; much to cxpl[~in 
V;~TY i..J. loc:ll]~T !,l:: l~ufcctur('<l version 0:';'" a j}ffi'tic1.l1ar vehicle 
maj- be offered wi th :L l aOOce er:..:;jnc \" '1~i l ;.:.: t the vey:! !June cfl.r, 
in say .t:urupc , fe atures a qui tc uiffer o!lt 1 ·90()cc engint:. 
The l'e 'i .;}on wh;y c :"lgine t nd po',-:c:·tr,·,i.:'·! iu C: favo;.lred ir.l.vest:rr.ent-
silver is tha'j; ' 1;he exre~~ e of rcpl.scin.s or r L. visir...:; such plRL't 
costs of t;'!(. o['ch.:r of R3Cm or more illay ue involved. . A po:;'n t-
of nGtc 13 the fact that even the o-v~rSeas :>nrent cOI!1p['ny 
i& con:::cious of the need to mini:lice plr.r,t investment on 
en(,ines . In this V![ y 011gi ne desi[,'11S te!!d to be modii'ied 
cradllnl1y oyer timG rather t;"a'l feauuril1,; periodic totnJ. 
:ce- d::: :-.lign :-3 . ( Por cxt.inplc , SOI;-.C cnGi...'1e types in COfl:JllOn u.He 
tod:J .... - da.te ba.ck man;)' yc;i:.rs in r espect 0::::" their essential 
desig.l : F~rJ Bscort 1959 (its predecessor ~ated back t o 19 36 ), 
JJc;y.irJ!ln r,.d.n'i./.'.:aI'ina 19~ e , IlW ~0ctlc 1955, to Dle:ntj.on u. ft.w.) 
,[nL.(;crl, 80>1Jr] of L:10 ;no,;t ir!!lOV8.t..i..vc rrI 2.nu:f3ct:.~er':" in the field. 
. , 
... r:) A ·~!_.i.J:d :J.wl cqu <!. J... .i:.,'. ·..JPi':..:d : .J .L ~.~ Lie.i.!. ~ :; Lh(: i!·l-·~lO:l::.:e 1'L·ud~.1 (; I, 
or.t .... L~1':· s~ :ouldr ,' rc ,yf t 1, . . !.1 ~ LU:::;'C-:';Ul'S..L.'! s r uP1i1it;X's. 
i! . '(1 
·1 
i;i.il.L " \}.L 
trJ.W. t t;hn. t cut:ai13 . 
. ,0 :f.' i:a, ~ l~C ::. .... wh ill.'/c:;., tnr.nt., tll ..... ir .: cC!L1ical ::1\.1.11s , c::pc:ci C!j..!ce 1 
1,Gli <.... ·:.) i J.. ,lL;:r, fin:J .. 1CiCt~1. ~3~"bilitc' · ' cu;..: to!ner CO . .lpoGition ffi1d 
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Reprez 8n+", ti ve Froduc t C:, cle Over 10 Years . 
2 PrcullcL i nvestment for face-lift model A _ 
1 MJi)- CyC.LE 
I MevEL JJ' 
I FP.CEUFT 
To MOViEL 
I '13 >. 
10 
I , , . Product :Lnvcstmcn-L for llCV! IIlodel !l
l 
which <loco not ;,nclud" 
rieviscd floor-pp.n, engine and powertrain . 
c Prodllct investTl1ent for fe-co-lift model :i. 
D Prodllct investment for ne,,, model Cl which includes 
r('vised floor-p?n, engine and powertrhin. 
Note : rr.'id -cycle r, cc- lift DC tion", m'e dc:.ign'c<l to ro'freshen 
t!IC vchicle i ::; market ;:'ppe"l after i tu having beon on the 
tYlffl:..·CID(KrICN-- _ 
1 ...... ~tAl NwJ;eL 
1; ' 
.. 
I , 
m8rket for between 2 to 3 years ,md th~reby to halt or postpone 
UJlY nrltural competition-induced downwa.rd slide in sales 
from the post- lallnch "plateall". 
L 
Assllming thc dCGcription depicted in the above diGGram is a 
reflection of reality and that the compNlY pl~l1ls on a revolving ~, 
10 y' m' cycle ·i t is clem' that its prodllct investment plans will 
compri~iC 110 1(;:.:::.8 th "l Jour phases . Each llhnt"ic rc:quirine action-
lH.'.scd pIons vv'hich dntnil "hnt func18 Dl'0 r8quired , ;';hen and how 
thej' \,i11 be '-,pcn t rUld their TC3pccti vc ",chedu1eG . It Ghonld 
- 1, 
come '10 no :jllrpri,fJe to lem'n th erofore that ',Ii thin the subject 
manufacturer' G finDl1Ce depnrLment there are no less than five 
sl:illed "l1"lyntG r;ho<:o rcsponsibili ty it is to manage Ql1d co-
ol'dina.te product investment projcct~3 . 'Phey , :i n Lurn , '1,ork. 
hund- in- glove with tlw compeny'D produot develop,nent depa.rtrnen t 
r;hose fUEc Lion i t i~ to develop tho actual physical product 
proglTJlllUC S . 
l'l'oduct ii:lvcfJLr;:r.:nt dccl .... .ion::.; [;1'8 , bjl'" tl:cir vr:r~- ::![;[;ni tilri0, Dlrp.)::;t 
irrcvcrsr'.blc once fund~; h<.1v,-, been COINIli tted. 1'hus if an incorrect 
or mis-directed investment i~ made that cnst and its allied costs 
DUel ~l:r'C, [,iOUrCCD of total financiul 1080 to the company. 
For ox~ ... f!I1-d.0, <l topi<.:al. dncisi.on '/l111ch it:; :focirlg this mnnufacturer 
and :!. m.u.lber of i t3 competj. tOT'S is ';,'iletller or not to reduce the 
siz~ of i k suall c ,'r offering down to that characterised by the 
existinG ;.1Ltzd:'. 323 and VVI Golf I1 ho:tchbac.;k" st.;lec . 0ui te o..part 
from ~!l:l: ' h::u-cl , quantitative GuleG fi~urc data tt.ere is the 
imponderable question of the l,h rke t' s t_ste ill small cars. 
Buyer.::; l:1~~~T ','~ ,)ll turn in incrou:;inb" nllmbers towards the Ithatchbnckl1 
(five cloor Or bootless) car style, in which case, the conventional, 
booted "n'3.11 car -.vill provo unpopular, Alternately, although the 
hatchback mo.,)' become vloll e::Jtablished there rna;) still remain a 
solid body of C3r bUyf>rs who favour a car with a boot, ' Whichever 
is the caGe the mOl1Llfacturer h'18 only sW'fieient investment funds 
to choo",,, either a hatchback or a booted style car. If for 
exomple h" is facod nOl', vri th a 10 year Corporate Plan wherein 
·Ll'l'!: llc"J',:,',Lo" 11111: ; L, h.' Ill,'"I( ~ .'·'1 "(~:,r' '.';,:\ "" " Ll " 'I ' I' ~ ....  tl - _ 'I I(! LUI<J1H...'J.; .. _ .LH1b> . . 1.(::1 -
tiun...: (;OnCf:r.!1. th...; G:lm of ii20m und; Gllce committed there is no avenue 
for sl'I,i.l,<;mng to a 11eVl model ::l:y18 lmtil ,)'CCQ" l3 (outside the 
plenninG period), the real w,ture of the situation becomes clear. 
In prnc ticcthe deci8ion requires careful market research to 
cstubli :· ·11 , .' ~ :J f. r QU is pO "}:'"Ji blc, bu:;e:cs l future purchase 
l're.fcre"c:('~, a clu;;" U'l;lld,.- of the financial :iJUplication~ of e ach 
.. t.l ternu Livu, !1l1 equa.Lly (..:lo;")r j r.tlld:,~ of COlTl!10tt tors ac tiol1G Dnd., 
n ,nallJ', " keen dic.l'lay of mCl.llccgerial judGement at the most senior 
of leveL,. 
Opcri~t i.ng j nvc:; L1::e11 t 
OperatinG jnvc[;tment, n'; dci'inod by the sub ject manufacturer , is 
essentially short-term funding neceseary to ,'llloVl annual expenditure 
commi tmellts to be met. In Corporate :r:L,u1l1ing terms, therefore , 
An earl:L"r section discussed th~ rol~ of Corporate Planning control. 
'1'11c poin L mu,\" be mno8 tb ...... t now11crc is uucll control exercised to 
such a dc 1..:'1ilc:d de~rec as over opt:rating investr,18nt. In earlier 
times the cO;.J)lc-n,)" I G ffi1l1Ual opera.ting investment plan was sought 
to be kept di3Lillct Drd 3eppr"te from tile mor3 detailed annual 
bllllcet ouch Lhat the invectmcn L p1:.:n mcr'ely Gtood as a yardstick 
where b~- budge ting vari311ec s ','/ere ga.uged, Today, experience has 
3hown thClt, the 3y~t('m ';;ork" the most ei'i'ectively Vlh en tlle two are 
closely dovetLiled. 
OperatinG investment plDl1Ilino; compri,;es the follo',ving clcarly 
defined Cll'E:("lt~ : 
... 
-
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A l!lontblJ reor.lew of 0.11 y:o d:- in- progre:::;s U11U finished 
inventory valu 'J s L~r operat.illg a.reo - us appropriate. 
Amon l,hly yecu:- to - datc reviow of all revenlle nnd expendi tllre 
by operating :IJ'Ci..t (\.ith :1. claiJ.y revic:w :LJ r equired i n cxceptional 
cirCwflstuncc s) . 
A monthl,y year- to-dat" rc:vi ew of all il.ventory V'-lllle~ by 
operatine area - as :::ppropriate. 
A mont.hly v~\rj once ;ulo'll~p:::;j.::; of ;:-'ctll<:il vcr:::U8 plt.mnod rcv cnllC , 
C\)lr~ n".i. l T!l ' ':;lL :uHl C:q>C' lHli Ltu'c i,.,. o!'(~r:~I:.i .. llL~ Ul' e,.1 :.llld for tile 
comporl~; 'K' 0. \;11010. 
A rr.0n thJ y variance nnoly;-;Lt: of ~ · ctual versu.s planned inventory 
mod \'."c,r}:-in-procross VcilllOS by oper ating area (ao appropriate) 
[Ind for the compLUlY aD n. '1/11018 . 
A mOll tilly l'(!vievt b:r i t et:l, by ()p~rD tj nc: nyon C f fu ture p18l1ncd 
and colt,ni t ted expendi ture throu:;h t o the year- end Vii th the 
objectivc of reducing, deleting, rc-?ffirming or resetting 
pl'to l 'L r..i.':"'::: upon' ;iuch expenditure . 
A mun thly proft t <J11(1 l or:G ~mnl~·:-Ji8 b~- op('rnting area. rnd for 
the company as " '" hulc. 
t monthly full ycar profit and lOGS projection analysis by 
operating nrc{l 'JIld 'for tho company aG 0. ,' ,-hole . 
In "ddi tivll to the ,.'Dove 1ll0l1"Lhl:i c1l1::U. J"oi,;, the 20me are 
rcpetltcc.l on 0 quarterly basis. 
A point of note i s' the l'[lct tInt the company's annual profit 
target i" " fixcd enti t;,' which ic; incDpablc of v[,ri"tion during 
the cour;-.;r! of the year . There is no tl;ling: , hoviever , to prevent 
tho loc i) l IIli..i!l:lGin:; dlI'C'c Lor :.llil1 hi:~ co- d LTcctorG Getting their 
o';m 11t;t::;I,:: " profl L ul l ,j {~t;tiYC for Lhe 'yn ;u', thci.r aim beinG to JTI:lkc 
~I 
.. 
- :1 _ J -
the 'Jl'ijrlnicHltion ""~retch" n little h=der than it v;ould do 
o LllOr':Jis c . 'rhc rev:Lf'ed, h.f()J:'Jllf'l tarGet io naturally cascaded 
dm'.n the organization (such that tarc;et :Jales volumes are raised 
by X 2D:OlUll. ','/hich :Leade to the so.lcs force having to pUGh that 
much I""r<ier , the aSGclllbly plont mu~t build X nwnber extra units 
"task" objective impoced lJY local senior management as part of 
their drive to raj.se GIll1uru. corpol'atc proft ta10ili ty is to dircc '" 
[lctiODO huvc il s.L01.i.fic:.1l1t i .lIIpacL upon opcl'a tlng investmeut 
AsswninG lhe ]"nrkctillG tlep,·'.r'iJ..ent ' s ullUz.ct for 19713 is Hl 500 000 -
which is i , l accordance with the agr' )ed '1llnual profit target . 
ilxpressed cnother wo.y , the sum of Rl 500 000 represe!1.ts t he 
Dmount of operating investment which M'l.l'ketin;:: requires to set 
in motion the c.ctions Md programmes designed to eaTn the COmpal'l.y 
its total profit taTget durinG 1978. :\educing departmental budgets 
1oJ' lCt/~ end raisinG the local , informal pr ofit target bj' 5;'; has 
the nf:fcct of demandiIlG 'lhat the Marketing departmcnt tuke st')p'" 
to ensnre that annual market pcnctl'u' tl.on rict:n b;'t :5 . :{~ over that 
required to meet the .lctual profit tarcct and, most impo r tantly , 
to llr.dcrt::Jcc this job wi tl1 only Rl 350 000 . 
Al t lloLlGh u :U,ndablc practice in muny wa~-s ahd especially in 
keeping the COffiP0.n;:,r aggressive, ir..ll0 v~'-t:L VI] (lll c.ic:Lng one rand do 
thc work of trIO) ,'n<1 coct-conscious this exercise IUUGt be wldcrtnken 
"'lith C;, l_IC for tr/u rI.!O::;OEn. ]?1.1,::::tly, there m::w be circll.1lGtnncC2 
wherehy the compm'y wilfL11ly ut:LSSCfJ a viable market opportuni'Ly 
, 
" 
" I 
- I 
" 
-
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',;herein uhorta:;G,G ai' l'undG x'(: :;lJl t in a continuous level of s ub-
optimol reGource lltilisatiOl~. For eX[:Juple, one car- line may be 
under Gevey" comped; :i tive preGGLlre which should be relieved by 
increl!lCll L:.ll uti vcrt:i. :..;:inC tm<1 pr(JJllotJ.on cx.I,)r.:nd:L -Lure. Au a con~jcqucnce 
of the bL:dge't- cut hovlOv" l' the advcrtisinc monaBer is forced to 
wlthdrar,' :.;upport in toto from th:lt cpr line: in order to, 2'1Y, 
launch· a sccond Gnd quite differcLlt model. He rationaliGes his 
decision on the bm'ji:~ th'lt jf ;ll1d \:lIen lri ~~ hH1gct ir- rnotorcll ~H~ 
VlOLlld on'; <o : . .(;ain ,:;ive the fL ·v;ing product the attention it 
deGerv~s ::.!ld demand 3 . 1:atur8lly, ",!at OCCLlrs is that 'IIi th support 
wi thdrov-ffi t.he car line fails even f aster. If and when budget 
i::.; restored the then avnilAbJ u fnndr; mu:::t be tbroVID into n. crj . .sti_s 
Gitui.1.~i0n v/Jlich t}lOj~ lIlay L LlVI 'IJe :in:.;ufl'j.cjent Lo Gave \vhcrcnc the 
earlier expcndi ~llI' (~ may hav0 Ull.iintnj,nud the otn LUG qno r.;n.tisf~<.:'Lor:i.ly 
despi tc u s!lart run embarassr.lent. Secondly, funds' reserved 
from r"dl<ceU bLldgets arc placed into P. speci2l account controlled 
1Jy the mm1Dsing director. In n sense tllCY are available for use 
under speciul c ircum3taIlces. ManaGers, therefore, . very often 
malcc \·ll..:ll-documcntcd, impas3ioned pl'::a:::; for the reloase of 8llCh 
funds to them. A,- is frequently thc case, fund3 a.re invariably 
r~le(l"ed ·from this account not so mLlch on the bctsis of the real 
priori ties of the issLle but rather on the f orcefulness (or lacl;: 
of it) of tile personalities involv(.d. 
~'o return to the conccpt of' applied operating investment it should 
be clear that two iSSllec PIC present. On the one hand are operating 
corrLro18 (CllCh as the :lbovo-lIlc:nt:iun(;d revic'l.s a r the paGt month I::; 
p C'I'fo]1i.1n.r,c( ~) ~ .md on t.1l1"' 0 theT i; OrC)ra Ling pl i.l:!.1l1il1l) (such ns vnI'innce 
correction ond l,xpemliturc ::·l'praisal). In effect, operating 
.-
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plrilming c~luD.tes to 1.1 Irfinc·-tanin.:;tr proccas whereby the business 
is mrd.n La:i.llud upon it::; plmmc,d course reluti ve to its 12 month 
incl.JllIc (~xpcnd 1. ~url1/pro:r:Lt-low.; ob,j cctt VL: ~ Opel"u Ling COn t.rols 
provide nn Informative llir:;i;oricol bn.cJ':".ground to present circumstances 
thereby reducing t " C risle of impl,mentinc: mis.- directed plnnning 
operations . 
{;J:·.'3~niz3.tton'].ll~r 7 operating invontmcnt plrumirJ.,G ~lnd control hns 
been rni2cd to [l hiG!1 uegl'c:! of sophistication. The above - mentioned 
computerised income and e ;~penf~c revieVl und forecasting s;:rstem 
exists _l8 the cornerstone of on- going fimmcial co-ordination. 
One of Lhc reason::; fur the method 1 s ncctlr:_wy [mtl cffccti veness 
is that the systems employed more desic;ned by staff plarm0rs 
wi thin til<' overseas parent. :iot only are these personnel some of 
the most skilled in the world but the~; bear the responsibility 
for dCGi[:?lil1G fine:lllcial reporting Gystcms vihich are internationally 
unifonn yet campa tible wi th "the particulLll' "Lyles and circUIllstances 
of each member of ~ \.idelJ" - sc"ttercd mL<lti-national business. 
J .2 . 3. Tcc~ll101or.\ 
Whon con[Jidering 1,J1': issue of' tcclmolog:r ViC-f.:-viG the Corporate 
Pl::U1l1in{: cffvrt:.J o:f :J 8inSlc mutor manuf:.lCturcr it is cssentiaJ" 
in the fir·st inst?l1c" , t~ lUlcover tile role technology plays wi thin 
the motor industry as " I:hole. 
From the outset it ShOllld be clear that the rate of technological 
lH'Ci'!,thl:Ol.l,:;ll VIi tiltH 'Llle motor' indu:.;tr,Y .L:; nut 11rocecclirlG at n 
rc·pid r"tc r.,1. : ·tiv8 to 0 ther, youn;;cr i!'ldustricc; . All thG essential 
technic,;}, breo.lctl'rQLlzhs necc3s['ry to produce a viable motor vehicle 
. 
.. 
'. 
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..... :::: knO'.ln t .. clay hod been i ncuJ.'p')ra ted into commcrci[ l,l designs by 
1930 , At (.U1 even deejlel' level, the principle of 8n applied 
internal combustion engine has remained unchanged since 1886 
when D'limler buj.lt the first pl'actical four-,vilcel£d "horseless 
c,..rrio!;e" . A mechaClic of 1909, used to working upon Model T 
Ford engines, ,',ould, for eX(llilple, not take too long to find 
his way rOlll1d thane of a current Ford Escort or Austin l.Iini. 
lIo',';ev(::r, if the indJ8try hns not bC2n no Led for its contribution 
to on-Going 'G:::chnological innuvation it does display the charac-
teristic of providing '\ menne; by nnd throucll which technical 
irLYlQV&.tion in other, sometimes qui tc separate disciplines , have 
been :J.dop"\.icu :..md transforTIled into cornn:.crc:ial cuccesses. Exrunples .,. 
inclu.de r[' (li[!l-pl~' 1.yre 8, nu t Olllat i.e t r:Jll Gl!li .. n::;j ans, solid-state 
cil'cuitry, " ,.d'c ty c;J.ar;s , "h,, (; '" ,'ud injection- moulded plastic::;, 
fuel, lutricGnts 8Dd metall~rgy. lolost, were conceived indepcndently 
of individu(tl motor m,mufactl.lrers but ,,;ere adopted and madL viable 
by thel,l . 
In any discussion of the industry's technology attention must be 
p"id to th n distinction which c}:i::;ts between technological 
brenkthroLlgh on the one hand [,nd teclmologicRl development on 
the othc r. '['he distinction is importrmt because , as may be 
deduced from wha t ",as mentioned above, tho) most noticeable feature 
of t he il:du~try 0 '.'81' the past Hft); j 'ears has not been its abili t:; 
to maintuin i 1.8 record i .n respect of breakthroue;h<; bu t r: ·j,hcr iL ::: I 
0-
consistency <.I S a devcloper of technology . 'reclmical development, 
· 1 
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i~ the on- going improvement 'll1d refinem2nt of es tablished, 
lJarli ~r inn..)vc.. tiOll L' - ezmfivJ c~: of \'1~1ich ,"vere l':cntion n d above. 
If it is lorlle, therefore, that the motor imlustry is, today, J!os t 
likel,' to be n t8cbIlologicnl develope r then 8. focus - point is 
8stnblir..;l1cd upon" which Cu!'porute Pl;mrrLng COllCernG uay 1)(. dircctL:d . 
By uncovering the motives which indllee the indllstry to develop 
technology alone certain line::: it ShOllld, in conseqllence, be 
pos8ib18 to 8XPOD8 t:l~ marmer :in viLich ::H ... ch motives m"c planned 
for over tbe long- term. 
Te clmolo[,'ical developme!1t mo ti ves are essentially two - fold . 
Firstly , tllC J: C arc IorcCJf3 wluc::h inciu.ce a m:::..nufi:1cturer to maintain 
hi~ produe t - line I s technology in eompeti tion with hi.s chos~n rivals . 
Secondly, there i:; the desire to cvo.de gov,-,rnment IE'[Oisclation or 
social pres:::ure. In any event , in the finaJ. analj'sis both 
Illotivc~ relate' to corporltu pro:fitnbility and corporate survival. 
A manufacturer whose products are technicall~- obsolete is in as 
much trolltl " as one whose prodllets fall foul of local content 
legislation. Eaeh of these rlill be discussed in turn. 
Competi tive Technological Development 
Sl1.ch development j.e· r;.~r~lJ' undertaken in rcc.tl0nsc to a desire to 
exercise a measl!re of corporate philanthropy by introdlleing, for 
example, a new ignition system simply to provide the buyer with L 
, 
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0. lllorc I'cl.L~Lble c:u~. x On t1 .. ,~ contrarj·, the moti va behind any 
cpontrt!lOOD!1 dcyc:lopmcnt j_G t~) bo fOI.:nd ~lrn i.rl8t the desire to r a.icc 
the vf,'1iclc I e; competitive op]lD['l relative to pO.2'3.11el dcwelopments 
offerings . 'J~hi[J motive mukcs itself felt b.r both employing 
technoloGY 1.0 r " .L:;, ! 'Lhe! "lH':C.il'jJ.:a ~iuD levD} :' UL<.il ~ into tLc 
product and by using Luelmulogy to seck out vlaYs and means of 
maintaining or reducinG production costs without rC !1der ing the 
end product V11:r ;; i.(;:!lJ Y Ufll!OJ.lP:. ti L.i.vt:.' Yt:J::.:U:; l'i.v: I] rj. 
30uth AIri c Wl speed rentric 'Cions and rising urban traffic 
congestion have led to car buyers ~eekin;:; more comfortable 
" live(,.tle" carr; them prcvio""ly. /\ccorr.iiq:;ly, local tcc/moloGical 
developmcnt has reGultE.d in the introduction of har d- wearing cloth 
upholstery und "tu!lp.d l1 sU:Jpens.i. ons in an .... ffort to make cars more 
comfortable, more qUiLt and mOre smooth ridinG. RiSiIl{:; production 
and repair costs have led to the developmcnt of solid- state 
instrwnent,~.tion electrics, body panels designed for rapi d , easy 
E.ssembl:- and repair or replacement if dZlllaged . A third techno l ogical 
dcvelopn18nt area cxists in r2spect of parts standardisation here, 
for exnr.Jl'lu, both mOl1ufr:cturcl' and buy er benefit from the 
installation of onc common tYP8 of 8 tartcr n • .) tor to all the 
mmmfacturer l s producto . 
CompU11iec: have adopted thin strategy and will continue to do so . 
~'hey do, however, ensure th"t the buyer p:.tys the full price of 
such a poli?y. They exist in markets where price is not an 
importDn L cOHsidol'rt l;ion or J.e belic·rcd not to be: - Rolls - Royce 
i::; ~;\lclt :! eOl1l1';t!.1,Y" . 
t 
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One of tho moe t ]wen1j- conlc"tcd teclmologieal development issues 
exists in re:3pect of fut::l OCO!lOlUJr. For example, it has been found 
thut GIlJ.:1l1 eDr buyor:::; are more .fuel 03conolH,f CO!L::c:i.:OUG tr..::n their 
lal'g(~ C:I,.l' CUlUl ·l;(:T'j):lr:l.:::. I II \;(U. l:~cqll(.'n<;(), JJI:!llur:l~!LlIl'(~l ' : ; have: 
devu Leu J3.ach Cl'fOl'L :Uld eXllcllt·(] to·"';'nl .: in':Lnc:j.llG al'out even 
m"I'Ginnl j,ITIpro-/Cmcnt~ in their slllall car;, I fuel E:cQnomy. 1~lCy 
do GO Sl.'<;lIl.'C tn the knuw1c:d£;G tlt:d, if Guch uevclupmcn1.,ul w:.>rk io 
SllCCeGnf~l the~" \'rill Do!:seBu :Ul Dttractivo nnd credible promotion 
plnti'J1.111 for thc ,ir vdtic.1.c . 
TL.chnoloGic" l d,"velopmont oJ: this t~'pe becomes of vi tal importance 
when i 'l, is '. uspected lhat a m",jor shi1't in buyer and/or cornpeti tive 
product oi'ferlne;s in al:out to occur or js in the oarly stage of 
'JCCUl.'llltj . ..:.,,0 years G~,O Gorporate 1-'1u.n:"12rG Wl 'L1LLll the Uui ted 
states motor inuuctry "iter·:..' fr.n:ed ":ii th just ::..;u(!l1 on issue. 
Tradi tionally, t!1C JiInerie,m lllotoric;t h88 t ended to favour large 
eighteen foot l ong cars pO\'ICX'cd by six oX' eight cylinder engines. 
Dy ' 1975/6, however , it w[.s clear that the inaustry's corpor"te 
plunn(;·r.'::.; had La dr.:/: i.rlc \,'h:rt i'IJ l urr] the Lhr'Jl ItlJii~ en.!' !! fac c.cl duriD{!; 
the next ten YUU.l's . Underlying this decir>ion Vias the fact that 
it VIa:.; felt tb"t a milcs t one had been reClehed in the development 
of such vehiclec Dnd t hDt r .,dicfll ch"necc in vehicle desibl1 were 
in the ol'Jirg. l"h'stly, the 1973 I fuel crisis I drove home the 
point th :..t l<ll'ge CHrs \vero a waste of SC8rce natural r esources 
3nd , as a consequence, Bovcrnmcnt l egisln t ion aimed at improving 
the con~urnv lion 01' fuel was inevitable . :'>eeon<lly, emElll c= 
imports (ch5~cfly 1'1'om J flpDn) had captured rOUGhly 2C~; of the 
-
1)) 
AmericDl1 dOlnr.:ctic m.:>rko ts. ~:h:Lrdl:r~, there \o\'as the knowledge 
that in o!'dcr to remain viat)l c cars would, at SOI!le stage, have 
to be reduced in size to mai.ntain pricing relationships . 
Logically and ratio11..:..~.lly tee issw.! is euny to re801 vc - a 
reduction in vehicle dimensions and the installation of smaller 
c [Cpaei ty engine:.;. As anyone "ho has driven in the United States 
will agree, dri v-i n,g conditions in that countr.' equate fairly 
closely '.'tl Lb t.hose (-~ncounterf]d in ar!d around Johennesburg. 
?unctionally~ ~i£:htc ~n f eet lone- CD.riJ \:i th cig11t cylinder encines 
arc not only sUIlcrfluou3 bll~ in man~" rn~'~-3 somewhat absurd . 
1'.Jnotionnll~,r , hO\':-" vcr, tne in(hl~3tr'yl s plrmnerr:: recogni3ed that 
t110r8 w"" Lhe definite p08sibilitj' of bUYLrs r e jecting out- right 
the introduc [·ion of ::;ignifi c:.ll'ltly '_liwller, less po".';erful models. 
£'01' rnDny months r:.dvocatc.s of retaining the trndi tion .:.~ l 13rgc c:. :r-
ei t 'ed re3corcll stud ic (; which indicated that, . for large car- bu;,-ers, 
"interior spacc" was a prime usc -requirement ond purchase motive 
d<.:spi t e t!1C fuct that parallel research establid1ed that typical 
buyer::; Dllly InGdc usc of :;uch vehicles' 1',,11 "eating capacity once 
every six monthn or so . Hationally , u t..:maller European- type 
C8r range r 'ClS al1 obvious true luarket rcquir8ment . Accordingly, 
therefore, beneficial teclmoloGical development of smaller, more 
d'ficieut, less wasteful em"::; was dclaj-ed a t what m- y only be 
described ~lG D !l u0cial coct" 11leD.~Llrt~d in tel'lils of wastcd natural 
r c sources. 
,.. 
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UJ:tima tCJ;Y, QG o.n CH:10 t Lon!)J. compromise rind largely in roc.ponse 
to Federal legisl£l tior., fir:, t Genpral /do tors (the market le",der) 
ond then Ford and Chr;;-sler moved t o re- style thoir cars down to 
r:hat h[',s bc;cn termed c "mid- size ". I n esse nee, no teclmical 
improvement was introduced for such v .Jhiele:::: .remain the e':lrlier 
"full-sizedll nCd'lnG minHG r ouchly one 8nu half :feet removed from 
the v/heelbaLc and boot length . Cost savings flow from t he 
consequentinl savings j.n f118tcri als r:hilst the car buyer receives 
il m.'~rgillD.l imvrovement in fuel consumption via a reduction in 
vehicle m.; iLht . , In overall terms, hc)\'/~ver, this beneficial 
technicnl Q~ -velopment must Te vic Vied P S having evolved from the 
respective m811ufacturer ' s self interest i. e _ to reduce costs , 
maintain a competi ti ve 8tnmi and to o-,-uue llllllalat:--ble legislation -
th" re ell needs of c,u ' buy;,rG assume a role of secondary importancc. 
A balonccd overview of thc motor industry ' s application of 
tcclmoloGJ to tho South A:l'ric,'J1 market is' di f ficult t o attain as 
... COl1 GC qUCllCC of t he re l a tively wide v;n-'j.cty of IL.OIlL...facturer s 
present, c,-",h of .:hom ha:J had a quito Lmique individual local 
history. On the \'.-hole , hO\'/ 8 - -e1', it is possible to say that 11.11 
such companies f all into t11e 8JlIl.e ccneral claGs of manufacturers 
8 ": dofll1r:d u.r 1.11" 1'a ot '~hat the (lc !J i Cn, 8nc:inccrinr; [md teclmoloGY 
of thel.r prouuct ~ It-_,,' \Jecn "iholly imported from parent' or supplyinc 
corr..pc.~nj. C 8 who are ongogcd ill mneti!1b the 1!18.ss- market for motor 
vchicleJ . ,\"" re s ul t , this Ela~S-ll1(ll'k" t oricnt:ltion is refle c ted 
in the \'lay they apply technolo.:::y to the design and construction 
of th8 i r product::;. Thir; rnepnG th::- t 'the representative South 
AfriCi..lll D:d' :';~·I.~l , J:'orrl , L:3zda, it'iat v I' ~,~c rcedes has had applie d to 
-
it the full ,-",eight of Gontcr"p('rar~· value enb'ineering, hich- opeed 
aSGcmbl;r :uld either ('.utomutCt! Q.csembly or nS8embl~l by largely un-
or semi-skilled labour. Applied tcchnology therefore is geared to 
producing it product c apable of being built at the lowest possible 
cost, in the fastest pObsib18 time which is co'apatible Viith a 
pcrcei v" d h'1"rket c al?; technOlogy 1'ocu'ie r; upon the supply and 
assembly sid" of the business before it considers the needs of 
individual buyers or bu;orcr c;rolJ.ps . x· 'l'he entire philosophy is best 
sumr.led Ltp b:r the l'ollo',,'ing Ll".o::im of the indL"3try: 
n",'/'0 cr;t the c::r!r i neers to design the best car :for our needs 
thcn Vi.] get the accounbnto and coot control people in to 
ta]<c ovt enough to bring the cOut dm'.TI to the level necessary 
to price it (;omp c tl tivulJ"" It 
r.loving f:~.'om the gCllerul to Lll(; morc upr.:t..:.il'ic it i s p08ui ble to 
idE:ntify certain different interpretations of the above philosophy 
on thc PLU't oJ indi vidl~al rn: ,nnfL1cturcrs . One of the more notable 
variations j" the> d:Lvision of the induztr:r into what may be termed 
technical development "leaders" and "followers". (The l r.tter group 
respond to dcvelopments introducod into their product- lines by the 
-x· ~\h{s drive to rmlLl,ce costs :rnd complexi.ties is desirable in the 
broadest Bense of secking to reise thc economic efficiency of 
the h.dustry . It opens tho door however to questionable over-
sights such as t he failure to 1'i t safer d'isc brakes (V'll Beetle), 
the omiGGion of hcater uml ven l;ilD [; i Ll n con l;rol.:: (moGt pick-up 
trud'G), :Old the ,;kimpj.nc of (I"Gcmbly 'U1d d .. ,ulcl' servicc 
quality cLlntr ols, 
\ , 
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former in 011 effort to main t ~lin their vehicle' c competi ti veness. ) 
Haturally, the lender3 .oggrcGzl vely incorporate technical 
development:.; in the expectation of gaining a marketing advantage 
v.11ilst the followers adopt L passive stance only introducing such 
improvements or amendments once it is clear that the actions of 
the development le~,,(krG have 1"N1 CEll' buyer" to ')xpect to find 
such features in :tll cars wi thin their ranges of consideration. 
ALlongst small c:,.1rs of ten j-I'nrs DGO, f or expmplc , it lIUS rare to 
":,,ats , till t(;U v;ir!do\'.'~ , .fi -. Q- : Teed gc;u'bo:ws, boot lights, heated 
r co,r - vd,ndo'';,; ~nd the .Like. . .LndeerJ. tlu car of that time typic"ll:! 
~portcd rube'or mat flnor CllV('l'~;, c:,':rclboc,rd door psnels, l"l.tdimcntr; · 
llu' t0r:; :0:1(1 ven'l;iln~ur'; 'ill,l :Ln:Hlequ,,'.el:; rlcsiL'Yled scats . Since 
the ciLrly 19'{0 1 G t he: 1'01(' uf t!cVCllJ!?lP..cn L l.codcr ha:J been shared 
by the 11"W market entries from Japru1 who \'/ere then the first to 
offer fc:atuI'es, such as thos~ above , in small car s and who still 
remm_n lenders tu this record. 
'rhe existence of technical leaders ["l1d follo\'ler s has important 
implicationG with r e spect to Corporate rImming: 
1 . From the out3et ",[Cch mrumfacture r must decide wh'3.t stand it · 
is to adopt V:LS-<1-\iG the 2ppliccctio.l of technological development 
to its products . J.8 it to be un ncti vc or n passive clement 
wi thin the mc.rlw t or will " compromi.se stDnd be sought? 
As may be gUQsGed ~hc middle- of-the- road option is the one 
most lil:cly to be adopted by the ma .jori ty of manufacturerG -
:llwlau .. inL: '1;11': onl~ fOl'lll1n[; the l ) ;t~i.i. c 01' i;hiu pUIJer. A typic:Jl 
c ():npJ'l)mj[ 'f~ i:: I.{) (I(:c-idc to f O.ll! J·j{ ,'"J 11;1 "1;11 :!(~: HI:jnr: t o pr,fJr:"iv1' 
" 
I 
I 
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tcchnical d{;v(>lopment '!T_itl"ln the field of en,;ines \'!hilst 
seekinG to sustnin a It.' ~[lcrship status with respect to 
interior appointments and trim. Th~ high cost of engineering 
tcclmo10{:Y ""!lOC i a l,,,tl ',cll;h eneJne :m<l power Lr:Jin uevelopmcnL 
foo tcro eoru:; ervct ti ve "tti tudel: wi thin their i'ield. Conver31y, _ 
the rela ti vr_ly low costs t'l.csociated with de:vc=loprnent work in 
respect of redllcin,:; opcrating nOise, vibr",tion, and enhancing 
seatinc comfort form nttr'\etiv(~ ind.ucclllcll L:J to become D~Gl'c~;Oivc 
2 . :;:n 8ddi tion "'0 cost, em .iJfi1Jortant influencing factor present 
when the local nwnufacturcr is ueekinc to determine Vihere he 
should [.; "LWld on tl1c tcehnicul dcyr)lopment Gcale is hiD acccns ... 
to sui !;ahle Gnu eOlnpntihlc t eclm-oloGY, especially \'lith 
rcspect to hi s overseaG p '-'Tent or =upplier. 
130' \'my Qf 0xnmple, thc toclmoloGo' doe:.: not yet exisl; wi thin 
South ;Srica to design and build a light, reliable diesel 
engine- sui table for p3ssenger car installation . For this 
r eUGon, components (:::uch no cnGinc~';) dcm:Jl1ding h.igh degreeG 
of dCI>ic,n "n<1 l:lanuf-'_cturilIG 8kill nrc froquently importcd 
wholly or p:;trtinlly :loSClllulcd from overseas cuppliers . In 
othcr words, the local munufucturcl' IlWY b~ either constrained 
or enjo;, a significant adv'mt aee according to whether his 
ovcrsene parent or supplier has, in turn , opted to be a 
technolo~y leader or follower in certain fields . Amongst 
0-
pu:::m:ngcr C:1I'S Volk'5I'lDgcn <.Ind Mercedes huvc an enviable advantage I 
in respect' of the:"r diesel el1bine technoloK' whilst Datsun and 
]..\uzJa'::; fort e i .D reliable, cconomicul petrol engine," . 
- l~tJ -
T\\'o points r.1UGt be rnised at ti,is juncture as follows : 
(a) The dire:ct importation of "high- technoloc;y" assemblies 
(e . ,:-; . engines) i.e no longer as eas;J as in earlier years . I 
~ 
Tnlcing engines ,"3 ~n eX:llnple, of all the components of a 
vehicle it j . G the moot heavy by mo.:}::;. Gou"th Africn I G lac:!l 
content prOeI'tumno (\ ihercb:; incrc.£l.s:i.ng proportions of a 
vehiclc's mass mu:t bc sourced locally by certain :JpecifiEd 
dntes if they fire to qualifJ' for tax 'U1el ehlt.y rcbntc 
conces8ions) opnratc8 UpO!1 thc busis of the vehicle ' s total 
mass. In thi R way, '" vehicle having 66~t of its mass composed 
of 10cn1 componentR wilT benefit from higher rebates than 
one Vii th but 50,'~ of its m?8J made in South Africa. 
Ultimately, it is not impossible for a <J:IDufacturer to arrive 
at a situation where 70/~ of his product is locally- sourced 
bu t the remainin:; 30;; happens to cQmprise an imported engine . 
. Accordip-ely, either he must continue to import his engines 
(at a hj.gh duty ~U1d cost/price di::mdvuntage) if he wishes tv 
maintain his teclmical lead or he must decide to adopt a 
loc?lly- built engine and pass up thiR tecrillology leadership . 
(b) If it is accepted that th~ most technically advanced, most 
henvy and most dEmanding of investment funds are engine and 
power-train components th(m a useful r:tratec;ic technical 
opportuni ty pr-esents itself . Should a number- of different 
maker; 01' vehicle to be fitted with common cngines and power- .... 
truins it would be possiblc for lllnnufacturcrs to adopt the 
mOG l~ tcclmic:ll1~." ;ldv'mcctl l'omponer;.ts ,-tvnilnl11 c by produciuG 
them uL ,. cbntrul point or from a common supplier. It is 
sLlggcr;tcd that if LLlch u :,>lan were adopted the SOLlth African . 
motor indLlstry \"Iould do much to overcome the CLlrrent inability 
of individLlal manufacturcrs to regularly utilise the best 
available overseas technology at the lmeneut possible 
invcstment cost . ·:+ 
3 . The fact that South Africr. is n II technology importer" in this 
field has two furth~r implications for the local motor maIlufactl.lrer . 
Tilese implicctions fl01"l, in a sensc , f rom , firstly, the consequential 
dependence Llpon an inflow of .foreign technology leading to [' 
meamlre of vulncr::bili ty in rCf;pcct of Uwt flow's adeqLlacy and 
sLlj.tabili ty. Secondl y, the cLlrrent ready availability of such 
technolog;.' Bnd thc high co..:ts associat ed 'Iii th its local development 
means that there is little incentive for local manufacturers t o 
commi t thcm:,clves to a pltlnned prOr;r3;llmC of 1lIliqLlcly South Afri can 
automotive research and development. 
The above sitLlations are not unique to one manufactLlrer bLlt are 
common to all . Accordingly , it is sLlggested that a body , sLlch as 
HAA!lISA , take the ini tiati ve 1'1l1d call i tc members together for 
the pLlrpose of est2.blishing a ccntral tec.hnical development body 
whose objective is to r edLlce the indLlstry's heavy reliance upon 
imported technology. 1'his obj eGti ve gODS beyond the simple 
co- ordin"tio:1 and rntionuli::;ation of existing information flows 
.'f rl.'hr:: rQcent ::';ie:fi [{-Lc~'18n<1-j1c t:'Beot/Citroc:n mergers point the 
directiOl~ in thi.3 is ::"'.l8 \ ,hilst the ciruul trnE:OUS technical 
merr;er between l;lfn-Romoo and Fiat represents a welcome 
reinforcement . 
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tovmrds the creation of p technical research institute having 
staff .and facilities sufficieEt to make a material contribution 
to the body of South African pure and applied automotive technology . 
Current exrunples of key fields of research open to investigation 
include the entire issue of petroleum-substitute energy sources, 
micro-electronics in respect of ignition nnd instrument systems 
alld glass-fibre body component". 
I t is already clear thClt t..'1e :tout sie';nific221t factor capable of 
influencing the t8chnical development of motor vehicles in this 
country io present in respec"\: of South Africp.' s lack of 
<:rude oil reser-res . Given tj,e fact that the entire 
world's ovpply of known pc"Lr'olewn dopo:Jit::; j::; finite rmd in 
steady decline, the day is not fPI dist~nt when the first sif,'1ls 
of un irrevoca.bl", rapidly expandin'1 in tcrnationnl shortcge will 
be felt . Oil-lacking nations , of \'iDOm South Africa is one, mll 
be expo~ed to c, f'lst nnd crippling drop in the commodity ' s supply . 
Such oil as there is mIl be either di vert cd towards those 
nations I'/ho arlo willing and able to p ny for it or it mIl be 
subject to stri.neent export quot8S imposed by its possessors 
with the objective of maintaining, int ot, their own social and 
industrial fabrics. 
Even in the short-term the sensi tivi ty of this nation to a 
perminant disruption in its oil supplies is acute . The majori td' 
of South Africa's petroleum needs are derived from Iranian oil-
fi.clds. 'I'he overthrow of that COll!1try' 0 COVeI"l1l11"nt uml ito 
replacement oJ- 011e h03tilc to South Mriea (",,- ) or the imposition of 
;\. ¥.ri tLCll Oc Lobc l', l'l'(tl. 
• 
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economic sanctions WOll1d talce but a matter of hours to 
accomplj.sh. In the space of that time the South African motor 
industry and the entire structure of this nation's ·society, as 
it is now ID10vm, would be placed in jeopardy. 
Given these circumstances it is abundantly clear that each and 
every local motor manufacturer must possess long-range contingency 
plans of a very high order designed to dilute and counterbalance 
any ' such developments. 
Corporate Planning and TecP~ology 
Viewed against the background of the above discussion it is suggested 
that long-range planning as conducted by each and every local 
motor company is flawed and wealc. Their technical research and 
development plans are not only focused upon product lines and market 
segments which could be splintered in a matter of hours but their 
technology itself is little more than a foreign element so loosely ' 
planted in South Africa that it has not talcen OD any true local 
characteristics. * The key, most fundamental strategic technical 
research opportunities ·are conSistently overlooked - largely because 
t o devote attention to such issues would lable the initiator as 
being "pessimistic" whilst his l ikelihood of obtaining funds for such 
research is mL'1imal. 
* One example of this is to be found in respect of the technical 
research department of the motor manufacturer forming the theme 
of this paper, approximately 10 out of the 15 member staff are 
short service overseas immigrants. 
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In the purest sense of Corporate Planning it must , surely , be agreed 
t hat if any issue is perceived to assLooe a moulding role in the 
company's affairs it is that company ' s responsibility ~o include such 
an ev.entuality within its Corporate Pl an. 
Finally, in overall terms , the r ole , impact and growth of technology 
has , is and will continue to be the subject of much controversy . 
Alvin Toffler, in his classic review of the human side of tomorroVi , 
Future Shock, has this to say of technology : 
"The high velocity of change can be traced to many f actors . 
Popul ation growth , urbanisation , the shifting proportions of 
young and ol d - all play their par.t . Yet t echnological advance 
is clearl y a critical mode that activates the entire net ."* 
As a consequence it appears logical that technology should exist at 
or ver y close to the forefront of Gorporate Pl anning endeavours . I n 
practice it does not . Instead , technological development takes place 
in an unsystematic way largely because planners at all levels and 
• 
within all fields are unw~lling and up~ble to accurately foretell the 
exac t avenues applied-technol ogy will follow , what fields it will 
open and which it will render obsolete. Levitt in his discussion of 
M~agement Myopia+ was, in many ways , seeking to interpret technological 
. 
----------------------- ---- - - ----- --------------------------------------
* A. Toffler Future Shock 
Pan Books, London, 1970 pp 387 
+ T. Levitt Innovation in 1Jarketing 
Pan Books , London, 1968 Chap . 3 pp 39 - 66 
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change in terms of consumer desires. The flaw in his logic, however, 
is that unl ess the flow of teclmology's impact upon the life and 
aspirations of the individual can be pre-determined it is difficult 
to quantify the affect such change may have upon buyers within a 
given product category. Certainly , monitoring the scope, magnitude 
and direction of technology is a task of staggering difficulty -
its individual filaments are so incredibly fine yet so collectively 
dense and so tied and knotted t ogether with those of its social, 
economic and political counterparts. The net effect is two-fold and 
is best described by Ralph Lapp : 
"No-one - not even the most brilliant scientist alive today -
really knows where science is taking us. We are board a train 
which is gathering speed, racing down a track on which there 
are an unknown number of switches leading to ~~own destinations. 
No single scientist is in the engine cab and there may be demons 
at the switch. Most of society is in the guard's van looking 
backwards. "* 
Firstly, the local motor manufacturers are part of the society 
mentioned and, secondly, like everyone else they spend a lot of 
time looking backwards or do\'m at the track rushing by. This then 
is the true Management Myopia which is afflicting one of this 
country's key investment and employment industries. It does so 
despi te the fact that there are, in 1978 , imminent operating crises 
whose probability of occurrence has never been greater Whilst, 
collectively, the industry has the resources to save itself via the 
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------
* Quoted in Toffler. Op.cit., pp 390 
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innovative, systematic application of existent fue l , energy and 
tr~~sportation technology. Indeed, the establishment of the above-
mentioned autonlotive research institute now may form an indispensible 
pre-condition for the entire local industr y ' s &urvival during as 
short a period as the next 10 to 12 years. 
SI':C TI ON FOUR CORPORATE PLANIDlING AND THE 1.lARKETING FUNCTION. 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section the earlier-discussed issues of Profitability , 
Capital Investment and Technology will be synthesized with the 
most visible element of the company ' s Corporate Planning 
endeavours, namely , the organization' s long-range marketing 
effo·rts. The term "synthesis" is an apt one for~ in the final 
analysis, the degree to which any business is successful in the 
long-term is governed by the skill devoted to the task of 
formulating its optimal blend of profit, investment, technology 
and marketing objectives . Not a single one of these four areas 
of concern are either means to ends i n themselves or are capable 
of operating independently. They must be combined in such a way 
that the company establishes and maintains the right products 
in the right markets at the right time and at the right price . 
Any deficiency in respect of profit, investment , technology and 
marketing VQll cause the business to fall short of its true 
capabilities. 
Much has been said of "marketing's" role in modern business -
and justifiably so, however the fact that marketing efforts are 
only as successful as the ' behind the scenes I endeavours of 
financial and research staff is often overlooked. Practical 
Corporate Planning should pay ful l justice to such efforts, 
for a very sound reason - any fundamental weakness present therein 
may be concealed or overridden in the short-term but in the long-
term a failing of this type will inevitably diminish the impact 
• 
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of the co~pany ' s planning activities . 
4.2 The Marlmting Synthesis 
By virtue of the fact that the following pages concern themselves 
with both practical realities and "ideal" intentions the overall 
synthesizing process is best introduced by means of the diagram 
overleaf. 
It will be noticed that three clusters of acti vities are listed 
vi z ; Buyer/Market Research, Market Segmentation and Product / 
Investment Profit Analysis. Additional ly, note that all 
interact and ultimately come together to derive physical 
Product and Derivative plans and actions . Each will be considered 
in turn but i t is vital to under stand that chronologically : . 
Buyer/IJarket Research actions may occur simul taneously with 
~arket Segmentation but tnat the former cannot be incorporated 
in marketing plans until the latter is complete . 
Product/Investment P~ofit Analysis cannot be undertaken until 
Market Segment Forecasts are com.plete for such fore casts 
serve as input fo r all profit analyses . 
For the purposes of this paper each cluster of concerns wi ll be 
discussed in the order of mention above . 
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4.3 Buyer/Market Research 
Functionally, Buyer/Market Research is analogous to the "sensory 
organs" of the company within the market. Fundamental to any 
marketing action is the need to know what is and what is likely 
to happen "out there" - every marketing text-book correctly 
emphasises this point . Ignorance of buyer wants is reflected 
in mis- directed marketing efforts which, in turn, are reflected 
in the company's profit status . Consequently such research must 
be conducted in advance of any product actions. 
Sources of research data are extremely wide-ranging and vary 
greatly in their accuracy and representativeness . Under the 
umbrella heading of "research" within the definition of this 
section are included the following : 
Formal research stUdies amongst current own- make and competitive-
make product buyers. 
Reports from company sales managers and representatives . 
Reports from franchised dealer personnel . 
Trade journals and industry journals. 
Financial and economic publications . 
Personal acquaintances withDl ~~d without the motor indus~ry, 
senior government officials and quite ordinary people encountered 
at all manner of social events . 
Not all of the information available j.s pertj.nent to Corporate 
Planning, e.g. the facts that green cars are not favoured by 
, 
Oran~ Free State dealers or that a chance aquaintance at a 
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cocktail party Vias dissatisfied with his new car's fuel economy 
are totally irrelevant to long-range planning notwithstanding 
their value to immediate-term prod-.lct actions. Consequently the 
company's pl anning staff find it necessary to deal with the 
broad framework of the market. By figuratively "stepping baclc" 
they attempt to determine the key macro elements which do most 
to influence the long-term structv~e and direction of their 
industry's markets. Once such elements are identified specific 
information may be gathered. 
Experience has shown that the key long-term macro element is 
that of Market Demand. Demand fqr any product is dependent 
upon (1) People With The Willingness To Buy and (2) Their 
Ability To Buy. Accordingly, the company's planners seek 
to identify informat ion sources which are relevant to these 
two factors . Each will be considered in turn. 
4.3.1. People With The Willinr:ness To Buy 
The broad long-term demand for motor vehicles is linked to the 
rate of population increase . This is so by virtue of the fact 
that the potential market, all things being equal, is composed 
of every adult aged over 18 years . ~lthough an over-simplification 
(not every adult ca~, wants or is able to irive ) the widely- spread 
appeal and necessity of vehicle ownershi p is hereby recognized . 
Defining this demand co~ponent further, plruL~ng staff 
will seek to derive two more realistic indications, namely , the 
rate at which new vehicles will be acquired by adults aged over 
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18 years and the I'ate at which new vehicles will be acquired by 
companies operating vehicle fleets. To quantify these rates 
three key demand sUb-components must be examined: 
(1) The rate at which existing vehicles are replaced by new 
vehicles. 
(2) The rate at which vehicles are bought in addition to 
existing vehicles. 
(3) The rate at which perso:ls or organizations who have never 
bought a new vehicle before enter the market i. e. "first-
time" buyers . 
Considering each in turn: 
Repla.cement Bu,Yers 
It has been found that th~s class of buyer is the largest of 
the three mentioned. Stabili ty of demand is a noteworthy 
characteristic of this cluster which is explained by the fact 
that motor vehicles, as durable goods, are subject to neither 
rapid deterioration nor close substitutes. Such variability 
in replacement buyer demand as is present arises as a conse-
quence of the following three considerations : 
1. (a) The rate at which existing vehicles are re placed by 
new acquisitions. If the rate of replacement rises, 
the manufacturer benefits fro~ an enhanced sales volume 
whilst volumes decline if the rate either declines and/or 
the replacement time cycle eXI'ands . 
- 170 -
As a general rule, and tilere is resear ch evidence t o 
prove it, the t ypical private new car ~~yer r eplaces his 
vehicle on a three and a half year cycle. (In the case ' 
of commerc i al buyers the cycle ' s length is more variable , 
being as short as eighteen months in the case of tipper 
trucks operating in arduo".ls conditions or as l ong as 
ei ght years or more for extra-heavy, inter-city haulage 
vehicles. ) 
Sound buyer rationale exist for explai ning the duration 
of such cycles. A simple illustration of a new car 
buyer's actions will ' serve to descri be the cycle 's 
length under typical circumstances . 
Fro~ the outset t he majority of car purchases are under-
t aken via the meai um of hire-purchase - either directly 
through deal er credit facil i t i es or indirectly using a 
bank loan (Y/hich is not only cheaper but permits the 
buyer to negotiate favourable discount terms with the 
dealer) • 
Assume owner A owns a used car valued at Rl 000 which he 
decides to trade-in on his fir st new car . On shopping 
aro\md various new- car showrooms he finds the car of 
bis choice at a pri ce of R3 000. The dealer agrees to 
trade his existing car for R800 , leaving the capital sum 
of R2 200"to be repaid over 30 months. After 30 months 
A now l egally owns hi s eRr. In that time he has mai ntained 
it carefully and has tra'V"elled the equivalent of 45 000 
kilometers . 
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Given his car ' s age, condition and mileage A estimates 
its cash or trade-in value to be roughly Rl 800 - his 
depreciation charge totals Rl 200 and will increase over-
proporti.onately in future on the vehicle should he choose 
to retain it. Accordingly, A now decides to trade-in 
on a new vehicle. He goes shopping and discovers that 
he will obtain his best trade-in offer if he selects a 
new model of hi.s current make. This fact , plus the car 's 
satisfactory service, leads him to decide to buy a 
second same- make car. In the 30 months since he first 
went shopping the p~ice of the new car of his choice 
has risen to R3 900 whilst the trade-in offered him was 
Rl 900 (RIOO more than he expected). 
By trading-in now his capital repayment on the new vehicle 
will total R2 000 payable aver 30 months (compared with 
R2 200 for his first car). In other words his car ' s 
depreciation rate has worked to his advantage - he now 
must repay only R2 000 whose real value has diminished 
over the 30 months through the workings of inflation. 
If, however, he decides not to trade-in at the end 
of 30 months a different set of circumstances will 
emerge. 
Assume A retains the car for a further 12 months after 
his final hire-purchase insta~ent . Depreciation during 
that time reduces its market value from Rl 900 to Rl 000 . 
In that time a suitable replacement car now sells for 
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R4 400 which, less the Rl 000 trade-in, boosts the 
capital sum to be repaid over 30 months to a staggering 
R3 400. 
Thus it is clear that the action of depreciation, when 
linked to the replacement cycle, is of cri tical i.mportance 
to most buyers. 
Leading fro:n the above example it is worthwhile ~o consider 
a number of factors which influence a vehicle ' s deprecia-
tion rate. Planning staff pay close attention to these 
factors because of their not inconsj.derable long-term 
impact upon the competitive status of their company ' s 
products . Firstly, the depreciation rate is governed by 
the physical condition of the vehicle at the time of 
resale. As a working assumption any car under four 
years in age or having less than 80 000 kilometers will 
be adjudged,to be in "reasonable" condition . Secondly, 
and more importantly, the rate of depreciation (given the 
above realistic assumption) depends upon the interaction 
of the demand and supply circumstances of that particular 
make and model on the used-vehicle market . Given the 
above illustration i t should be clear that the action of 
inflation on ~ car prices raises them to an extent 
where, at the margin, prospective buyers switch away from 
new towards used vehicles. naturally, prolonged conditions 
of rising new vehicle prices act to bolster used car 
demand. In turn, used car prices rise in response to 
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demand and consequently reduce the effective deprec i ation 
rate of new cars.* 
Assume, in the above example, A bought a Ford Escort 
which by vi rtue of its p·opul arity within the second- hand 
market held its value to the extent indicated . Owner B, 
however, had bought an "odd" car e.-g . a Renaul t 5. B' s 
status at the end of 30 months is not as advantageous as 
that of A i.e . : 
Owner B (Renault 5) Purchase Price 
Less Deposi t 
Capital sum repayable . over 30 months 
(Renault 5 val ue after 30 months Rl 600 ~) 
(Ford Escort val ue after 30 months Rl gJO 51) 
Owner B' s Depreciation 
Purchase Pri"ce 
Less Resale Value 
Cost : 
R3 oorlY 
I 600El 
Rl 40;0/ 
R3 OOO:Y 
I 500 
RI 500 
Thus A is better off to the extent of R500 (A ' s resale 
val ue (RI gOO 51) less that of B' s Rl 400 d/). 
B' s troubles have not ended. His Renault ' s actual 
residual value may be RI 400 but when he goes shopping 
f or a new car dealers will be reluctant to take over his 
Renault which, by virtue of its poor used- market 
acceptability, they will have difficulty re- selling . 
* A major difference between the new and used car suppliers 
is that the latter ' s cost inflation rate i s markedly 
below that of the former . 
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Consequently the popular-make dealers (such as Ford, 
General Motors, Volkswagen and Datsun) · may only offer B 
Rl 000 for his car. By way of contrast A will obtain 
Rl 900 - all dealers )le visits know that a well- kept, low 
mileage Escort will be sold within a few days whereas a 
Remaul t 5 may "stick" in their used-car department 
inventories for a month or more. Invariably , therefore, 
B i s likely to be forced to return to the Renault dealer 
and buy a second Renault - only this dealer will be 
prepared to offer him a trade-in he considers reasonable . 
For the Corporate Planner an understanding of this 
replacement process is greatly important . It expl ains 
why, since the advent of double-digit inflation in the 
early 1970's, the larger motor companies have tended to 
expand and why their smaller competitors have contracted . 
The B's of the market gradually switch away from the 
l ess popular manufacturers by selling their "stiCky" 
cars privately for the best price they can realise and 
switching to a more popular make which is subject to 
lower levels of used market depreciation.* 
* Appendix II traces . the decline of such once- popular 
makes as Chrysler , Leyland, Alfa- Romeo, Renault, Fiat 
and Volvo and the corresponding rise of Datsun, Toyota, 
Ford , Volkswagen and General Moto rs. 
Appendix III lists so:,e of the best and worst new cars 
as measured in terms of their resale value retention 
rates as at the time of writing - September 1978. 
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Amongst the total replacement buyer market segment 
absolute levels of make-loyalty tend to be stable in the 
short-term whilst over the long- term a decline may be 
experienced by less popular makes as a consequence of 
weakening owner- loyalty brought about by their poor 
resale values. Recovery and a reversal of such a trend 
i s exceedingly difficult with the odds loaded heavil y 
against success for the process feeds upon itself - the 
less popular a vehicle becomes in the new market the 
worse its resale value becomes and the less inducement 
there is to replace with such a make. Evidence exists 
i;hat this slide is cmnpounded by a loss of "faith" i n 
the company on the part of its dealer and employee 
bodies. The best dealer salesmen and co~pany employees 
"see the writing on the wall" and resign whilst dealers 
fac i ng dropping profit margL~s terminate franchise 
agreements leaving the company saddled "with s i gnificant 
reductions ~n both dealer and in-company competence . 
1. (b) A second factor influencing the length of the replacement 
cycle is the overall usage patterns to which vehicles are 
exposed. 
In recent years much publicity has been given to a 
purported reduction in the rate of vehicle replacement 
as a consequence of the savings in wear and tear 
occasioned by maximum speed legislation. Undoubtedly 
certain vehicles which would normally have been replaced 
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at an early date (e.g. sales representatives cars used 
over long distances and operated at high speed) have 
been affected to some extent but any overall lengthening 
of replacement cycles has not been found to be truly 
noteworthy if speed restrictions are considered. A 
more important factor which acted to lengthen such cycles 
was the general economic uncertainty which was evident 
from 1975 onwards. Prospective buyers tended to postpone 
vehicle replacement to avoid becoming committed to hire 
purchase contracts at a time when employment prospects 
dimmed. Rising new.car prices did not improve the 
situation . 
1. (c) A third factor is the rate of car price increases measured 
against t he rate of growth in buyers disposable incomes 
over time. There is strong evidence to support the view 
that in circumstances where the rate of price increase 
exceeds income growth a braking effect is noticed in 
the frequency of vehicle replacement. Under such 
circumstances the question of what has been termed 
"pent-up demand" arises . 
As vehicle prices rise and incomes lag the .. car replacement 
decision is postponed on the grounds that it is not an 
affordable expense. Buyers who would normally have 
bought during, say, the middle of the year allow their 
customary buying time to pass. Many will have their 
deposits available but feel that general economic conditions 
are such that they wizh to avoid i ncurring onerous hire-
purchase obligations. Very often the fact that their 
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chosen car ' s replacement price i s now markedly above 
that prevailing two or three years Garlier acts as 
both an explanation for and a rationalisation of their 
purchase delay. Experience has shown that, as a short-
term market stimulator, the announced threat of impending 
major price increases acts to " jarr loose " the pent-up 
demand. Buyers throw their caution to the wind and act 
upon the counter-rati onalis'ltion th'lt, "I may not be 
able to qui te afford to buy a new car now but i f I 
don ' t and prices go up I ' ll never be able to afford to 
buy at a l ater stag~. I f I buy now I 'm sure I ' l l find 
some other areas of expenses that I can cut down in to 
meet my hire- purchase instalments . " Such shock- tactics 
have been found to operate over the immediate- term but , 
unquestionably, over peri ods of continued economic 
hardship and inflation t he element of pent-up demand 
becomes larger and increasingly imJ;l,:rviOUS to such 
efforts to break i t loose . So much so, th'lt buyers 
come to accept that they cannot now purchase the vehicl e 
of their choice . 
Once a buyer finds him or herself in such circumstances 
the l ikelihood is that what has been calle.<:l the "Buy-
Down" factor comes into operation . 
Buy-down is best illustrated and expl ai ned by example 
for it is a fUnction of both qUffi1titative economic and 
deep-seated qualitative psychological motives . Buy-down 
has its co'.mterpart in a more satisfying "Buy-Up" process 
and both actions occur as patterns of replacement buyer 
action over time. 
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The typical car buyer begins by acquiring his first 
car second hand, for he is a young person of relatively 
limited means. Once in employment and his financial 
status improves he is subject to strong economic and 
social, ego! prestige based motives to "buy-up" to a 
new car. This first new car is usually a small one. 
Time passes and this car becomes ready for replacement . 
His choice is to buy a used car, a new car of the same 
size or a new car of a larger size. Financially, the 
larger car is within reach and, consequently, he again 
"buys-up." Assume that by his third or fourth new car 
the buyer has tended to stabilise his car purchase 
pattern . At age 45 in 1975 he finds that a Valiant is 
both personally affordable and in line with his needs. 
Financially he does not expect to be able to buy anything 
either l arger or more luxurious. Further assume that 
his 1975 Va~iant would normally be replaced i n 1978 but 
that their retail prices have , in the interim, risen 
substantially over 1975 l evel s . Moreover , his personal 
financial status has weakened . Economically a Valiant 
is beyond his reach. In ego and prestig~_ terms, however, 
a Valiant re~ins highly desirable. In effect, he is 
exposed to "buy-down" pressure. 
Of importance is the fact that he is likely to resist 
the "buy-down" force and retain his existing Valiant 
for the above-mentioned psychological reasons. From 
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the manufacturer ' s Corporate Planning point of view 
this individual ' s replacement cycle has lengthened . 
Naturally, once the whole market of replacement buyers 
is considered, replac.ement cycles will increase in 
duration and depress retail sales volumes. 
Overall, the impact of replacement purchase patterns upon the 
market are a source of great interest to the motor company ' s 
Corporate Planning staff, this is particul arly so in r espect 
of the following consj.derations : 
1 . The replacement buyer segment is the largest component 
of the new vehicle market from which is derived the bulk 
of the company ' s sales volumes ~~d profits. Consequently, 
changes in both volumes ffild profits may be attributable to 
changes and events occuring therein . 
Moreover, the forecasting of future market shares must be 
largely based upon the replacement segment and will talce 
into account forecasts of competitive segment shares and 
anticipated rival actions designed to erLhance their respective 
shares. Underlying all such efforts and conside!'ations is 
the faith and confidence the market has in ea~h manufacturer ' s 
products. 
2. Vehicle usage , industry cost pressures, retail price actions , 
the rate of income increases, "buy_down" ~~d "buy-up" trends 
directly influence both retail sales volumes (by lengthening 
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or shortening replacement cycles) and future marketing 
actions implemented by rivals . 
Combining a broadly- based and detailed understanding of the 
above two elements the motor manufacturer's Corporate Planner 
will be able to draft a 5 year plan which will take into 
account the following typical assumptions and input variables: 
Replacement cycles wil l not vary' significantly from the 
curr ent aver age 3t year cycle. 
Changes in ' current minimum hire purchase deposit and maximum 
pay-back periods are not anticipated. 
Recent merger- action between Sigma, Leyland and Peugeot/ 
Citroen will exert a greater- than-present competitive 
pressure upon the remaining "small" manufacturers - chiefly 
Alfa-Romeo and Fiat - whose existing oW3er-bodies will, as 
a r esul t, contract further . Ei ther as a result of their 
contraction or as a consequence of one or both of these 
companies withdrawing from the market , thi s company may be 
expected to raise its own replacement market penetrati on by 
0. 5 - 0. 75% . 
Vehicle usage patterns are likely to remain unchanged over 
the next five years re l ative to those now identified . 
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Current industry cost pressures will continue wlabated . 
Overall industry prj,ce increases, at a retail level, in the 
order of at l east 15% per annum must be expected . This 
factor, plus expected operating cost increases , will maintaD1 
the current "buy-down" trend towards smaller, more economical 
motoring options . (Our product pl ans must take accoW1t of 
this fact by revi ewing, every six months , our 1976 commitment 
to adopt Model X during 1979 with a final decision required 
by December 1978 . In addition, the feasibi lity of bringing 
into local production Model Y must be investigated as a 
matter of urgency.) 
The above i s but a simplified version of replacement market 
s egment considerations trucen into accoW1t by this and other 
motor manufacturers. However, i t does illustrate both the 
' breadth and type of detail which is r eviewed and the implications 
of such investigations. 
Additional Buyers 
This segment of the market consists of buyers acquiring a motor 
vehicle which is additi onal to one or more other vehicles 
o~ed or operated by them at the time the vehicl e was bought . 
The l argest cluster of multi-vehicl e owners is to be found 
among companies operating fleets of vehicles. (Private 
individuals are, of course, represented but are, in the main , 
confined to the relati vely more wealthy members of the cOmmW1ity 
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where t~o, three or more vehicle households are common.*.) 
Most commercial establishments find it necessary to operate 
more than one vehicle either directly in their operations or 
as ru1 indirect requirement (such as the provision of manageme~t-
staff personal transport). 
The additional vehicle market segment is a key consideration 
in Corporate Plru1Uing for the action of acquiring additional 
vehicles acts to raise the overall size of the total market. 
In a sense there is "demand duplication" single purchasing 
units buy more than once. 
Indu~try marketers continuously strive to induce demru1d 
duplication by catering for particular demographiC , use a.'ld 
psyc~ographic market niches. Common market niches include 
recreational buyers (who buy a vehicle to tow a boat or 
caravan); second car (wife) buyers and you·th buyers . Amongst 
the commercial fleet niche the aim is to simply sell more 
vehicles of a given type to established buyers . 
Additional buyers' purchasing volumes rest upon similar 
foundations as were present within the earlier discussed 
replacement segment. Such volumes relate back to the overall 
incidence of such buyers within the total market, the rate at 
which their ownership spread expands or contracts, and the rate 
-------------'- - ---------------.---- -----------------
* For Corporate Planning purposes a typical two car household 
where one car (usually the husband's) was bought new and 
the other is second-hand is considered to be a one-car unit. 
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at which additional buyers replace existing vehicles . 
Consequently, sales forecasts seek to predict over time the 
volume implications of changes in the above variables. 
When considering the issue of additional buyers, Corporate 
Pl anners are careful to distinguish between the simple vehicle 
usage issues present and the actual motives acting to induce 
and maintain buyers to become and remain members of the 
"additional" market segment . For example, and by way of 
contrast, amongst replacement buyers use and purchase motives 
are closely related. A replacement buyer must have a new car 
to travel to and from work - without one he cannot function 
as a member of an automobile- orientated society. For him a 
car is a necessity. ·An additional buyer, however , has already 
fulfilled his use - necessity requirements. Instead he must 
i dentify supportive rationale why , for him, transport over and 
above the single vehicle is required. Usage does not readily 
provide that motive . The perceived requirement for a pick- up 
to tow a boat over weekends does not suppl y a cast-iron purchase 
motive for a pick-up whilst the fact that a salesman ' s car 
i s used for cal ling on customers is irrelevant as a genuine 
purchase motive . Instead the onus is largely upon the vehicle 
marketer to advance sound reasons or purchase motives . The 
recreational buyer must be con.vinced that his weekends wil l 
become more convenient and enjoyable if he buys a pick-up 
exclusively to tow his boat wh?-lst the company must be led to 
bel ieve j;ha tits salesmen 1 S eat's will become less costly to 
operate if there are more of them in the f~eet . 
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Overall , therefore, the "additional" market is characterised 
by an absence of the levels of necessity and urgency present 
within the single-vehicle r eplacement segment . 
As may be deduced the Corporate Planners within the subject 
company divi de the add i tional vehic l e segment into two 
broad categories viz; the commercial vehicle niche and the 
recreati onal niche . * 
With the exception of the r eplacement cycle duration 
consider ations voiced earlier, certain special factors govern 
the l ong- term growth trends of these two quite different 
n iches. Each wil l be considered in turn . 
Commercial Fleet Additional Buyer Niche 
The rate at which a typical company ' s fleet wil l expand 
i s , first and foremost, a direct function of the current 
and anticipated level of economic activity within that 
establishment . 
* In practice it has been found that the second (wife ' s) car 
niche is not large and is exceedingly difficult to quantify . 
Typically households wealthy enough to operate two new cars 
simul taneously are relatively rare . Moreover wi thin such 
households there is, very often, a "model split" - one car 
is e.g . a Mercedes and the other e . g. a Datsun . As a 
Mercedes planner you recognise that you do not have a 
model to compete wit h Datsun and as a Datsun planner you 
recognise that you have no model to compete with Mercedes . 
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Vehicle acquisition and operation represent a major overhead 
burden which is easily pruned when a down-turn in the company's 
financial status is anticipated. Motor vehicles are highly 
liquid assets - the redundancy of six salesmen and the sale 
of their vehicles is no more difficult than the act of hiring 
six additional salesmen and buying them each a car. 
Alternatively, a delay in the replacement of existing vehicles 
is equally easy to accomplish . 
Consequently, the motor manufacturer ' s Corporate Planners will 
focus their attention upon the key economic activity indicators 
which both pl ot the path and provide advanc e warning of the 
national economy whi ch, in turn, governs the anticipated 
actions and reactions of cl ient companies within individual 
economic sectors . Commonly consulted economic data sources 
for this purpose are four - fold : 
1 . South Africa is fortunate in having available a comprehensive 
range of authorative economic and bUsiness/financial 
data suppliers (e .g . commercial bank economic reviews) . 
The difficulty of siftip.g through such information is 
relatively more simple in South Africa than is the case 
in certain overseas countries; South Africa ' s social! 
political/economic parameters are considerably more 
simple than those of Britain or the United States for 
example. 
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2. Government socia- economic policies arc, both vlell-entrenched 
:.md 81.:"lb10, r:'l(;tOl'~:; Wllir:!"l D.s::.:is t pLlilllC:l"3 in tEeir e [forts to 
preJict tl:e impact snch policies are likely to have upon their 
compan;, ' s operations . The subject manufacturer has within 
its ranks of senior maYlneement pC1'30nnel men who h:,,1ve 
dev eloped anu \'Iho m:linta1n close peroonal rel:..ltionships 
'.'/ith senior government officials . In some instance::; such 
!Ilana,:ers ure ex-government employees having been draViTI from 
responsible positions within key ministrieo . Such formal 
:lnd informal contactf" do :.!uch to L""l. s..;iot tl-:.e co~npany ' .8 plalmers 
where tj0VC1'!1IlIl?r! t poli l!ies ~U'r) lik.~ly to influence the company' 8 
;:cti vi. ties via thf: over'all Ec:ollomic clilr.ate . 
3. I\s is ofoen the case , vehi c le sale::: to fleet -owning corporation:; 
tend to follovi the dictwD of th" classic "80 - 20 Rnle" 
'."hereby the bulk of sales arc maJe to a minority of customers , 
the proportions may not be exact but the inference is clear. 
Amongst the manufacturer ' s fleet- customers there is a relativel>~ 
small cluster of institutional buyers who account for a ffiQjor 
p!'oportion of tne afldi tional vehj.rlG r::-:.yl·;:}t ~ LY..a::1ples of 
~.:tld·! buy(:r:: .'1!°G- 1;hc: f ;~H ' :lI,ol Ll 'U(;].;: : : il.° !': C0!1l!) .':~ i !ie8 :.lllU thc: :-;outh 
l\ l"ric::ul l\:d"L\\'o~, ,'~ . 
:raturally such large pur21,) 2sers nrc: eo.sily identifiable 2.!!d 
tbe COirll)~Y is o3 '~""!nerul1'y 2.ble to cuI tivc.te close and cordial 
relationships with the k",' r.lel!lbers 01' such customer's 
management establishment. Through such relQtionships not 
only ere actual sales negotiated and concluded but v i tal 
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Corpora'"e PlanninG input is ob t::tincd as to likely future 
purcht: . .::c patterlls :,:uld the circU!Il::::t:-Ulces surroundinc; such 
~mnller fleets :lre not ignored. The 3ubject lO:lnuf2.cturer 
maintains r.. staff of fielLl s3.lcs managers stationed tlu'(,\up;hout 
South Africf.l . Their responsibiliti es include the monthly 
submission of a de~ailed Contact J(eport wher ein is l i sted 
pl':lllnin: input -inta rel:l'tinC to ';llc motives , patterns and 
ti~.1ing of fleet sales jn their l'c[f-i.onc. 
~ . Finally the subj ect COL1p2~y conduots and acquires market 
r esearch s ttl.dies for th~ express Pu!'pose of uncoveri~1G scme 
of the more salient feat'.>r"s of th', fleet nddi tional vehi.cle 
seemer~t. A topical e:carlplc of cm '- cqnired OI' "syndicated" 
research pr)je~t j.G the much publicised investig::..tions 
into the heavy t':'lJ.ck ir..dustry und~rtD.ken durin!) 1977 and 
1978 b~' r.:arplan - J Joh'-'T:nesburg based uarket research agency . 
In- house: research is focu::::ed upon assessing the relative 
3Gtu'3.1 strengt:1G and Vleakncsces of tr..e company ' 3 product 
Rccreahon::tl ·vehicle Addil;ion::tl Jbycl' ;Tiche 
As a CI)Ylcrnl rule tlJis niche in f'ounu ()d upon owner'ship of a 
8[J"?ciulis:!d vehicle 1'01' plCi.l.GU1'C pur!10r.:es. In 8. sense it is n. 
parallel tel luxury motoring in that it iu both highly per30n1l1 
[l.nd equa tes to the tiC. tinfnction of an expc!lsi vc whi.m on the par:, 
of private lmyero .. 
4 . 3.4 . 
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The very fact that recreational vehicle purchases ere luxur;; 
purchases means t:'l8.t their oYeI'8.11 i!'!cidence of oper,'J.tio!1 3.11':'! 
rate of purcha.se is closely dependent upon over".ll levels of 
disposable income . The relationship is simple , as disposable 
incomes rise so tc10 will the rate of recreational vehicle 
acquisition. A second factor opeoratin" within this market 
seBment is the fr.ct that, in Sou1;h Afric:1, the purchase of 
recreational veh-ir.l r. j 3 '1. ['lean8 to 0.11 r~nd in itself - there in 
Ii ttle status attu.clled to the t Jl'e, ace and condition of such 
vehicler: . Many families will gladly buy an old, fifth- hand 
panel VQ.."1 or Kombi to drive to the beach over a Vleekend but will 
be u!lable to justify spGndin: [(4 000 l'r more for a nevI vehicle. 
Indeed, there is evidence tlY'.t D. uDfini tc :'nti-statu8 desire 
cy-iGt::::: such th::J.t to belonc; to U. U"R.:l' Lroup the vchicle munt not 
be a nev,' one whilst tl"'c sho -!.' t diuta!lcC's invll1vcc1 f,'ene!"qlly do not 
rn .'.ke ei ther reli~.bili ty or comfort p.cime cO:C::Jidcr<..ltions. 
Por the COI'porate Planner, the above b OlO facts act to Cl8.ke this 
market segment a hiChly mercu!'ial one veith !'espect to absolute 
levels of v~hicle sales. l~ :llly e~fent the subjec t CO!":l9any's 
pla~Ti!1g r-:a:'f !.1 :'. ~·:C: clo3c rei"cn?nce to dispoc.:tble inco::1e o.nu. 
v ehil~.Lc Cl"'O t/ t' l'i c.:0 ror0ca~:;"LG \':hen seeking to forecast cales 
volumes to this buyer cluster . 
.!?iI'st - 'llimc Huyc!'G 
The fil'st - time buyer seement of the market is sm<lll and trnnsi tory 
but one I'lhose relativE' s;.ze is ::;omewh"t stnble . It is not subject 
to the ... vide demand fluctu:J.tions no t; ed amo!:lest the replacement aYlU 
addi t i onal bur"T cluste.'c:. .\s the ti tIc implies this curre'lt seement 
c\):uprisc s individu:..ll s ~ .(:quiring their firs t nc'.'.' !r:.'Jtor vehi..:l ·: . As 
mey be irr..3Gined fir::;t-t ime lJuyers r l:prcser..t n key uynn.!!1ic e lement 
./i thin the r~ltlrke t pl,')c c.' for t hey Of'e an aeti V8 agent where by both 
(a) the tot~ll vehicle ~C'..rket muy be t!'!ade to expand C'...l1d (b) t~e t.Jt:J.l 
vehicle popul"tion si ze increased . 
The bulk of such bu,,:C: r's is to br: found :l!non:;st pl'i vette persons in 
their mid to l:lte tvyenties \\;ho h ,lV j~ e:::t ::bl iohecl t hc!,selvec in 
eml'loY'llcnt ~ o <o n exten t which p~rtn:; .tG them t o ufforj the purcllU:.:e of 
a new car rather thuD a used altern':)' t ivc. 'rhiG cegment 1 s youth 
v:hicd serve t '.) muke i t the Ill'Jst distincti ·:e yet most difficult market 
niche for any manufac turer to enter effectively. Earlier 
it I'lns r.l8n t ioncd that vehiole o"'Ylersh ip for many represents Em 
extensi,.,n of self or :.ill expression of individuality. As a v.'Orkablc 
c;e nero.l .L t y 1 ! !oVlll(1 r e nr'U Lh.)G0. ! nllt ivc: :~ :'j!l)l',,! \'.rcll-dl~vclope(l them mc.ongst 
"youth" liUy'~,!,8 . l\. ! 'evie:r: of the owner demoGraphic profiles of 
popular IIspol' ttnr; !t t'Ci.I'G (e.g. J1 :~LCilln lGaU ~;:~3 , ESCll l't R~ 20:)0 , 
Cnrti na '5 f) J f) ;.;, l\lru-~u(l) will make til i :J IH)int clcD.!" . ,;(, 
.J<- There is evidence that a representative car buyer follows either 
t r,'o or three oW!lersliip ";,hOSC8 II during h:L.s yenrs as c. notorist. As 
a ,youth faG t , oporting and uflcoEvt.nti on'"!l vehic les .:lre favoured . 
Once married \<vl. th a 81':13.11 but growin8 family 0. switch 'is nude 
to',vards Im'.1c1' more rational "i'"mily" cnrs. Onc e the children have 
left home two "venues are folloYled whi ch are essentially a function 
of income . A lower i ncome household Vlill L10ve to'.'la1'ds smnller 
"sensi ble " cars offe-rine; economy of operation and r e lin bility . A 
hisher income houcehold ·will revert to vehicles r ·-,' ll; u~: ;L :',: e i ther 
luxur;r Vii th sporting appenl or luxury \'!i th pres'tig ]. 
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~Ph8 cOl:!pmly TrJ C:orpol'aLc: I )lu~ln (:r~; lIwkc, n:: :1 :::it~11'LjllC; point Jar 
their !rlarkGt :~ e.:mer.!. t proj ec t:lon::; , thE: 8.~j:Jumption t~"'..a t thE; :na2or :" ty 
of peroolls a t ;ed und er thirty cLU'X'ently drivinG used vehicles have 
the a"lbi tion to bl1Y a new vehicl". This assumption lOGically lead s 
to the quc"tion as to '.'Ihy this ambition 01' desire i s unfuLfilled 
in many cuch persons . 
Disposable incolae relative to the price of ncw cars provides the 
a,nsw(..r. The typical .lOUll[j perDon , having at lcafJt a matriculatj_on 
education, 13 not in u pO~'ii tiOll to afford Q new car pLu'cha.se lmtil 
he or !Jhe is aced tw enty five or more* . Suggested reasons for this 
fo..ct nr c ~iven lH.:loVJ. 
1. Disposable incomes are lmable to contain both essential living 
expen::::83 and "'.T chiclc i'i...YJ.ancc CODtS. 
2. Preed fro:!! the r c:s trictions of home life the dC!"Jirc to expcriE:nce 
* 
must compete, for c}:n;,lple, ','.Ii ";';"'1 equQlly 01' 1 e:-..::.:::: expet~;:.::i.ve t:l:ld 
eqli.3.11y at trac ti V'2 d eoircs to tr3.vcl oV (.' "r'Sc[U~ or indulge in 
used cal' they haVe nolV is quite adequate for the present. 
Asswne l'~ has a illli v ~ l' ::: i tj.' d e£jI'ec and ha3 worked for a year. lIis 
take home pay is in the r egion of ,,400 per month. Once livinG and 
accommodation expenseG have be en met he may have RIOO to alloc2te 
towards personal wants. The monthly instalment payment necessitated 
by the acquisition of even a small car will consume all of that 
l{lOO - on t~ese L"ro'_t..:.d8 such Q pUTchasc is likely to be r~jec ted . 
After three or i.'oLU' more year" his take home pa:" is likely to rise 
t o E650 - R700 whilst his e" "ential exp~nses will not increase 
proportionately - a' ,1'1 car now becomes a di s tiJlCt pOSGibili ty. 
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3. /,bny r;uch po ten t :i.al bu::cr o ~.t'c W~I'y (mid jll~tLriably 1:0) of 
conuni ttinc; as much as 20 - 30/,~ of thE:ir incO;!!E::3 to ::';v Iih)!"li..~lt.; 
of hire purchase instalments. 
~" T,imitcu dioCI'ctioncll'y incomcs x'cstrict their ability to buy 
the car they really want . 'rhat is to DRY, what is affo"d"blc 
is invariably a very cormnon small car having no peer group 
sta tus appeal or little pSj'cholo,';ical jm;tification for the 
heavy outlay involved . Consequently the purchase decision is 
postponed. "Later when I can ai'ford it I 'll buy a'1 Alfa Romeo ; 
right now I 'll sta:,' with mJ old car. I can al'ford a new Mini 
now blJ.t WJ10 ym.nts to buy O!l'_' of thoDe?" 
5. Alternative non-car tro.n~port of1'c('in .JG which are le!J~3 cxp~nDive 
and mor~ exci tine exist, for €.'xrur..plc, n IfiotoI'cy~le. 
Over all , as a class of buyer , industry I'~f;E.:Qrch har.: indica ted that 
the actual compoGi tion of this the first- time buyer secmer.t hos 
chal1ged over the past four to five years. These ch8l1ge: have acted 
to switch your.g people away from buring new cars anu exi fJt over a'1d 
1. There is the har sh impact the economic recession has had upon 
J'outh se~kin.: employme!1~ . Job; for Gchool- leavers have been 
difficult to find. Moreover, there hus been little incentive 
for many cmnloj' ers to booot the ~ earni"co of jtUlior employee::; 
lackinc both experienc e and post- matriculatio!1 qualifications . 
- 192 -
2. Inflation has r<"ined new car prices substantially. For eX8.!nple, 
the retail price:.; 01' "!'cpresentative s:nall (typjcal first - tim.::) 
cars have risen between 1974 and 197d to the following degreen : 
Change in /Jew Car Hetail I'rices* 19'74 - 1973 
1974 1973 Percent Ch=:;e 
Ford Escort 1300 ~1990 H3S30 92 ~ 4';; 
Datsun 1200/120Y 112195 H3990 Bl,7;; 
Leyland !aini TIl7BO R3200 79.1j:, 
V:t Beetle 1;'00 H1993 t;3545 77.4;: 
* SOLU'ce : Car iJagazine 
(}]xcludf:s GS~ , licence fees and ir..surance) 
3 . There is some evidc!1ce that yOlmg buyers have had an =ti-r 'caction 
to trleir l 'ui-urc P"' "c] ic tE:c] eire umntanc 0~] (whieh would includ G 
extlOnded national ser-Iice 8!ld the thre::t of added future 
aunterity) :::uch that :::trong desires i'or enjoyment and to live 
life for the I:loment are expressed in their connumer ceh:lViollr, 
For example the stated freedom and excitem~nt of owning a 
:";pol'tin,'3 !I.otOI' cycle:: (co~:t-Ln ::.~ ~', litllc a8 :;:2 500 relative to 
nL'l)Vl.' di:"":Cl1 !.:;:...; ioll ,.11 :0 ~ l' ca:::;\,.111 :fa): t}~~ relative lUlattractiveness 
(mod hence rejection) of' the typical f;:llall cars tabled above. 
A j"Otmg member of' .:l focus eroup re!Jearch proj..:ct conducted to 
investi_gate this phe>llomenon during July 1973 expresses this 
moti vution lllcidly: 
"~'or R50 a month I ' ve c ot a good used Honda which cP.n blow 
any car off the road );'ostly my uta tes rid e bikes, its 
i\m - you meet ~ome grea t people aa bikers especially over 
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weekends like on -the Brealcfo.st Hun •• •. (',etting to work's 
!10 problCl':' from tty place to work ' s about fiftee~l r.:ti!1Ut~S 
even in rush hour . One GUy I know with a car sits every 
do.J- for forty minutes on the Ml just getting to Hisflik 
Street . ;~l co parld.ng [LYld petrol are eaojr. 1I 
Prom a Corporate Pla!U1ing point of view, the first-time buyer 
se,sment is rclativ0ly sto.ble in respect of its croVith over the 
lone- tern (beinc relat e'l, 0.3 it is, to the gcnero.l overall rate of 
population increase) but i ..: also no ted for its sC!1sitivity 
to prcvailir_g econom:i.c circwn8tanc~s . OVf"1r -::!: ~_ . )' .:'- 1;-::rm. it is a 
segment having the potential to expa'1d the size of both the new 
vehicle mecrket and the physico.l nw;]ber of vehicles i..'1 operation 
wit!1in the country (with obvious implications for the used vehicle 
and spare parts market8) . 
Tte sub~ect manufactl:rrr'::; Corporo.te rlarmers devote their efforts 
towards attemptil1: to d "fine an ,'lI'pro:z:ip.!'"t~ future GroVitt pattern 
based upon popul ation reld discr0tionary lll(;Olne projections or. the 
one band and the rela ti ve sizes of the 8zistir!,:; r.~arket shares of 
* This last as:JLunption h e,s a res::;onable bo.ois in r cali ty. As a 
sencral rule firat- time bu~-er8, when s-;lectinc :::t vehicle I!luke, 
nrc IlIOst lilcely Lo OC influrmc',c] by tJ,c expcrienceu of current makc 
ownerD. IJ :.rc..lce A !1tt.J.in~ emu mai.lltains .:l marlcet shure of betwee!l 
15, ' - 19, ' for , say, 10 years it is assumed that, in the abocnc c of 
. ' 'I 
'lily indication" to the contrary, ron.'7,hlj- 15~', - 19~., of first-time 
buyers will be draw!'. to Make /, . The phenomenon of the s on 
f[lvourjJl ' ~ t]I0. :~:""~l" (~.:.'tJ" nnkc .'l.fl -th f' onl? his fat""t' ''>r f:"'.VOlH':-; :i.s 
t.illJ..~": j'ccocnizc.:u IUy t!t(: mClul'octu.cc:r ' !.j Corporate ::' l~lrU!e.("L,: . 
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However, wi tlli!! the lant tv/a YOLT:; (1977 - 1978), p:lrtially in 
response to the tt:J.gnatiol1 of CTO'l/tb. VlithL"'1 the e::tabl:"shcd vehicle 
market (vide App endix TI) onu pr,rtjally an a connc'luer!ce of Docial, 
economic and political pressures eXeTteLi within and without 30uth 
Africa, increasinG attention has been paid to the 10n3- term market 
potential of this country's non-Europe~~ comcrtmities. 
Over th3 lon;:;- term it is onJ y the fruition of this m=lcet' c promise 
which economically justifieD the Dubstantial current over- inveDtment 
burden carriea by thA various existinc manufactureI's . Moreover , at 
a social level, the motor industry has been cast in the role of a.~ 
instrument by a..'1Q throuGh which cocial cha.'1c;e may be injected into 
those corrummities via tho medilU!l of' adV811Cement on merit, equal pay 
and s~ared facilities. 
In essence, therefore , the poir..t ho.r.: be,_~ mudc that., in the ab.J enae 
of any mitirating facto!·s, the Black, Colour~d and Asiatic popluationn 
hold the key to tJ,e lone term profitability a.'1d survival of the 
::;outh African motor irduntry via thei r pot0"tia.l to become fir nt- time 
buyer" of r,eVI :notor ·.f,,',j .cle~ . 
in the company 's Corporate Pla.nnins efforts in this area . Indeed, 
it is possible to say that a bulk of til2 rr.anufacturer ::' lon.:;-term 
plarninc; is now conc eI1l',d with 0nourin(, both the viaaili ty of those 
segmen ts and the ability of the company to refJpond to that viability 
as and when their demand for motor trClnGport "takes off". l'or this 
reason and by virtue of the i'act that tl'e potential d0mand will be 
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in terms of first-time ac quisitionn the is~ue of the Black, Coloured 
and As iatic market f:;81_":!lo;:r.ts in cOnblinGd within this prf: 8o::nt section 
of the paper. 
Black, Coloured, Asiatic M:arket Gegmentn 
In s tructur e and compofJition thi:J seam-ent ia as, ii' not more 30 , 
complex in composition as its l':uropcan cO\.Ulterpartn. The Corporate 
:Planner , us a c.:Ol1GLqucllce, ia cf.lrei'ul to c.1 iatineuioh between three 
racial e;roups (Black", Coloured,~ and !.sintics) for each one is 
Gufficiently dlntinct f rom one a"other to warrent beinG viewed as 
separate m2..I'k')t segments in t heir OV/l1 ri~ht . To con.cider th~m as a 
to tal gro~D of' II~lOn-E :.u'o ll ,:, anll buyer::: may b.) convenient but i s 
hardly accurate . Re~arding them [:.8 a cor. ~lo:nerD.te COtLt'to ~~!. !"' 
danger of blurriJlci or ignoring key d emoe;ruphic, psychological and 
culttU'ul diff'crences pertinent to both their type and level of 
consumer demand . ~; ome such key viabl es Qr 8 C;i yen below . 
Asiatics are not only a relatively ~=ll population group 
(726 000 estimated , 1975) , they are r ela tivcly more wealthy 
tha'1 t~le a veraee Bl ack arld Coloured and ar e f~O[raphically 
COnC8!ltrated iE :ratal . They pO::;!3es~: a r01ati\~ ely hi{3h de[jre8 
of sophie tica "'viOll ::,uld, llotwi tlwtanding [,.!1: ~ cuI tural d iffcl'enc cs, 
compare el08e1;)" wi th the typical Europea.'1 vehicle buyer in hoth 
purchase motivation alld conS,UllCl ' behaviour. In effect th8y are 
IIcloscr" to Europ,-81;'::; t heir ac tiolJ." ao vehicle buyers can 
and '''ill reflect this fact. 
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'l.li1C Colonred ma.rket offors th!~ motor manttl'acturr::r the m3.r !~ (::!tine 
advantace~ of beinG sizeable (2,4m in 1975) and geographically 
conc entrated (estimated 86~~ resid e in the Cape Provinc e vii th 
720 000 UOi" of total) located in thc Cape T'eninsula). AD a 
group they are comparatively wealthy relative to Dlack~. Their 
rate of real income growth 1970 - 19'15 VIaO the highest for all 
non- European groups 3.t 5,6;~ per annum (versus 5 ,1;: for Blaclcs and 
~. , 2~: f or Asiatic s Over tlle S3.IDe period). Durin::; 1975 3..'1 eotimated 
55~: of Coloured hOllschol ds carned in excess of 112 500 pCl' annum. 
As at 1 976 Coloureds owned over 92 OOJ cars (4,8,; of all cars 
owned) . ;.ddi tional1y , their 1976 mini- bus and commercial vehi cle 
ownership comprised '''r , 35,; and 3,5" re iipectively of the to~al 
~~outl\ Afr i cQ11 hur; :J.I~U COllU~lcl'cial vehicle popul'1.tionG . Overal l 
4 , T/~ (or 12~ 000 vehicles) of all South Afric an vehicl,,::; were 
in t,~c hand 8 of Colouredc durilJ3 197G . 
Nwnr.:ricf.ll1y th e: IHac k popula Lion .i.:::: by far the 1nrcc::::t comp.ri:;:ing 
18, 2 :nilli on perSO:JE (nib of total) in 1975 . A quarter (4,8:0) 
reside ill urban areas (chiefly Jol~a"'ille8blxt3 - Pre toria - Reef, 
VlhtJr ~.: 2,.~.rP- or ~O.- _ of all Jlc.ck arbaYl d"Ncller.s are: to u[: fOll..'1d) . 
?U.I'31 dw,=:ll~rs ure, in th'3 rani!: , dO::1icil , __ d iT. t!'lC various Black 
home l alld'l . 'l'r:ld i tio"ally South Africa' 8 population is vi eVied on 
a tribal basis. Tribal bc.scd cultur al and social di~tillCtio1l3 
arc rr.08t mark"d in Ifomela'1d rural arQo.G . Convf:r G ely, in an 
urbnn settin~ (as typified by SOVJcto) such distjnctionn hav~ been 
"tr..ro'llll into the l!lc1tine pot" nnd a 1111ique conclomerate Bl ack 
urban culture has 0merged containin,z clement::; of tribal and White 
culture DIu::.: speci2-1 inGredients grown from township conditions 
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themselves. Demographic research indicatcs that roughly a third of 
nlaek households e::lI'llcd in f'!xceD3 of H? 50} pel' '"ll1m.W! in 1975 I.lntl th: ... rl, 
not surprisingly, the incidence of such households i s stronGly weighted 
in favour of the Witwatersrand . l.1oreovel', as at 19'16 Blacks owned 
roughly 7, 6~ (153 000 units) of the totell nmlber of licenced celrs, 
17,s;~ (8 600 unUs) of the tot"l mini-buses and 16,1~:b (99 OCJ tmitc) 
of the totQl commercial vehicles in South Africa. 
~ee Appendix IV for an !:!.nal YfJis of tbt:: sale;; of c~rc , 1:1ini- buses and 
commercial vehicles b_' racial c;roup betv/ecn 19'74 mod 1976. 
4.4 l,\arket Se ,;mentation 
Referring to the di'-' .. gr~.m 'It p3ee luG it shou,ltl be cle~ll' t!~.[l t th<::: 
Market ~jeQuent[\tiull exercit.c C1111 1.)(.: conduc.:tlJ'} L:LHl(!Ul'l'l:~rtl~F ',":1 til t! :o 
earlier discussed Buyer/ll;arket Resel!rch action~. 
It ~hould '1180 u'O clear th'1t in any Mat'keting 1'1elnninE effort tr,e re i~ 
a c1istinction between the \'/ :J..y tr. v:hich the p.!.::.:.rk .. :t tends to SE[9!lent 
itself and the actual Ylo.y i.n which tl1e m!ll'ket is rer,!:lented b;.r the 
actions of ~1'?rketers z(;e~·:il"!r3 to 0):p10i t th:::tt _~.: .. 1J:kGt . In p1./.I'e 
mcrketi!1() "LlLeoT ... : no SllCh di.:..:tj.nctioH :.:hould e.z:ict ["or, ide· lIly , 
however , marketing efforts devoted to the effective retail inc of any 
produ(!t C:.rd particulnrly ~ompJ.~ :< CO~SUr.lcr dvrables sUr:!h as a motor 
vehicle) nre not perfectly "lic;ncd with market requirements . I!1decd 
this variance betwee~l what the !1lClrket wants and what the manufacturer 
provides exists as an estel'olished felct wi thin the motor industry and 
long- range plannine efforts reflect the incvit"bility of the situation . 
In essence the vari r.. ..r..ce ezists by v irtue of t}w rrlQrl-:e t ! s complexity 
orc tile o",e '1CL"ld 821d the marcufacturer's lack of product flexi bility 
(or the ability to ex::wtly tailor his vehicles to market needs) on 
the other . Expressed Mother v:ay the motor manufacturer ' s products 
are a compromise between what is wanted and what can be produced and 
sold at a profit - like all compromises it is imperfect . 
The ear l i e r Dub-sc r..: tion Qi ::..cussed n~ltur :.tlly-oc(:nrin:; P.1'lrket segments 
(replac8!!lent , 8.\~ ditior!al and firp,t - t i!!le buy~r ;;) . ~ r.hi~ cub- section 
will atte!11pt to describe the :u~..rll1er 1.n wh ich th,.: r:l3.nui"acturer seeks 
to derive its. 0'.'Ir1 cO!llpror1ise st8Yld ·\,;orl:int; fro!:!! !112rket 8egments .md 
from what it, ',:!J "ttl org<:'l.fU zut:iJon, can ::ti,'foY'd to tm~)le!llent. As:.l 
compro:nise it in Gener:....lly not as bl"lOQ :1C those ::J.~1in t:1ined b~,r the 
typical llmarketilc -orientc.tedll concerr~s such 0. 8 Jlever Brother..:;), Colg~~te­
:Palmolive ond South Africnr. Breweries . lIt t i:!leS th ere is the distinct 
impres~ion th .!.t although there is a fa.r greater need fa!' vehicle 
markets to beco:nc I! (:o:tsue!er: orientntec1 11 (by \rirtuL of the substa!lti::ll 
invest:nents m3.d e ) , ~he opposit e- i ~3 (JJ't~~~ l true ; the a.dage "they C3....YJ. 
have ~~ny colour they like 80 Ion:; ni~ i t l s Llae;k'l still holus true in 
lTIa.!:Y i!1sta!:.ce s . l1'he mot o!' industry does not ~ -::lve o.n i!::.age of I!putti!'J.g 
cu s tO::lC'l' ·l;I~; L". 
A nv.:nber of qui t ~ rational rC ~180!1C exist to explain the above 
circurrsto.nce. !J..'hesG reasons urG given below in 3. way intended to 
contrast them \':i th the stand t,doptec1 by more typic::tllj' mari:eting-
orientated establisbments. 
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1. All South Africal ] m.~)Jluf.'~lcturcd vchic10:;:; : lre lt08i~~ned wi tIl 
l)VC!'seas ~ lJ'lrkets in l!lind. rrhis point h :::l8 been r~H:llle cGrlicl", I~: 
are~ nt ':.ie~t, a Gucccsuful compromise and., at vrOl':Jt, ,:) failure 
\"/hich V/FlS unaUe to be Clc10pted "~ ll and "Jopted by Gouth African 
buye~:"s. In espence, therefore 1 until ~::uch time 3.S there.. is :) 
totally Gouth Ilfric::m d.esiened vehicle a vast degree of cOl,pro,nise 
between. ll:arket needs and prou.uct design will exist. N."ass con-
su:nption product :narl ~ ; ter:J, however, ar~ a11e to e:.djust their 
product designs ~e<o as to take QCCOlU1t of particular local reqv.ire-
mer.!.ts. 1'lor ey.~!.:nple [1 shompoo in Bri t::::.in !':1.:.y feature a lavender 
fragrance, that scent may be rejected locallo- but it is an easy 
matter to produce the same sho.),: poo for tl:e South A.frican rr.arket 
but with a lema!] scent m:d tilereby f:ir~d tot~l acceptance. 
2. Relative to rIlB,8s-consu:npt ion gooQs :J. motor vehicle represe!lts 3. 
substClr:ti:llly creClter f inancial outlaJ" on the p ,rt of the buyer. 
Consequently, considcr:J.blJ more pur~hD.sc motives ,-~re present . 
Thi;-:,; means that, in relE'tiv8 termc, the G't'1!'kctin'; of tiJ.:lSS-
concumption ~:OOCh3 is more 8i:nple - t!-~erc ~r2 f~\':c!' v nritlbles to 
take into (;0!!sid.eratio~!. '..ill: _.! vehicle !anriu~ter c.::mnot pay close 
lii:..; produc L, l'iGht)..y ur: W!'OllL:J.y he GLle<;t:~~ a few that nre perceived 
".Jo be of key import:l.Y'J.ce o.n:l c.cts upon theI'. 
3 A1J.l· e" tel pOl'rlt (, ' ;) , b ' "t • . U ./ [ '. DoVe;) vehi.cle UYCI' 8 usage reqUl.r·e:nen·s 
nre c.zc0p.clinf,ly hrond whereas t.hose oi' repl'esentative maSB-
consumption product:: are relatively no.2:'TO"/. Co:npare, for eX3.!!1ple, 
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the usage elc~nrmts surrounding even the sP.l:J.llest fC~!TIily C3r 'IIi th 
thosE' pertai!ling to i.t 50e lJo t tie of ::;h:l~!lpoo. 
4 . Whereas buyer iJurc.:hnse :110 lives JOI.' roo.8oS- consumption goods l'emfdJ1 
fairly stable and limited those :xf vehic le buyers Clre both v aried 
and changeable as to t i me and place . A !lO!flents thought will 
underscore the truth of this statement . There are prob'1bly EO 
more thtm ten ren30l1S whj - people buy sh:.:!.!!lpoO and more thnn one 
h=dred in reSpL c t of a car. 
5. All p.rodu(!1; p\J. ('ChilD~~; iY1Volve CO!!l , ~ PCT80Yl'11 or cGu investment on 
the ~");'~rt of the purch,wer. ~OI' e::,uw:p12 ..l :!l'lJ1 wi 11 bUJ~ 3. certain 
ornnd of beer 1'01' re8.cons bnsod upon 8. dc::-ire to project 0. certain 
im:1ge of hilll~elf to others . (:,:?.l'keters re\~ognise this f3Ct [t!1d 
Carling blar;k: l J: dJC L 1,'/! i:Ll~ L 8!1l'')O L11- (;hl!111(:d clOLle-trotting ::::ophi:.rti -
cates drink ,\m:Jtcl . ) Jsy thE t'Q: r~c to':en the !}!o tor vf'!hicle represents 
one of t ile rr:ont not31Jlc m :CLI1G by whi0h ;..:11 ovmer m'ly seek to project 
strong 8..nd c1eeJ!- Gc~:~ted ~nl)i tion :.md i!!!:'t.3C nro jc: c:tio~l c':tp:'ll . i lj.tie~) 
2G :nota::..' vehicJ.Gs. r O:::'E ovor such considerc~tions ~lre comr1e:.:. , 
vClr ied '0", '1. "~hift r~ar!:edly in rC' S,JOEC;e to ,ch'.m:;ec in both tine :mel 
place . There is lit tle ]ll'~"ti .:. e :lssociute ,i \'lith toothpaste but 
a great deal clssoc:iute'1 \'!i "ill a ~,~erced(:G-.!"'3e~::; . 
6 . The willingnef3s and ability 01' vehiule buyers to purchase is 
highly volatil~ i n response to economic and manufacturer confidence 
considerations. r,ient i on wns made in the prcceeu.:i,.rl{j SUb-section of 
t he motor industry's u':)nsitivity i~ these reg8.rds . r.l'~e same 
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c:mnot ))c sai.<.l t(l :..tpplJ' to such a Great extcnt wi thin the field 
of ::n:?ss - cons1J.:nptiI..111 gO(His . 
7. Unlike the r::.laD8 - co!!.Curuption prouuc.:t manui:"ucturer L!~l e motor 
company is unable to mClke product changcs without considerable 
delays . To chan,;e the pack:lge of n brand of toothp:..tste may take 
I.ever Drotilers " matter of weeks whilst for n motor cOElpany to 
introduce n new style of se:J.t covering i:::;: likely to i::1CUI' 3. delay 
of six to eieht "lonthe. 
In pr2ctical terms, therefore, the motor Dl"=Uluf'J.cturer tends to deal 
Hat nr~G lcn[:th!! wi til i tG t~lreet m':lrket::; . rr~h:lt is to s.'l..Y , 3.1 though 
the broad trends of a giVUl lll~.l'l~et :"1.:!'e identi fied :ll1d i~corporated 
into planning uctions, u.ctrJ..l ~ url r; ttl(l~/ of obo(..:ure m,u~ket segments is 
vieVled :"8 being w'l.Gtcful, iEc0ncln~l'~e ~Xi.lll 1 3.<.:king i n. cost- effec tiv8£1ess. 
Of nll (If the nC0v8 s;;ven reD.Gons the i'il'st is likely to be the most 
i:nport'~;--lt contributi~g f'n'Jtor responsible for the m:--.;.n"..lfacturer's 
perceived nloofness frorr.. the m3rkct, Tee fiJ. c t t~nt ::111 nv ::lil2.blc 
product lines were essentiall:r c1e s j.el1cd wi trlOu t SO-:J.t:! Afric!1!1 tflJ.yt.rs 
Attention VI"!} '!rQvm earlier to the t en-year product life cycle adopted 
by the subject m:mufLlcturer. 'rhis c~ ole's dur[Jt ion is set and maintained 
As may be recalled from Wl earlier discussion exceptions to this 
statement exist wl'lere the seGment is readily qucmtifiable. The 
super-luxury and you th- GPortinc; Ql'e typic ,' l example::; of such excep-
tions. 
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by the overseas p"re~lt l':rJOc e product development st::lff is, nutur!llly, 
orient:::. ted to the design o:f products comp::ltiblc ','I i th the needs of 
buyers wi thin that establishment ' s ,nain markets . A 'llanufach.lrcr vlho 
is ver:- active wi thin the Europg::m Economic Community "!ill , consequently, 
seek to tailor its product lines as closely as possiole to the 
perceived future motorinG needs of thClt continent. The South African 
subsidiar;r of such ~ cancer!! must, in turn, reconcile the facts 
that, firstl:f, the }:Urope:'.n market d00S not "lr;,~"-" ,d" l',U' t~ 'nt or 
~outh Al'ric:l ar~a, nccondl;', the locul !IIurkct In~ks the s ize and 
i tnportr.nc.:e neccn:..;ary to urinG j.nto beinr; ~l u"1iquely 00uth ~1I.fric :.. .l1 
!!lotor vehicle. 
inflexi bili ty 1.)1' :l.n inabil:i. ty to I..!h:lllgC ~l!1L1 :t!!Iend his pllYGic; ll 
prodl.ct so as to align with local circumst._cDces , he is forced to 
.find other more remote e.nd , consequentl:r, l ess effective methol1s of 
both segmenting the market a'ld differentiating his product so as 
to appea.l to cuch Ge[1llent::; . 'l'hcc(~ t.llte:rnntiv(' method::) are, fir:::tly, 
product pricing and, secondly, product specificntion. The following 
discussio:"l v/ill co~sider e::.ch in tU!'!: . 
rroduct pricinG as " means of el".h:.mcing product differentiation wi thin 
the field of Corporate rlanninc may be vie\':ed in bot!1 a tactic."l and 
strategic light . Tactical pricine; :1ction has a relatively more 
distant rclat ionohi!J Ylith (!orporaLe Planning 1'01' it is enoentinlly 
d(..!~·;j,cn()d Lo yj.cLd :;!']\)t'I,-LC:l'!P. :.t.dV:lTlL~! ~~'::,:; . 1'\)1' cX;UllplC! , tf at the encl 
of a C<1r model's life cycle the company 112.3 excessive inventories of 
old models, n tactic p.l pt':lce reductj on u.esir:ned to sroll off rcdlmd",., t 
old stock may be iopl€.rr:e!lted. T::ctically, SUC; ! ::-n ftctiO~l is bo~l::, GiH!ple 
to 'lccot!lplish :.md quick '1;0 yielLt l.'8sults . In ' ! ne~1::;c , therefore, it 
serves aD ~l Ilfi':'1e- tu!1in.':;rr InethOt1 for boosti:1C; ( or da"npc!1.ing ) sales . 
At a strategic, level pricing concerns are qui tc differc~t :md more 
closely allieil with those 01' Corpol'ate Planninc _ They are focused 
upon the longer term and tlpO~ the more broader issues of product 
marketing_ 
ffhe nabject I1t3.rlui'actul'er l::: strategic prlcll:.r; planning operates b~~ 
model-li~e _ Each vehicle model from th" time of its inception through 
until its market deletion is subject to such plannine-; o !J.'VlO inflexibl e 
policies e)::ist 'i,i.lch which nIl pricing pli3.r.nin:" ar.d price segnentation 
o.ctio!.1s must conform. Firutly, the vehicle 1 8 price I!lust reflect the 
presence of a profit component - no new vehiclc is ever sold to a 
dealer by the manufacturer "t a loss _ Secondly , the v:holesale price 
must reflect, on o.vera:;e, the ..,!'.tount of money target bU,feI's nrc 
ReD.:Jorls for these policies 'J.re thr'ce-folcl: 
fr::mchised Jealcl'G the adVUT!.t:J.G0 of stc'ldy y~t increasinG 
profi"tabilit:,i (r .:-: opposed -to !! l~oom ~'!"!.d bust " cycle,3 gene!:'ated by 
.:-;- The~e policies would f.l.J..lpeur to 0(> soelc\'Iha t tri te u~til it is rC:llised 
that n numl)er of 1Il'1lluL,ctnrel'S pl':lctine differential pricing whereby 
some !nodels ore sold 3t :J. loss L.lld other s ~ :t v3.stly ir:flatcd prices 
or \l'ihere 1:>,{ modele are :::n -i d 8.t a :!.ocr.z j,n ol"!i er to 3.t trac t spare P.2I'ts 
bU!.ii! !e ,:~..i • 
a1 ternctting narket- skiauning ctm1 market penC'tro.tion tacticCll 
prici~g a(:tiQn~ . 
(b) 11broufh over ::;lxty ye:..u'G 0'1' opcl'ation ti~e policy has shown itself 
to be L\ ffi1jjor :LnstrulIlcl~t in 1"o:~'Lering the erorrth :..l!':d uevclopu)r;nt 
of the company . 
(c) By seeking considantly to operute profi to.bly the company ho.s 
Gained an enviable reputation for finan~~ial man:tge!1lent emongst 
fina'1cial institutiop.s. Consequently its lines of credit are 
more solid and stror~ thnn thor:e of cel't:tiYl of i"t8 rivalD WhO::f~ 
pricins polictea have been more vo.ri:..ble . 
S!,ecific det"3.il as to how prices arc developed for each model-line 
is ll..'1l1ecessary \Jut the seqClence adopted by t!1e company when seg:nenting 
the mr-rket, by pri ce, will nOW be reviel'leu . ~'!1is review will appear 
someVlr.at over-sir~plified ;oet it v,ill illustrate both the type of 
factors t3:cen into cor!Ginoration nnd the genuine Gimplici ty of price 
segmenta.tion within the automotive market . 
appreciated " motor vehiele may be offered at a price 'my where wi thill 
the range of lh.:nds Zero to B_lIldc lnfini ty . '~he co~np '1!1y, however, is 
not a ch:lri ty oyer3ting to give vehicles :J.w::ty and infinity is an 
equall;;r unworkable concept. However, between these two extremes 
intc!'c" Ullg llll:]GilJi] Hie" cxi:;t . COlL!J0'luen ny, the UlOGt fund:"\lncntCll 
first 8tep is to rcview t}'IC m:\rkct wi tll thc 0 bj ccti vc a C determining 
what establish3d price bc.:.nr1::; prev:J.il :U} '.1 rc:;ul t of cmapeti tara 
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~aturally, there is rul upper nnd lower limit to the market- wide price 
bruld. DurinG July 1978 the followillg ceiling and basement ret<lil 
prices were present within the market : 
LCUllLJOrc;hini i~s pwlr~ 
Jlcylanu r,~ini 11c rltlXC 
R '56 4')0 
1",' ',) ~~l h) 
bctvlCen tbe~je tvVlJ ex t .!:'emc8 l'[.Lll the Lulcmc.:c of t:-18 market 1 G pro{luct 
ofi'cri.::gs. 1_'2?1ese nre all E'xa!:-:ined i n turn by make and model- li~.:.e . 
Jfaturally the ke;' determinant :lS to V/lwt cODsti tutes n model worthy 
of :ldd i tiol1:ll study is it:; level of market GceeptCl..'1ce as measured by 
its level of retail snles since its market introduction as given by 
l.JAAMSA stati.Jties . (As may be imabined this is relatively simple 
m,ongst the lower priced vehicles competing at the bottom end of 
the marlcet wllere differences irr monthly sales volumes between models 
rna? run into the hundreds but becomes increasin,£;ly difficult 3S one 
moves -"P thc market - where the re·~nil snles differentiation may total 
a~; -L'::-:; [1:':; live or ten uni tH' ) In uGsence 'l1.i1U.t the planner seeks 
i s a rrul;:,e of exi8ting ke:; models with their r~tail prices . 
Assume 8.S 3. consequence of the above market reviE-;' the following 
hypothetical table ic derived: 
-~ National Association of Automobil e T'-'1nufRC tut'eTfi of: :Jou.t " ;doric c -
,-tI1 inu.cpcYHlcnt indu:Jtr'y co-ol'dirl'l.t.:i-
!.:"-Il'lu:Cr.:.c tUl'er~ belone . 
c;ouncil to v/!-:1ioh all 10<":;].1 
Vchicl (> ;"ode1 
A 
B 
C 
D 
10 
G 
H 
I 
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Ect:.lil i'I'icc 
(Han,i::) 
3 200 
3 990 
4 385 
4 735 
5 210 
5 350 
6 147 
7 500 
9 luO 
11 5uG 
15 475 
':~ct:J.il Sc:.les 
"11,'1 , 1977 - June 1978 
5 000 
14 400 
13 800 
10 105 
8 742 
7 300 
6 862 
5 281 
::; 002 
2 81'1 
2 513 
Hence the market offerings (;,10dels A - K) rep:-esent key "marker" or 
"strategy" competitors, ,:otice that in price theJ' are distinct from 
one another. NIore importo.ntl~- tht=re is overy reason to suppose 
th~t each ::Ippeal to different bUJel' t,:'pc::;, ProGpective 110dcl 1) 
buyers are likely to te significantlJ' different from those of 
~!odel 10 Wld substantially different from those of rr.odels J and K, 
:raturally D. difference in bu:~er "type" equates to n uistinction 
between ro~r::et segme!1tr: b:.lsed upon price. Tn esse:'jce, therefore, 
the manufacturer ' s market segmcntation pTactice rests upon the premise 
that the key serynenting variable 1.3 'Jrice . 
4,4.2. Market Segmentation Py !'roduct l'rice And Specifica'~ ion Action 
Price, it will be readily admitted, is not the sale differentiating 
variable present. There is also tho isoue of 1Ispccificntionll or the 
type of physical t~lllgiule Lenel'i ts any vehi"le 0:':':":"8 i'o:.' i'ts 
monetary value. In other word:.:, if' '-' car is priced at H5 000 what 
does it yielil to the buyer in the V/::Ij ' of ailv:,lllt'1[;CG COllll':Yccd Vlith 
another vehicle priced at R4 OOO? To expand purelJ priC0- icLl.sea 
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pl:'..!"lrlVrS lUlCl:'rtake v/hJt ,:1re tel'Hied ~~pc:cificntio!l An:J.lyseG upon each 
key "marker" model . 
Briefly 0. specification .').1"n.l:;:..ii..; i nvolves ~ri in- depth study of 
each m'lrker model in isolatiol'l Q.."ld in contrast Vii th the models ab0ve 
Dnd below it . 'rhe investigation relates to the levels of specification 
nnd trim bui.l t jnto e:l.cn. l?ol' example, wlKI. t justification ex i:Jts for 
An :.ibbreviated but rcprefJentative specification an.:tlysis is given 
below which 3erves to justi:f",f this H350 price pre!:liu:!l . 
;.)n8ciiic8.tion fI~D.l ;~Si3 - j.:odel D ')v c.:r ~,iodel C 
0pc:c:i.fic2"tion r.lode1 .) '!J Over C rl'crnium 
Villyl Hoof 
Radial l'ly Tyres 
Fi tted Rs.dio 
Shaded Windscreen 
Seo.tj_ng for ~ 
Cloti'l- Jeo. ts 
J,ocking Petrol Cap 
jrert'~pr/nCllli8 ler 
IL!n chumr: ter 
l!:.llogen lleC1dl<1:Irps 
.. 
x 
A 1\350 
X 
,. 
X 
;; 
X 
l-
X 
X 
A 
Hence it is ;:: reasonable supposition that th2 I,lodel D buyer will pay 
R:550 more to obtain a vinyl roof, fittet; rC1<iio, seating for five 
personG, cloth scats =<1 n tncholllctor. 
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A:J a further p:::.rt of tt..e spccificatior! D.nal~-:Jis of !',lodels C arid D 
these above adJitional specifi8'"tio~ items are applied to tl:e stated 
H350 differential. 1'i1at is to sa~' the R350 is broken dOlVn into 
monetary values of the five additional items featured by Model D. 
~'or example, the following may be determined : 
Specification } ... n~l;,'-sis - :iodel ';1 Over fl10(lel C 
Spec . Item 
Fitted llUlj jo 
S8["!. ti!1g "'or Five 
()loth Se,_t.:; 
Tachometer 
'.i.'ot :J.l 
T'rice/I[ .'1.1l> e 
~ ; (3 ) 
Ii 1 2:) 
H 80 
E 50 
IT 20 
R j~j(J 
011ecii'ic8.tili~1 Ollnlys(-G 01' e UC1: 1l1 :'J.rkl: I' Inodel or ...:truteGY corupetitor 
permi t the e:-::traction of a complete Mi.:r}ce t Price/Specificati on Profile 
where by the total m::rket ie' ~ogmentable in terms of the following 
cnnr8.ctf'risti,::: ,- : 
: ~akes and models 
Letuil prices 
j~ct(li l price: dil'LcTr.m L :L ~~ L:; 
::';peci:.fication levels 
Spccii'ic : tion uX'il!e/valu2G 
In practice price/cpecii'ic3tion evaluo..ti0! lS ure an on-going process 
by virtue of the continual introduction and deletion of vehicle 
models. (A point of interest is thQt price/vcllue differences are 
bused upon relative Llifi'erences rather thnn o.bsolutes. Hence an~~ 
ret ail price increns es mny chnnge the rand price but not the relative 
1-
~Hl becuu:;c tl:.e !:.:..t.l'kot is oligtlvolistic .... 11 othc:rs raise their prices 
by em equivalc!1~ LiTwunt . ) 
HavinG a complete luarket price/vCllne specii'i,,,"tion profile pel'luits 
th", Corporate Planner to llttempt four thing'; , viz: 
(3) to Geb~llent the mu,rket in terms of' price and specification 
(1;) to l;cG!lIcnt the ~l1:11'kct in tCl'!!l:':; of bn;'-cr need.:; :uu] pro rile ~1 
(d) to ueLl'.:.·:ni 110 lOI'!g -rancc :!lOdel :l.'1d specification reqairement::> 
fur \,/ l!~ C OI!!p:.U t::r . 
I3UYE1;j j,t/I E.Kj~:T l1/l f.1~A 0 , .. W\Il.::ET SJ,GMSNTATT()N 
-
Demogruph:lcS - Price n::mtis 
- Purchase Patternc - Key r,Iarker Models 
-
Long- Term r,brket Corwidcrations 
-
Specification Levels 
-
]~ d;rer Needs - Pr i ce/Value Profiles 
I 
.I..:A.BKEfl' SEGME],"!'ATIOn 
8Ylf'rIH~SlS 
I 
r.:J\B1CR'~ SEGr:iEIlT 
l!'OHECASTS 
Por tl"!(; Guko vi' prar: t;ic:~li ty :_.:: ~d C01:v2uience specific mnr}cet segments 
arc c1u:.:;.;rii)(]t1 v:i.;), tIle woans oj' :If\ alph:t1)(.::t:i.e c;c:d.e in the c~LOC of C:lr::: 
(trucks make use of weight or paylor-u. and usage see;mcnt nomenclature). 
This scule is illustrated below and i I; iu an::.;y to 3£:e how it hc.s been 
ocri4 ,-ed frotJl the Pl':l .cc/v:tlu~ cyn.LucrLion procc.':=;:.:. 
Segment 
A 
B 
c 
]) 
SeQuent Description 
::!:I:~.ll C:U·:..). H:.l! : l .... : Lt':t'I:'::1'0J.'t,. ~)\,w; ~lh.~ ~ 'j.l'i(!:l ·l.t\Jl·. 
l( ' vc.l~:. !';lhjlll:l:;.i. :; \.lPlJr~ nl'(!l':d.:illl'~ (~C01lnllly . IllWI 
il;comc 1JU ;/~I'8 but adcl i tiono.l bayers nre well 
l' Jpresel.!.ted. 
J~l[J.ll f8.!nil~· cars. 11,'!ed ium specification level . 
E:. ph<-1: is upon econolfij4 . Young marrieds/r eti rees . 
;,;Q·lcrate income level:::;. ~Jo nonscnS8 reliable: 
t l 'CU1S port. 
i"u'"il"- car". Marrieu "lith chilJren . Interior 
spaee is important as is engine porler and stylmg. 
Pamily transport but with added emphasis upon pO','ler 
old/or status , .\:1 important buyer is '11so the 
young above- average income professional. 
specification levels . 
High 
Mature , suecessful "mno.gerial/ professional buyer . 
~·;l;.l~u:,; :.1nd :_:pe(;iJ'i<':l.L~ioll :l!'\J vel'~- :LmporL:mt (;on:Jidul'-
:l tionc . 
RETAIL 
SA LES 
VOLUM"S 
£ 
:Jl 
c 
F 
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011ecific:J.t:LOi""!. 811U status 8.re of paramount importance . 
],ioney of' little: object . 
rIence the Gorporut(! Plallner pl,)!Jseu:Jes six diGtinct market segments 
into which he Il l::'.';" nu'," r.(8::dg~l (vi a cpecifi'::ntion eVflluations) every 
model ~U1U derivativC' olfered b,Y his OV'~' l CO:.lp3.11~· :.l.."1d its l'ivnls . 
Such s0g!J.cnt fore e::!<.:i.::; consiGt of in- depth i nvestigations of both 
individual ::;c~mcnt::; imu the iutcrnc-Lion which tukcs place bctweeJ1 
segments . R'c8ul ts of cueh D..YJalyses yield vi tOll information for 
long-ranGe plannine purposes , for example : 
segment growth o.~c1 d~cline trends 
levels of competitive activity within spgments 
price and specification mOYGmentn within and across segment 
boundaries . 
Iro illustrQ t e "L"nis i:.lpor ant st:-_£:e tn thl: pL'lr~~L"'1~ cycle assume a 
Given 
review of the six market segments exposes the sitaation dep i cted in 
the cli,"gr:lm below: 
"000",,,0°"° \:1.:>° 0 °0 
_,,">-_ -.... °0°"'00,,"00':> ., 
- - -- --------
----- ;;-
--.... 
.-
.-
-
--
____ ::D 
A -1:.::-_- --, - -- - -------.,. --- - .. 
1'170 '''7/ 1 'I'7~ 1"i7 3 'T '7'5 ,.,70:0. '''77 "7 a 'fSlO 
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J!\.lrther ClSGl"J;).e thnt four model options are open to the compa'ly w{-... en 
considerine i 1.8 101;.':;-l'angc product strategy: 
An A Segment vehicle 
A B Segllent vehicle 
A C Se~[lent vehicle 
J\ II ~)C~IIlCH L V"(~}lJ_C le 
In effect the task is to forecast the future market viability of the 
four lli'1rkct seg!!lp.ntc (A - D) over the 118Xt ten yea.rs Qnd to Ill:J.l.:::e 
r e commendations Q.S to v/hat models to o.clopt 8,llU Wilich to :eject. 
Sep;mcnt A SeGment A may appear attractive in the long- terra by 
virtue of an anticipated en.'lonced desire for motorir.g 
economy _ HOVl8V8:!' current sales volurnes are so low that 
there i s little prospect of invcst:nent recovery within 
three yec.rs whilst l'isk levels are unacceptubly high . 
'1'11.(, :::::0 a.p.l.)C'ur to (m eI'0vitl: segmcY!.t3 ",'hich huve expanded 
:.It, the- cxpell38 0:" sale:: volllfficn5 viithin. segments D o.nc1 .E. 
8c <rment D ,', ',his segmcnt mr'Y be expected to contract further over 
the long- term ll! responze to continued co s t/price pressures. 
As Q consLqueDce the Corporato Planner may decid-.: to recommend the 
following ten-year product plans: 
1. Introduce a Segment B vehicle. 
2 . IntroQ1lco 0. Segment C vehicle. 
- ::J.:'; -
:; . Introduce:) ~8[';Ill0.nt 1; veh:;".:;le b-...:. t vii th :.t ':lide r[..,~lge of incliviclu,Jl 
• .,. . 
model derivatives differe~1tiD.ted from each other on a price and 
spe cific~tion basis SUCll that the lowest specified/priced version 
competes wi thin Seg.nent D Ylhilst a highly specified/priced 
version effectively competes within t':te stable and lucrative 
Segment P. 
At the end of five J-reo.I'S :'1.11 product lines c~!'c to be rc - npprniGcd . 
I n l1ClI'til.:ul~r the future vi:lbilitJ of the proposed Seg:aent D 
rnotl c.L IUUG t Lc C'll'C rull;y' evalu:' tel! CUll] u<:lctcu if nec~~G"l':r . 
Additioncclly, at that title, See;ment fl must be investi';<lted to 
determine the extent to ';'hich it h"!s (if ::t all) or i s likely 
to expo11oJ. duri:lg the l1vxt 15 - 20 :~e~rs u t tt.e expense of Segmr;n ts 
'IJ <lnd U. 
In ~UIIUtl:;l!,y, it should iJe clear that the issue:::; of Pri ce &.nd Product 
Specificc.tio", <lre closely re13Led in tt.e long- ra"'ge :aarketing efforts 
of the sutject moto L' :1!W1Uf{.:.ctur 0r . Price is a key m·...:.r:-::et seL;!nentation 
dovice (in Doth thcor:~ und effect) yet it is linked to Specification 
by cuztO!TIcr-03.oed connic1er ntions in respec t of buyer demographics , 
att i tud e n Llnd compcti til18 nctior..s cutu product of.t'erings ~ !,=oreovc'l· 
the twj.l1 issues of I'rice :..l!ld Gpcuific:J. Lion are s:'11thcGicca and 
evaluated in terms of i3Llycr/:;1urket Hesenrch (lat<l '~o derive both 
market seg:~ents and m:.lrJcet segmont growth forecasts. 
8eJ:'uCllteu in teI'~ n8 of l'rice ::!!!u ;..)peciftcL.Lton co!wiJ.erat ion...: . ~\l£ 
third st ;-~Be to be reviewed is that v/hich nOVI seeks to deter:ni..l1e what 
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CeB!lle!lts. A brief 1l1lntion 0.1.' ·t::his process ';'10.3 given in the 
preceding sub-section . This sub-section will now expand upon thio 
and i n troduce tho roles invoot!.lent aYld profit play wi thin the model 
selecti0n process.* 
Esse~tially the Corporate r la::mer now 101o'/ls V/h<lt !G3.rket eaps or 
opportunities exist. He must, therefore, answer the following 
questions : 
In view of tlIe lllv0:.:tment reQuirements stemming from the product-
IH:.1I'ket n~r;d, "':11ch products [ire likc1~r to bt- thE: most ~I.cofituble 
to prodUce' or ':;hut market g ''PG that we huve products to fill 
are liJ:elJ to "e the most profitablc? 
AssUI:le the m2llUiactuL'or has i"c,ntified three key ,,,,rJ:et gaps a 
small cur priced at I() ,00 , a medium- sized car ct R5 500 and a lurge 
eer ret~iling for H6 5eQ. Beine the loc':)'l suGs i di5.ry of a !..Iml ti-
nationo.l t..:ocporation bhe opportlUlj.t;1 ex.ists to co-Cot :.!rOUnn the 
purent anil :;'ell'wl sub .. ;idiary comp"mies for car modele sui ted to tLe 
aobve-defined 10cul market gut's . (::Jouth Africa's market is too small 
to cupport the inveotment cost!: of desi(>nin(>, tooling-up fOT and 
building the three cur- lines locally . ) '.rhi3 rr:odel selection 
opportuni ty t3 advantageous j.n the sense that the local manui'actw.'er 
.~. 
'l'he e3I'lier general sections which dealt VIi th L'1Ve8tme~t and 
proi:Li:,,\)j,lj t~" wi tldn thie inrh.l'Jtry IIl"Y h olpfuli.;j be rv-read at 
tlli..: staGe . 
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has the ubili ty to select from u. wide rall£:c of :Porth Americ[Ln , South 
American, Europear" Australiw1 Q.'1d Japal1eSe vehicles . The bre2.d~h 
of choice naturally raises the likelihood of identifying and adopting 
al1 optima l vehicle rem;:;" . llisailvantac;eouGly, the very fact that this 
cho ic e exists me pns that, whatever decision i s r.1ade , the product 
will, to 8o",,:: u:tr)nt, k ou~ of :::tep with the prccise rcquircmer.tG 
of the tar;;et South Afl'ical1 market segment . lr.oreover , any attempt 
to ro-design the vehicle with the objnctive of cnhnl1c ing iLG lOC:ll 
thE: requil'c!n8nt fo r such irJVe ~tmcnt will '0" wei'lned or truded-off 
b:,r comparing the direct inVGstlllent cost aca:Lrwt the rever..ue lost Ly 
not making ::;ucl: improvements. ":-
* 
The s..,oj <,ct manufac turer Luil t a r ange of light pick-up trucks 
\'/11088 dcoj.gn or supply source was Japnn . T!1e vehicle WCG closely 
matci1ed to Sou th African conditions being rugged, durable 
powerful '-'11<1 econo:.lic::1l. I t fo=d l'cccdy mark"t accept8!1ce but 
cOl1sistentJ.:,r fail::d to meet l:l' tT'ke t pe:r.:.etratio:n ~\J8. l::::: i n rurc.l 
ru:.H'}cet:: . ;:;ubs(.(lUent rE::8cD.:cch evillence revealed thCtt the typical 
South Afl'ic::lll farmer who re jected the vehicle was not only above 
avera.:;e he i ght but ;:,180 favoured '.':e arin~ a hat '.-,hilst driving . 
Consequently , he felt that tL" pick-up!::; headroom and door- height 
for gett.ing in and out \"/::1S inadequate . Thi s over::;ight on the 
part 01' the J~,panese desicn staff required an R800 000 investment 
to rectify. 
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Overseas pr.oduct supply soure",::;, wtere neVi products are designed 
"from scro.tchl! make very close :l~.wessments of buyer preferences 
at all stages up to the selection of fin~l product designs . 
Nutlu'nlly, the bUyC1'3 consult0u arc IlL"de up .of :nembers of the 
main mar,=et for the pro,:oscd vehicle. In this way a British design 
Gt~ff will :tncorpoI':l.Le Ilc !.iign l'f:! i...tures catcrine rOT the unticiputell 
purchase l;rei'eren(;es of British buyers during the next five to ten 
yenrs. 
ASGU!ne, for 8xnmple, l~ri tinh !anl~ket recc ;- l'ch inuica--:es D. s 'trong 
r:ecd for economy, ease o:f service and ma.intenance, s8u.ting for five 
per~ons and n cost of ~4 000 at current prices. The design team will 
then experiment with various "neine, povlertrailo :md axle configurations 
until a "b8I'e- boncs tr chaGsis is derived ~'1hich meets cost/investment 
targets o.nd j" in line with stated bUj'er preferences . At this stage 
the stoling team take the ch:::ssis and seek to provide it with a "skin" 
which i3 not only compotitlc ',,'ith the chc:Jsio but is capable of being 
producLd at 0 targe t cO:3t/invc:.; t:ne.l't '-Ll1tl ic; i:l ~tep with lJri tish 
target bUj~ersl perceiveu. future stylin~ preferences . -:,-
Such rescrrc:l UpOll ot;~ ling tre"ltmelltc 1.3 · ~:/1}1.0~lly undertaken via the 
menns of vehicle "clinics l1 wt:ercin sele cted memoers of tte target 
market are exposed to the styles and asked to give their opinions . 
This opinior. is normally expressed via u simple rating scale UGil1g 
Major consumer research studies will be undertaken to investigate, 
for cXClmple, preferences for: square, rectanGUlar Clnd round 
headlal!1i)!]; t\'!O, rUlH', thrc r~ ~Uld five uoore; integral emd 
dispersed :cc ~J.r liGht cJ.u~ "~er:::; j ltc~drOO!il legl'oolll, hip ':.J.nd 
Ghouluerl'OOLlI; boot-oize and roor pillal' thicknes3. 
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numbers which express a degree oJ "like" or "dislike" concerning a 
particular feature of the vehicle. By asking buyers to rate both 
the prototype and competiti ve vehicles a re l ative measure of the 
prototype's abi lity to exceed, be comparable or be inferio: to 
rival products is derived . The very fact that the research is 
orientated towards vehicle design and styling means that any \'Iealmesses 
versus rival nroducts may only be corrected by physically amendL~g 
-the prototype. 
Ultimately, therefore , a product is pl aced into production in 
Britain which meets both the requirements in respect of price , size, 
operating cost and styl ing . Consequently if that'same product is 
now introduced into South Africa it i s not as compatible with local 
needs as it is in its true target market , Compounding the difficulty 
i s the fact that the local manufacturer has no way of materially 
amending the product's overall design - the investment costs (for 
reasons which have been given) are too great. 
In selecti ng a product- line therefore the local manufacturer is 
totally alive to the fact that he is making some form of compro~ise , 
The specific model he adopts will be the best available to him for 
his t arget market and not necessarily the best suited , To some 
extent his chosen model wi ll be incompatible with local needs , he 
will be powerless to correct the dei'iciency and , naturally, any 
product weakness will result in lost sales to competitors whose 
products are relatively stronger, 
Once a suHable short-list of potential models has been developed 
their final selection takes place on the basis of (1) their respective 
- 218 -
requirements for investment and (2) their forecast profitability. 
This selection process takes into account the followi ng considerations: 
forecast retail sales volumes by year 
incremental investment needed 
residual value of investments made 
total, fixed and variable costs per unit 
wholesale prices per unit 
contribution per unit 
Detailed coverage of this financial evaluation is unnecessary , in 
principle the process represents a simple break-even analysis based 
upon retail sales volumes . The model selected will be that which 
satisfies the need for the maximum p,rofitability over the planning 
peri od with the lowest investment need . This financ i al recom~endation 
i s made independently of any exogenous considerations (such a.s the 
reliability of supply, chronic design faults and the like) Profitablity 
is the yardstick with the final. decision being .made by the managing 
di rector who will take into account both financial and non-fL~ancial 
variables . 
4 . 6 The Final Synthesis - Extraction Of Future Product And Deriva tive Pla~s 
At the commencement of this, the final stage of the Marketing 
Synthesis process the manU£acturer has determined the following: 
what market segments exist 
what requirements exist within each segment 
what product line is most compatible with identified segment needs ; and 
what product line is not only compatible with segment needs but 
which is the most profitable. 
Only one fL~al action remains and that is to determine the specific 
derivatives and specification levels which must be offered to the 
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target market segment in order to optimalise the appeal of the chosen 
model. In other words, "fine-tuning" actions are necessary in order 
to tailor more closely the final product assembled in the factory 
with segment needs . (The synthesis naturally flows from segment 
needs on the one hand and financial-investment/profit - factors on 
the other . ) 
.The manufacturer will attempt to undBrtake this tailoring task by 
adjusting and amending his product in two ways, namely: 
by varying Specification levels; and 
by varying Derivative Offerings . 
Each will be discussed in turn and related to Corporate Planning 
practice . 
4 . 6 .1. Specification Levels 
Major mention has been made of the fact that the local manufacturer 
does not possess the ability to re- design, to a material degree , any 
current product line. However, limited design flexibility is present 
in respect of product speCification. "Specification" i n the context 
of this section refers to what are termed the "hang- on" features of a 
vehicle and they include, inter alia: 
paint colour; 
trim colour; 
trim, upholstery and carpeting; 
seating style; 
instrumentation; and 
level of standard f eatures . 
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By combining different levels and types of the above six features a 
wide range of vehicles may be produced which, although they are in 
essence the same basic model , are perceived to be distinct from one 
another. For example, the subject manufacturer produces a range of 
" small" cars within which substantial differentiation exists (via 
the manipulation ' of the above six factors) as is set out below: 
a choice of three engine s izes ; 
two and four door body styles ; 
ten exterior paint colours ; 
four vinyl roof colours; 
four interior seating and carpet colours ; 
"low", "medium" and "high" level instrumentation; 
two seat types; 
three levels ( "low", "medium" and "high") of standard features plus 
no less than 230 additional accessories (ranging from tinted glass 
and styled wheels through to sheepskin seat covers) . * 
From a Corporate Planning point of view the manufacturer will seek 
to balance the range of features that it would like to offer (and 
thereby enhance its chances of attracting buyers) with the cost and 
complexity difficulties attendant upon offering such diversity. 
(Thi s latter i ssue is particularly marked with respect to specification 
items re~uiring high levels of investment such as engine ranges : ) In 
order to resolve the problem highly specific research investigations 
are conducted vdth the objective of deriving an optimal specification 
"mix". Such 'i nvestigations closely mirror those conducted earlier to 
settle upon the optimal model range except that specification items are 
evaluated instead of model lines. 
* In the United States the Ford Motor Company ' s Mustang range alone has 
such a wide range of features and possible options that if each option 
were combined it would not be possible to build two identical vehicles 
in' a full year ' s production. 
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Retail volume enhancement projections are made on the basis of the 
expected demand which will flow from offering a particular feature. 
This forecasted demand is then translated into profit terms via a 
comparison with the costs which would be incurred as a consequence 
of the features being adopted . ' However, whereas overall financial 
profitability was the final dec~ding factor in respect of model 
choice, a greater measure of flexibility is present in respect of 
.8pecificat'ion levels. Although, for example, an engine choice is 
likely to be made on the basis of profi tabili ty the decision be.tween 
vinyl and cloth seats is less likely to hinge upon direct 'financial 
considerations. The engine question will involve major plant 
investment, that of upholstery will not. Moreover, one of 
the key considerations in determining specification levels is the 
extent to which specification items compliment one another to forn 
a harmonious whole . For example, if the model is aimed at a high-
class market segment the marketing planners will be careful to specify 
the vehicle accordingly. If the vehicle is to sell at R12 000 the 
fitted radio may well be a cheap, low-quality R50 unit which, financially, 
offers the manufacturer the most profit. However , to be in keepir~ 
with the rest of the car's specification, a high quality R350 radio/ 
cassette player is called for, the additional cost of which must 
either be absorbed or built into the retail price .• 
Specification features may be conveniently classified into long and 
short term. Long- term specification relates to high investment 
items which will be an inseparable part of a model throughout its 
ten year life-span; examples include engine and body-style (two or 
four doors). For the balance, such as colour, trim and so forth, 
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specification planning occurs on a short-term, annual basis . Short-
term specification items are , naturally, l ow investment features and 
may be changed easily and rapidly . They provide the manufacturer wi th 
the means of "freshening- up" his products periodically by bringing 
out new paint colours, seat coverings and trim levels . 
4 . 6.2 . Derivative Offerings 
A "derivative" is best thought of as a sub- model wi thill a model ra'lge 
distinguishable from its fellows by nomenclature and specification 
differences . For example , the Ford Escort model range contains tv/O 
derivatives ; a 1300cc "Ln..and a l 600cc "GL" a'ld Mercedes-Benz seven; 
240D , 300D, 280S , 280SE , 350SE, 450SL and 450SLC .. 
The reason for providing derivative offerings is simply to expand the 
appeal of a single model line to a wider target market . This 
practice is by no means unique to the motor industry being well 
established in the f i elds of toiletries , detergent, foodstuffs for 
example . 
Physical differentiation between derivatives may range from the most 
simple to the most complex. At one extreme derivatives may only be 
di stinguishable in respect of nomenclature whilst , at the other, major 
specification differences may be present . As a rule, however, 
derivatives are typically differenti ated in terms of specification, 
pri ce and nomenclature . 
The importance of offering a suitable derivative range is best 
i llustrated by example . During September 1918 Ford of South Afri ca 
produced only three car models yet the range of derivatives offered 
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was so great as to encompass all but the very small (Austin Mini) and 
the very large super-luxury (Mercedes- Benz, Jaguar) warket segments . 
Ford South Africa Model/Derivative Range 
(As at September 1978) 
Escort nOO 2 door R 3 830 
4 door 3 960 
1600 GL 4 730 
GL Automatic 4 760 
Cortina 1600 L 4 990 
L Stationwagon 5 390 
2000 GL 5 430 
GL Automatic 5 800 
GL Stationwagon 5 800 
GL S/Wagon, Automatic 6 180 
3000 S 6 150 
Ghia 6 940 
Ghia StationViagon 7 230 
Granada 3000 GL 7 660 
Ghia 11 500 
Each one of the above derivatives is aimed at individual market 
segments whi lst prospective buyers can move up and down a price and 
specification scale . 
In Corporate Planning terms few areas of product marketing strategy 
are more rewarding than effective derivative decisions. Firstly, 
derivative changes are extremely easy to make (specification levels 
are changed in the factory and the price adjusted accordingly) 2L~d , 
secondly, there is the persistant opportunity to establish a wide-
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rrulging appeal to prospective buyers. 
If the models' life cycle is ten years (that is, from its design 
inception through to its deletion from the market) , the plan.'1er' s 
concern with respect to the models' derivat ive offerings falls 
logically into two fields; namely pre-public introduction Q'1d post-
introduction. 
In the time that a model is under design development, great thought 
will be devoted towards determining its optimal derivative r ange 
at and immediately after its launch to the public . To assist, buyer 
res earch is conducted to uncover target buyer ' s preferences. 
Additionally, consideration is given to the gaps derivatives will :fill 
relative to both the company ' s other offerings and those of its 
competitors. 
Dur.ing the post-public launch period, the same ground rules apply 
with respect to derivative selec~ion. Firstly, the sales success of 
each derivative is evaluated. Secondly, a close watch is maintained 
upon the market f or the contraction of existing opportunity gaps and 
the expansion of others. For instance, a model may be latL'1ched 
featuring a sporting derivative which, although successful in the 
immediate post-launch period, rapidly declines in popularity. 
Consequently that derivative may be eliminated entirely . 
Within the subject comprulY long-range derivative planning tends to 
operate upon an 18 - 24 month cycle . This cycle is closely linked 
to the time it takes for any single derivative to lose its "freshness " 
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wi thin the market. At the end of each cycle appropriate re-vitnlising 
derivative actions are implemented . 
4.7. Summary and Conclusion 
Corporate Planners will attempt to combine market data with product 
price and specification data for the purpose of derivL~g market 
segmcnts . Sales within these market segments will then be forecasted 
to determine both growth potential and their likely segment inter-
. 
action. Having identified viable future segments a."l effort will then 
be made to introduce a suitable product line into each. Criteria 
employed in product sel ection includes an assessment of the investment 
, 
costs required for manufacture and the profitability of the likely 
product oyer its market life. A product compatible with local buyer 
needs, requiring relatively little investment and which is likely to 
be the most profitable will stand the best chance of being brought 
into production. 
The South African Corporate Planping task with respect to product 
marketing and selection is made difficult by the markets ' complexity, 
its current stagnation, the lack of any real ability on the part of 
the manufacturer to effect styling and design changes and recognition 
of the fact that segment differentiation is, in many instances, based 
upon insubstantial variations in specification levels within what are 
otherwise identical model rangeB. 
SECTION FIVE CORPWATE PLANNING CONSTRAINTS 
5.1 Introduction 
A planning constraint may be viewed as an · environmental factor 
having the potential to confine, prevent or re-direct the 
implementation of company plans to an extent that the plan 
finally executed is a compromise between what company ma~agement 
' . 
wish and what the environment allows. 
A fundamental reason for Corporate Planning is the existence of 
operating constraints actL~ to limit and hinder a company's 
scope and efforts directed towards attaining its profit objectives . 
By implementing a Corporate Plan a company will have, L~ effect , 
impressed upon or injected into its environment an element of change. 
For instance by launching a new product the status quo within the 
market is upset ; buyers switch brands , competitors react and 
marketing mixes are adjusted • Such change may be ei ther positive, 
. 
neutral or negative. Negative change , which is the concern of this 
section, equates to a constraint upon planning action . 
Systematic long-range planning attempts firstly to recognize the 
constraints attendant upon proposed courses of action and, secondly, 
thereby either to minimize or evade the ir5luence of such constraL~ts 
before such plans are transformed into actions . 
Two broad classes of planning constraint exist . They are displayed 
" 
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below together with their respective major components . 
CLASSES OF PLANNING CONSTRA:TI~T 
Formal Informal 
Forecasting the Macro-Economy 
Product In~lexibility 
Internal to the Comp~~y 
External to the Company 
Market Structure 
Each will be reviewed. 
5.2 Formal Corpor ate Pl anning Constraints 
Reasons for the import~~ce of formal constraints are two-fol d. 
Firstly they are the most direct and tangible hurdles to 
planning action . Secondly , a planner may only at'tempt 
either to evade or accept their in~luence upon his efforts . 
Such constraints are , as a general rule, so well entrenched 
within the operating envirbnment that the individual company 
i s unable materially to amend or ' dilute them . In effect they 
consti tute, environmental "constants" around and through which 
Corporate Planners must work . (This is not to say that such 
constraints are unchangeable; .. they are , but rarely as a consequence 
of the actions o~ single companies .) 
No attempt will be made to investigate all of the ~ormal constraints 
pertinent to the motor industry . IVhile the size and complexity of 
this economic sector ensures that the r anee o~ constraL~ts is 
proportionately great , three of the more interesting classes of 
5.2 .1 
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constraint will be discussed in the following pages. 
Forecasting the r.lacro- Economy 
The relative pr osperity of any individual motor manufacturer 
' i s , first and foremost, a function of macro- economic factors 
governing the effective demand for motor vehicles. Notable 
macro-economic considerations incl ude unemployment levels, 
consumer and business confidence , real income gr owth , inflation 
rates , income distribution patterns and the nation ' s balance of 
payments status . Additionally, recognition must be paid to 
government soc io- economi c policies intended to modify these 
consid er ations . 
Motor industry r etail sales have been found to be remarkably . 
sensiti ve to changes in th~ above- mentioned demand-inducing 
considerati ons . Such responsiveness i s so marked that retail 
vehicle sales have been adopted as economic i ndicators in their 
own r ight . A serie s of studies were conducted by the subject 
manufacturer with the objective of identifying one or mor e 
indicators having a greater sensitivity. It WaS hoped that these 
indicators would provide the company wi th advanced warning of down 
and up-turns in aggregate consumer demand. Although the exact 
nature of these investigati ons i s confidential, there is evidence 
to suggest that results Were not pr omising . Such indicators as wer e 
found are generally unreliable and totally ineff ec tive beyond all 
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but the very immediate future. 
Although the motor industry has forecasted the progress of 
the macro-economy with certain success, there have recently 
arisen three special considerations which have greatly 
complicated this tas~ for the South African Corporate 
Pla.'1ller. They are World Economic Uncertainty, Local Socia-
Political Uncertainty and Sens~tivity to Economic 
Each will be briefly considered. 
World Economic Uncertainty 
" 'j 
As a direct consequence of nations inability to derive a workable 
international : monetry system the global econ?mic structure 
is in a state of serious disarray. Integral with this 
failing is instability in respect of inflation, unemployment 
and commodity prices - not the l east of which is crude oil. 
South Africa is powerless to influence, materially, this 
undesirable situation. Instead the country is in a relatively 
passive role whereby it is on the receiving end of variations 
in world economic elements. 
National vlealth is largely dependent upon profitable exporti~~ 
whilst productivity and inflation are linked to import levels 
and costs. Local economic growth is, in turn , a key determinent 
of the viability of South Africa's motor industry. For this 
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reasan industry prafitability during the caurse af the past three 
years has been unsatisfactary. 
Allied with the matar industry's prafita9ility and the status af 
warld ecanamics is the dallar/rand exchange rate. Far ins ta.'1C e , 
tqe prafits af the subject manufacturer are calculated as r and 
values which are subsequently canverted i nto camparable dallar 
amaunts using the ruling -exchange rate. Any downward valuatian 
af the rand against the dall ar autamatically eliminates a substantial 
prapartian af the lacal campa'lY's reported prafits. By the same 
taken day- ta-day fluctuatians af the rand's value versus the 
currencies af averseas suppliers materially influence the l anded 
cast af imparted campanents . 
In essence, therefare, the 10. cal matar industry is placed in a 
relatively expased position as regards the events within the 
global economy whilst local Corporate Planners are as powerless to 
predict meaningful courses of events therein as are their Detroit, 
Cologne, Paris, Turinor Tolqo counterparts . 
Local Sacia-Palitical Uncertainty 
Prior to. the Saweta Q'lrest af June 1976 local matar industry 
planners facused little direct attentian upan Sauth Africa ' s 
social and palitical framework. (Indeed there is every reasan to. 
believe t hat this element Vias ance viewed as being ane af the 
easiest environmental considerations to forecast.) The period 
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commencing 1975 - 1976 must be viewed as a notable break-point 
in South African history for, in the interim, major internal and 
external change has. occurred . 
Urban unrest and radical shifts in the,government of neighbouring 
countries coupled with a consequential pressure towards South African 
world isolation has resulted in a considerable degree of uncertainty 
becoming associated with this country as a potential investment 
opportunity. As has been establishea, the motor industry is greatly 
dependent upon investment, injections. At this time it is an open 
question whether such investment needs may, in future, be satisfied 
from local sources. 
Against this background Corporate Planning issues at stake are more 
fundamental than the specif'ic questions of, for example, investment 
sources and future market structures. Instead emphasis is placed upon 
seeking to construct a whole picture of South African society in five, 
ten and fifteen years time into which both the motor industry and the 
company may be projected . The major constraint to planning over such 
time horizons is not that this prOjection is difficult. It is 
relatively simple but what is hard, however, is to accept the 
forbiddingly hostile conclusions which emerge. 
Sensit;vity To Economic Sanctions. 
Mandatory economic sanctions would effectively destroy the 
local motor industry as it is now known. Vulnerability is present 
in three areas, namely; fuel, imported components and internal demand. 
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Fuel rationing would be so sever e that private motoring would all 
but cease to exist as would supplies of imported components . 
Moreover, there is every chance that all overseas- owned manufacturers 
would close. 
Some hybrid local motor vehicles may be produced although the market 
for such units is l ikely to be the mil itary. Finally, local private 
d emand for motor vehicles will be minimal as a consequence of fuel 
r ationing and the economic disruption occasioned by a cessation of 
for ei gn trad e . 
The Corporate Planner within an overseas-owned local manufacturer 
takes account of ~vo prime considerations . Firstly, the treat 
of some form of economic trade boycott is a very real one; if not 
i n the near future then at least at some more distant time . Secondly , 
any restrictions placed upon motor component and/or fuel supplies will 
strike at the very foundations of his comp~Dy. Logically, therefore , 
s ome form of diversification programme appears to be desirable . 
Overall, Within this framework two planning constraints exist; all long-
r ange plans must henceforth recogniz·e the· threat of South Africa having 
no formal outsi de trade l inks and the overseas parent company is unl ikely 
to approve any local diver sification for investment reasons. 
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5 . 2 . 2 . Prod uc t Infle>:i bility 
' . 
The issue of prod uc t inflexi bili ty has been touched upon in 
Section Four . Its importance as a Corporate PlruLDing 
constraint demands that it be ·specifically assessed as such . 
In the ideal world a motor manufacturer ' s long-range product 
plans will take account of the company ' s ability to design its 
products to fulfill the needs and wants of a quantified buyer 
cluster. South Africa ' s vehicle market, however, is too small 
and segmented to warrant investment· in design, engineering ~~d 
styling facilities capable of creating it unique "South Afri can" 
vehicle . Consequently, every local manufacturer has no alternative 
but to adopt a product range consisting of vehicles designed wi th 
overseas buyers in mind . Even in the case of multi-national 
compani.es where a deliberate effort is made to design vehicles 
having an appeal to widely differing markets some degree of 
compromise is inev·i table . Furthermore , South Africa is such 
a relatively small market that local buyer needs are likel y to 
be passed over (and rightly so ) in favour of the requirements 
expressed by Australian , British or Brazilian subsidiaries . 
It follows, therefore , that a prime constraint to long-r~~ge 
product/marketing planning is the understanding tha t a truly 
effective corporate product strategy cannot be attained under 
these circumstances . 
Allied with t he above consideration is the fact that the local 
motor manufacturer is dependent upon overSeas suppli es for both 
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applied technology and product components. A "technology embargo" 
operates as a function of the inability of the local manufacturer 
to flli1d research and development expenditure of the order need ed to 
make a material contribution to its operations and future product pl~~ . 
Consequently long-range product and manufacturing plans must recognize 
that local capabilities within these fields may only expand at the rate 
deter mined by the d evelopmen t of affordable, imported engineering and 
design technology. High inves~ent costs associated with such technology 
invariably result in the local manufacturer being out of step with the 
pace set by the parent company . 
Dependence upon imported supplies of product components represents a 
planning constraint in respect of the reliability and quality of 
component shipment . Serious disadvantages attend upon any major 
variation from scheduled shipping dates; Failure to receive a single 
component prevents the production of the vehicle in question - vehicles 
cannot be built and sold, for instance , without dashboards, instruments 
and t r ansmissions . Fl uctuations in imported supplies can be smoothed 
by carrying inventory stocks . However , the cost of such holdings is 
high in terms of direct investment, deterioration and "shrinkage' , Ln 
addition inventories become a serious burden when market demand is different 
from stocks held . For example, having ample stocks of two- door car 
components is of no assistance if the demand is for four- doors and it is 
four-door components which are in delay. MoreOVer , a truly damaging 
shock shortage exists in those circumstances when the supply fluctuation 
is so great that any normal inventory float is ineffectual. Such 
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variations exist in respect of typically ; production strikes , harbour 
and rail 'congestion . 
Imported component quality is a further planning consideration having 
a serious impact upon a product ' s acceptability to local buyers . It 
is very often felt that the quality of components supplied to overseas 
subsidiaries falls below that utilized by parent companies . Sub- quali ty 
assembli es , machining and mouldings are often encountered amidst imported 
components consignments . The local manufacturer is frequently placed in 
an inenviable position as a r esult . To bu~ld vehicles featuring such 
components is likely to reduce the product' s quality - a fact which will 
act to erode buyer support for that make. To r eject such components' 
results in an immediate stock shortage with all t he attendent difficulties . 
Compounding the long- term trouble are 'contracts with such suppliers which 
require lengthy notice for cancelling these relationships whilst to 
replace unsatisfactory suppliers Fesults in incremental costs of locating 
and bringing into production alternative supply sources . 
5 . 2 . 3. Market Structure 
A notable planning constraint exists in respect Df' the stagnant, over-
competi tive South African vehicle market . l.larket stagnation 
means that it is difficult, even impossible, to justify expansion pl~~s, 
strategies and investments. The situation is clearly a two- sided one. 
On the one hand the Corporate Planner is tempted to formulate long-term 
plans around f uture market expansion based upon the grow th of Black, 
Coloured and Asiatic market segments. On the other hand, pressure exists 
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to "be realistic" and plan on the basis of a semi-stagnant 
market where the emphasis is upon a survival strategy rather 
than upon aggressive market growth-share conquests. 
Brief menti on was made earlier of the future importanc.e of the 
Bl ack, Coloured and Asiatic market segments to the future of 
the local motor industry. That the potential exists cannot 
be denied . (Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that any 
improvement in real incomes amongst these population groups 
i s immediately marked by a quickening interest in vehicle 
buying.) Of prime concern is the persistence of any income 
improvement. Real income decline occasioned by infl ation or 
unemployment may effectively place vehicle oymership further 
beyond the reach of aspirant owners and may cause existing ones 
to revert to a non-owner status. Pr oblems associated with 
predicting these macro-economic ·factors influencing effective 
demand have been discussed earlier . 
Aggravating the difficulty associated with the saturated market 
and the compl exity of basing l arge- scale plans upon the pot~~tial 
within Black, Coloured and Asiatic market segments is the non-
availability of other alternative options; for example, market 
expansion outside the Witwatersrand cannot be supported by 
adequate buyers and export potential to the rest of Africa cap~ot 
be exploited for political reasons. 
Overall, therefore, the Corporate Pl anner is forced to select 
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ei ther a pessimistic "maxket stagnation" or an optimistic 
"market growth" path with very little middle ground between 
them. The fact that there is a strong element of compulsion 
acting upon two equally unclear chOices, each bear-ing 
considerable penalties in the event of error r epresents a 
major planning constraint . 
5.3 Informal Planning Constraints 
5.3.1 
As the title suggests informal constraints exist and function 
in the same way as their formal -counterparts - with one 
powerless ffio divert or influence a formal constraint he is 
able to do so with respect to informal pl anning hurdles . 
Consequently, the Corporate Planner is in a position to 
determine whether , in a given Situation, it is better to 
attempt either to oveI'come the constraint or evade it. 
Two broad classes of informal constraint may be identified; 
t hose Internal and those External to the company. Each 
will be considered in turn. 
Internal Informal Constraints 
Essentiall y this constraint takes the form of a negative 
attitude adopted towards Corporate Planning on the part 
of company personnel chaxged with the responsibility for 
its implementation. Bi tter experience has shown that 
" . 
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the benefits of long-range planning are not immediately 
obvious to management outside the company's planning staff. 
This constraint may be overcome in two ways . Firstly, 
all long-range planning efforts must receive the full and 
active support of the comp~~y's top management. The 
subject company ' s local Board of Directors form an executive 
planning committee . Each member bears the responsibility 
of co-ordinating and maintaining the momentum of Corporate 
Plarming actions as they relate to his orgal"izational unit . 
Mor eover, all Corporate Planning concerns are subject to the 
scrutiny and approval of pl annil".g star!" personnel wi thin 
the Group Office who are, i n turn, accountable to the parent 
company's central pl anning staff. Secondly , the problem may 
be solved by removing or diluting the pressure pl aced upon 
low er and midd·le level management to focus upon immediate -
term activities. This mis- placed orientation stems from the 
f act and fear that the individual's job performance at these 
levels is judged L~ terms of how well that person meets short-
range objectives . 
Success has been achieved by the use of Management by Objectives 
whereby every manager ' s objective for the year includes an 
element composed of personal aspirations linked to the demands 
of the Corporate Plan. Not only are short and long term 
company goals attained thereby but so too are the personal job 
desires of the accountable manager . 
5.3.2. 
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External Informal Constraints 
This body of planning "roadblocks" is the most contentious 
of those discussed for it relates to the manner in which 
the company .seeks to resolve the constraints imposed upon 
its long- range actions by the moral codes of the society 
within which it operates . 
Any company is not free to act as it sees fit . 
In a sense the firm is a "citizen" of its society and must 
accept the responsibilities that this status entails. 
The subject motor manufacturer is an exceedingly large 
economic and social "citizen" and, consequently, is highly 
visible with respect to its public acts and omissions . 
From the broad spectrum of i ssues relating to informal 
external constraints three 9f the most important and 
topical will be selected and discussed, viz: 
• 
Safety And Pollution Responsibility 
Equitable Labour Policy 
Recognition Of Government "Diplomatic" controls 
Safety And Pollution Responsibility 
A difficulty local motor manufacturers do not have to 
face within their long- range plans is that which relates 
t o vehicle safety and pollution control. This is in 
marked contrast to their North American counterparts. 
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South African society is not particularly 'conscious of motor 
vehicle safety or pollution . The extent to which this is 
so is evident from local manufacturers ' emphasis upon what is call ed 
"active" safety r ather than "passive" safety whilst any form of 
' . engine pollution r eduction is virtually non-existent. *. 
*"Acti ve" safety rel ates to safe ty as a consequence of accident 
avoidanc e . It is typically expressed in· terms of statements such 
as "the a bil ity to acc el erate out of danger ","powerful brakes" and "positive 
steering' . The und erlying assumption is that drivers will be sufficie!'.tl y 
alive to what is going on around them to be able to exploit effectively 
their vehicle's active safety features . Naturally , this is not true. 
Active safety features will not assist a driver whose mind i s elsewher e 
when the accident s i tuation develops or whos e tyre bursts at speed or 
. whos e way. ahead is s o congested with small children that evasive 
action is not possible. Similarly, the active safety school totally 
i gnore the issue of death and injury ·occuring to per sons outside the 
car e . g . pedestria~s a~d cyclists. 
Passive safety is orientated towards protecting l ife and limb once a~ 
accid ent has taken place . The assumption i s made that accidents will 
happen but their seriousness can be reduc ed . Safety ·belts , padded 
dashboards, non- burst door locks and "steel-cage" passenger compartments 
ar e all exampl es of passive safety devices. 
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From a legal point of view with the notable exceptions of 
active safety roadworthy checks upon" lights, brakes and 
steering and the passive safety seat-belt legislation there 
is no obligation placed upon any local manufacturer to maL~taL~ 
or improve the life-saving designs possible within his vehicles. 
As a Corporate Planning concern safety and pollution are not issues 
although from a moral standpoint they should be. Herein lies 
the importance of this and other mQral questions to Corporate 
Planning. Installing safety and pollution control devices within 
a motor vehicle raises that vehicle ' s costs which, in turn, must 
be recovered in the retail price . At this time no manufacturer 
(except at the price inelastic luxury end of the mark"et ) is prepared 
to rais'e the pric e of his products for this reason unless his 
competitors are prepared to follow suit. 
The true point at issue, however, is that at some time in the 
near future safety and pollution will become major planning 
concerns - as they have in overseas countries . Only at that 
time will this constraint be of immediate interest to Corporate 
Planners , in the interim it is ignored 
cost. 
at a tragic sO.cial 
" , 
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Equitable Labour Policy 
As a consequence of South Africa's racial composition and 
the unique body of legislation designed to control its 
implications, a major conflict has arisen between certain 
employers and the legislators. 
the root causes. 
Differing moral values are 
On the one ha'ld motor manufacturers having overseas parent 
companies are pressured to apply a labour and employment 
policy drawn up upon, the soc i al norms of the United States, 
Britain , Germany or France . On the other hand the same 
manufacturers, as South African "citizens ", (or, as they have 
been described, "guests") must take account of local inter-
racial. employment and job status practices which are, in many 
instanc es, totally at odds with " enlightened" overseas norms . 
Typical clashes arise over the issues of separate toilet a'ld 
eating facilities, wage and salary differentials, unrecognized 
trade unions, inferior journeyman qualifications and job 
recogni tion. 
Historically, local subsidiaries have tended to evade this 
conflict situation by recognizLn.g the Governnent' s and White 
trade unions' wishes whilst alleviating the affects of this 
discrimination via the provision of paternal fringe benefits 
e.g. subsidized canteens, free company transport, medical aid 
and low-interest personal loa'ls. In recent years, however 
overseas dema'lds (via shareholder and government pressure groups) 
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have risen to the extent that local subsidiary companies must 
take a firm s tand with respect to racially-based employment 
discrimination. The fact that local subsidiary motor 
manufacturers are highly visible entities has elevated this concern 
to a level where it is now a priority Cor porate Planning issue. 
-" 
Three open questions exist with respect to removing racial 
discrimination at the workplace. All have potentially major 
impacts upon the company ' s operations over the long term. 
Firstly, there is the need to foster the real job advancement 
oj' Blacks. This meanS more than creating empty jobs simply to 
"get Blacks into the organization". Ins"tead the company must 
assume a multi-racial characte~with Blacks making meaningful 
work contributions. With rare exceptions , however, even Black 
graduates having m~~agement functions do not perform at a satis-
. 
factory l evel. Their backgrounds count too heavily against them. 
Sub-st~"!dard work is the outcome and, as such , is a weakness or 
"'operating constraint. 
Secondly, a constraint is pr es ent in resp ect of thos e instances 
where, via artificially accelerated promotion, Black managers 
are plac ed in charge of Vlhi te subord inates. Serious internal 
conflict and stress is likely to result. The danger is a real 
one and must be r ecogniz"ed as such. 
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Thirdl y, much "liberal" employment practice runs contrary to 
entrenched South African racial boundaries , Inevi tably , 
there will exist 'a situation where a direct confrontation becomes 
unavoidable . For example, a Port Elizabeth motor manufact-
urer has thrown open its toil et and 'eating facilities to all 
" 
races - a direct contravention of statutory legislation . 
Hence within the field of labour policy major planning constraints 
face the Corporate Planner as regards the Manpower and Personnel 
elements of the Corporate Plan . These constraints are most 
marked within overseas owned motor manufacturers . 
Recogni,tion of Govern:nent "Dipl omatic" Contr ols 
It is a recognized fact that large manufacturing industries 
are of great interest to Governmentj firstly, they are key 
economic entities and, secondly, they are large , visible and 
r eadily open to investigation . 
Quite apart from the wide range of formal legislation governing 
the lcng and short term operations of such industries there are 
also present what have been termed "diplomatic " controls , 
Diplomatic controls exist for the purpose of covering those 
circumstances not specifically provid ed for by legislation . 
They flow as a natural consequence of a given Government policy 
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and, in many ways, serve to add flesh and substance to the 
skeleton provided by statute . Over time there is every chance 
that such controls will be made law, a change that is increased 
in direct proportion to the lack of co-operation the Government 
receives from the control's victims. Conversely, they may either 
,remain informal for many years or be replac ed with others which are 
more or l ess onerous with the passage of time and ·changing circum-
stances. A noteworthy characteristic of all such controls is 
that their severity is also a function of their personal application 
on the part of the ministerial persQnnel involved. 
Flexibility, common-sense and an understanding of Government policy 
as it relates to a particular circumsta~ce are the cornerstones of 
diplomatic control. In their ·very essence they represent informal 
agreements to act or to refrain from acting in a certain way under 
given conditions. A hypothetical exrunple is the best way of 
. 
illustrating a diplomatic control at work. 
Assume a motor manufacturer wishes to import a precision gear-
cutting machine. On the basis of tenders submitted by overseas 
suppliers three potential sellers are identified. 
GermaYl company R220,OOO 
Israeli compaYlY R2l2,OOO 
Swedish company · R185,OOO 
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Their ability to. meet the desired specificatien and delivery dates 
is equal. The Swedish supplier is, therefore, the mest attractive . 
To. impert the machine exchange centrel autherisatien is necessary . 
When the applicatien is submitted Vlhat reactien must be made by the 
cempany when in casual canversatien the questien is raised as to. why 
~~e Swedish supplier is, faveured when that ceuntry denates funds to. 
terrerist arganizatians whilst clese ecenemic links are being ferged 
with Israel? 
Mereever, the meter ma~ufacturer's management are quite likely to. 
recegnise the implicatians ef such an intentien befere seeking exchange 
central permissien. Cansequently, they may decide to. use this fact as 
ammunitian in their case to. abtain the necessary impart autharisatian , 
' ''We did cansider buyfug in Sweden but we decid ed net to. despite theix' 
lawer price afterall they suppert terrarists a",d Sauth Africa daes vlish 
to. draw cleser to. Israel . ". O,er the langer term the same argument 
may be used to. faster better relatiens between the campany and certain 
key gavernment ,departments , "We understand the need to. reduce imparts 
but please treat this as a special case afterall in the past we have 
alw'ays imported from countries which suppart South Africa.". 
For diplomatic controls to be effective same form ef threat er punishment 
mus t be associated with the issue at stake. This threat may take two 
ferms , firstly, there is the metian to farmalize the diplamatic central . 
This thr eat i s the most dir ect ef the two but will only tend to. be employed 
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when the situation is of a truly material nature . A topical example 
of this threat in action as a consequence of a breach diplomatic 
controls is that pertaining to private diesel vehicles, "A number of 
l ocal motor manufacturers wish to produce diesel engined vehicles for 
sale to private individuals. If this is done South Africa ' s.consump-
tion of diesel fuel will rise . To counter this restrictions may be 
placed upon both the availability of diesel oil and the manufacture of 
such vehicles . " . * 
The second type of threat i s a mor e pointed one being directed towards 
a single company or small group of companies. It is suggested that the 
delinquent parties are likely to be instructed to conform or be subjected 
to certain harassment or hinderence. Opportunities certainly exist to, 
inter alia, refuse or delay exchange control allocations, reduce government 
vehicle orders and reject applications for investment alloViances . 
*The reasons why an increase in diesel fuel consumption is considered to 
be undesirable are stated below : 
• A given quantity of crude oil yields fixed percentages of, inter alia, 
petrol and diesel oil . Any increase in demand for diesel would 
necessitate a rise in crude oil imports and a forecast surplus of refined 
petrolvhich Vlould then need to be stored or exported. (The increase in 
the number of filling stations V/orldwide during the l ate 1950 ' s and 
1960 ' s may be t rac ed to the rise in demand for jet-engine kerosene 
creating a glut of petrol and l ubricating oils . ) 
Tradi tionally diesel applications have been wi thin the" economically 
productive" sectors of agriculture and industry. In a time of diesel 
fuel shortage what fuel is available must be allocated only to those 
~vo sectors end not these two plus a potentially large group of private 
motorists. 
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Overall, therefore, the need for the individual company to "keep in 
the Government's good books" represents a , planning constraint having 
s ignificant financial and operating consequences. 
5. 4 Conclusion - Corporate Planninl( Constraints 
The very ess,ence of Corporate Planning i s a systematic attempt to 
chart a future course for a company through an environment which is 
simul taneously hostile and opportunistic . Hostile environmental 
elements act to prevent the company from adopting and implementing 
plans which, from its management's point of view, are the most 
desirable. Thus a key argument in favour of Corporate Planning 
and a major concern when attempting to undertake such plaIUling is 
the presence of environmental constraints . 
Two broacl classes of constraint may be identified, viz, Formal 
(pertaining chiefly to the macro-economy, product lines , market 
str ucture and government legislation) a~d Informal (pertaining to 
factors within and without the company such as; ma~agement acceptance 
of Corporate PlaI'-'ling , l abour policy and the relationship enjoyed with 
influential Government personnel). 
In no small way the art of effective Corporate Planning is closely 
linked to the planning staff's ability to recogniz e and forecast 
existing constraints, perceive the rise of future constraints a~d 
to project both into the field occupied by each area of the company . 
SECTION SIX A FINAL REVIEN OF THE CORPOHATE PLA;JITlTG 
THE SUBJECT p,IOTOn MAllUFACTURER. 
Corporate Planning was defined as "~methodical, systematic aYJd 
di sciplined process whereoy a company ' s long-term profit objective is 
identified, goals determined and strategies generated to attain those 
goals which take into account probable changes in the task environment 
whilst the whole is mad e actionable via meaningful feed back of results ." . 
The degree to which the requirements present within the above definition 
have been met by the subject company's planning activities is hopefully 
demonstrated by the material in the for~going pages . It is certainly 
evident that many difficuities occasioned by the size and complexity of 
its multi-national (Organization structure have yet to be add r essed and 
solved. However, given an improved understanding of unique local 
circumstances on the part of overseas planning staff members and the more 
effective application· of the company's immense personnel and fLYJancial 
resourc es to identified probl ems a material enr~cement iP_ its l ocal 
Corporate Planning practice may be expected over time . 
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Appendix I (a) 
Passenger - Car IndurotI',V Sales 
Make/Manu:facturer Sales Volume % Market 
Alfa Romeo 3916 2.3 
HI/Nt 6218 3.7 
Datsun 19298 11. 5 
Ford 27739 16 . 6 
Fiat 6767 4.1 
General Motors 17836 10.7 
Leyland 7490 4 . 5 
Mercedes Benz 7628 4.6 
PeUgeot 9256 5.6 
Renault 2830 1.7 
Sigma 18549 11.1 
Toyota 11304 6. 8 
Volkswagen 24960 15.0 
Volvo 5 
Ci troen 2819 1. 7 
Others 149 0.1 
Total 166764 100.0 
Source: NAAMSA Statistics - Full Year Report , December 1977. 
LiGht Co~nercinl Vehicle Industry Sales 
1977 
Appendix 1 (b) 
Malee/Manufacturer Sales Volume % Marke t 
Datsun 14221 22 . 3 
Fiat 180 0.3 
Ford 7584 13 . 0 
General Motors 4249 6.7 
Leyland 3264 5.1 
Peugeot 3251 5.1 
Sigma 9607 15.1 
Toyota 13341 20 . 9 
Volkswagen 7294 11. 5 
Total .62991 100.0 
Source: NAAMSA Stati st ics - Full Year Report , December 1977 
Heavy Cormnercj.ul Vehicle Industry Sales 
1977 
Make/Manufacturer Sales Volume 
Da t sun 4586 
Deutz - Magirus ' 134 
Fiat 161 
Ford 3236 
General Motor s 5426 
Internationa l Harvester 758 
Leyland 2112 
M.A .N. 282 
Mercedes - Benz 2710 
Oshkosh 195 
Sigma 605 
Toyota 5602 
Others 515 
Total 26322 
Appendix 1 (c ) 
% Market 
17.4 
0.5 
0 . 6 
12.3 
20.6 
2.9 
8 . 0 
1.1 
10.3 
0.7 
2.3 
21. 3 
2 . 0 
100.0 
Source: N~EA Statistics - Full Year Report December 1977 
Year 196 5 Manufacturer 
Gener al Mot or s 26 . 9 
For d 23 . 9 
Vol kswagen 12.9 
Sigma 9 .8 
Leyland 12. 9 
: ierc ed es- Benz 2. 9 
Peugeot/6itroen 2 . 7 
Datsun 0. 6 
·Toyota 0. 0 
?iat 3. 7 
Alfa- Romeo 1. 2 
Volvo . 1. 5 
B:,~,';" 0. 2 
Others 0. 8 
TO'l'AL PERCENT 100 . 0 
I:-!dustry 
I An.'1ua1 Sal es 127339 Volu.'lle 
~~ Change 
Annual 
-
Industr y 
1966 
24 . 9 
23 . 8 
13. 7 
11. 9 
11.1 
3.1 
2.7 . 
0. 8 
1. 0 
3. 6 
T~b· -
1.6 
0. 0 
0. 8 
100 . 0 . 
--
138480 
+ 8 . 7 
MARKET SHARE BY PASSENGER CAR MANUFACTURER FOR THE PERIOD 
JANUARY 1, 1965 - DECEMBER 31, 1977 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
22 . 5 
, 
18. 3 16. 8 14 .1 11. 8 14. 5 18 .8 
21. 2 21. 2 21.8 20.2 17. 8 14. 9 13 . 7 
13. 6 14. 0 14. 4 14. 9 14. 6 14. 0 15. 8 
12 . 9 13. 6 12 . 5 12. 2 10. 7 14. 0 12 .1 
9. 9 9. 9 8 . 0 7. 2 7.1 7.5 6. 8 
3. 8 4. 6 4. 2 4. 2 5.1 4. 6 3. 9 
3. 6 4.). 4. 5 4. 7 6. 0 7. 2 7.4 
2. 6 2.4 2. 8 4.4 8 .3 · 10. 3 10. 2 
2 . 5 3.8 3.3 4. 5 6.7 6. 8 7.1 
3. 9 4.1 5.8 5. 2 4.4 2. 9 3. 6 
0.9 0. 6 1. 0 1. 3 1.4 1.8 1. 5 
1. 7 2. 5 2. 6 2. 6 1. 8 2. 9 2 . 5 
0.1 0. 2 0. 6 1. 0 1. 2 1. 2 0. 9 
0. 8 0. 2 0. 2 0. 8 0. 8 , 0.1 0. 0 
100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100. 0 100 .0 
. ------~ ---- - -- -~-----
I 
·138819 151245 177820 201772 175835 182961 229442 
. ! r 
+ 0. 2 + 13. 5 +25 . 4 
~-~--L.....------
+ 9.'0 I + 17.6 (12.9)1 +4 .1 
"'--' 
1974 1975 1976 1977 Tren< 
13 . 6 12. 4 11.4 10. 7 ~~ 
13. 4 13. 6 15. 2 17. 0 
"---l 6 .. 1 15. 7 15. 6 15 . 3 ~ 
11. 2 9. 5 8 . 6 11.3 u----"" 
5. 9 5. 8 5. 3 4. 6 D~ 
4. 2 4. 7 4. 9 4. 7 ~ 
9. 2 7. 8 6. 8 7. 4 ~ 
11. 6 12. 9 13.1 11. 6 
---:s'" 
7. 4 8.1 9. 8- 6.8 ,,~ 
3. 3 3. 2 2 .3 4. 2 ~ 
1. 6 3. 0 2 . 9 2 . 3 ~ 
0. 8 1.0 0. 3 0. 0 t 
1.3 2. 3 3 . 3 3. 7 ~ 
0. 4 0. 0 0. 5 0. 4 ~ 
100.0 100 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 
-
-----_ .. -_ .. .. - '------- ~ .. -.--- . --_. __ . . -
226776 229031 185132 166764 ,,~ 
! (-1. 2) -I- 1. 0 (-19.2) I (-10.0) ~ 
Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1 977 
Est. 
1978 
Source : 
Annual Growth 1959 - 1977 in New Motor 
VGhicle Market 
NeVI New 
Passenger Car Market Commerc i al Vehic l e Market 
;;; % 
Units Annual Growth Units Annual Growth 
89363 
-
21606 
-
87220 - 2. 4 18954 - 12. 3 
98779 + 13. 3 20385 + 7. 5 
75938 - 23 .1 20726 + 1.7 
81308 + 7.1 24864 + 20.0 
110468 + 35 . 9 37494 + 50.8 
143373 + 29 . 8 52618 + 40.3 
127898 - 10.8 47093 . - 10. 5 
139076 + 8. 7 47074 - 0. 1 
139223 + 0.1 54820 + 16. 5 
151546 + 8 . 9 60245 + 9. 9 
177945 + 17.4 78351 + 30.4 
201854 + 13 . 4 95719 + 22 . 2 
175884 - 12 . 9 119798 + 25 . 2 
J.82961 + 4.0 109316 - 8 . 7 
229442 + 25 . 4 112941 + 3.3 
226776 - 1. 2 115151 + 2 . 0 
229031 + 1.0 134575 + 16. 9 
185132 - 1·9. 2 115116 - 14.5 
166764 
- 9.9 90037 - 21. 8 
205000 + 22.9 101500 + 12.7 
(1) NAAMSA Statistics 
AppGndix 1 (e) 
Total New Motor 
Vehicle Market 
. % 
Units Annual Growth 
110969 -
106174 - 4.3 
119164 + 12 . 2 
96664 - 18.9 
106172 + 9. 8 
147962 + 13.4 
195991 + 32.5 
174991 - 10.7 
186150 + 6.4 
194043 + 4.2 
211791 + 9.1 
256296 + 21. 0 
297573 + 16. 2 
295682 - 0.6 
292277 
-
1.2 
342383 + 17.1 
341927 
-
0.1 
363605 + 6. 3 
300248 
-
17. 4 
256801 
-
14.5 
306500 + 19.4 
(2) C.B. Ferreira - The Marketing of New Motor Vehic l es 
in South Africa , 1973 , pp 194 
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SOUTH AFRICA COMPARED WITH PENETRATIONS ATTAINED IN OTHER MARKETS 
(CAR MARKET SALES ) 
South Africa United Japan Australia Brazil Venezuel a Mexico Argentina , Kingdom 
Volkswagen 15 . 0% 3. 5% 0. 4% N/A% 56 . 0% 5. 2% 28. 0% N/A% 
Ford 16.6 25 . 7 0. 3 23 . 5 14. 5 37.3 13.1 22.5 
General Motors 10. 7 10. 4 0. 2 25 .1 17. 2 24.6 8.1 6.3 
Datsun 11 . 6 6. 2 31.1 11 . 8 N/A N/A 12 . 3 N/A 
Sigma - Chrysler 1.8 ) 6. 0 N/A 4.8 2. 2 22 . 3 20.1 8.9 
- Mitsubishi 3 . 9 ) 11.1 N/A .8. 2 4. 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
- Mazd a 5.4 ) N/A 6. 9 6. 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Peugeot/Citroen 7. 2 3. 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 19 . 6 
Toyota 6. 8 N/A 36.9 12.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
I,Iercedes Benz 4 . 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Leyland 4. 5 24 . 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fiat 4. 0 5. 7 N/A N/A 9.4 4. 0 N/A 23.0 
(COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SALES) 
Toyota 21.0% N/A% N/A 20.8% N/A% 10. 5% N/A% N/A% 
Datsun 20 . 9 N/A N/A 8.1 N/A 7. 7 6.5 N/A 
Ford 12 . 8 31.2 N/A 18.7 18.1 ' 36 . 6 27 .4 28.2 
G. I.l ./Isuzu 10. 7 19.1 N/A 23 . 7 20. 9 12. 6 19.1 18.0 
I~razda 9.9 N/A N/A 4. 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Volkswagen, 8. 1 2 . 5 N/A N/A 24 .1 N/A 11.4 N/A 
Leyland 13 .1 25 . 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Mercedes Benz 10. 3 N/A N/A N/A 27.4 N/A N/A 11 . 6 
~endix II 
An Example of Corporate Philanthropy 
Being an extract from a report contained in Indaba - Friday, June 9, 1978. 
"The teeing- off (at General Motor ' s Kwazakhel e golf course) marked 
the culmination of the first phase of the social responsibility pr o-
gramme which General Motors drew up in 1972 to improve the quality of 
' . 
life of its black employees . 
The company contributed R65 , OOO of the R198 , OOO cost and under took 
to pay R7,9l5 a year maintenance . 
I From the Government Sport Fund came R50,OOO and R83,OOO from the 
Cape Mid l and s Administration Board. 
The projects of Gener al Motors ' first phase were : 
A Coloured recreation club comprising a night club , changerooms, 
tennis courts and rugby, soccer and cricket fields , costing R140 , OOO. 
African l;'e.creation facilities including the nine- hole golf course, 
four new tennis courts , three tennis courts renovated, three flood-
lit sVlimming baths, restoration and .establishment of an Olympfc- sized 
cycling track all at a cost of R292,OOO . 
A loan of R500,OO to Port Elizabeth Municipality for the building of 94 
houses of modern design for ownership by Coloured people , General Motor s 
have also made it possible for the Cape 1lidlands Administration Board to 
raise a loan of Rl , 060 , OOO on a subsidized interest basis for homes and a 
schOOl in the African residEntial ar ea . " 
AEl'endix III 
RESAT,E VALUE OF CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN cARs 
Best Buys 
BMW 
All models but beware of 
condition. 
Datsun* 
All models except as noted 
opposite . 
Ford-* 
All models . 
Leyland 
Mini - but beware of condition . 
Rover - new series . 
Jaguar - but beware of 
condition. 
Mercedes- Benz* 
All ~odels . Reta~~s value so 
well that a resale profit may 
be made in some instances . 
Peugeot 
404 "- but beware of condition . 
Sigma 
Mazda - all models except 
rotary engined version. 
Colt/Galant - all models . 
Volkswagen 
Beetle* - all models . 
Passat - all models but 
beware of condition . 
Audi-l(- - all models. 
Lancia/Lotus 
Scarcity value/collectors/ 
specialist appeal . Beware of 
condition . 
* Denotes exceptional buy. 
Poor Buys 
. . 
Alfa- Romeo 
All models cxcept for limited 
volume exotic sports cars which 
have scarcity/novelty value. 
Datsun 
180U and 240 - 3CJC series . 
Fiat 
All models except limited volume 
exotic sports cars which have 
scarcity/novelty value. Beware 
of condition. 
Ford 
Pre-1977 Cortina 2000 series 
All pre- 1973 models . 
Leyland 
Apache, Marina, Triumph. 
Citroen 
All models. 
Renualt 
All models . 
Rambler 
All models. 
Sigma 
Valiant/Dodge SE - all models. 
Mazda - rotary engine version. 
. 
Appendix: IV 
BLACK, COWURED , ASIATIC NEW VEHICLE SALES 
Currently available Department of Statistics data makes it possi.ble 
to determine, for the years January 1974 - June 1976, the number of 
new cars, mini- buses and commerci al vehicles sold to Whi tes , Blacks , 
Coloureds and Asiatics. 
Cars 1974 - 1975 2f 1975 - 1976 2f 
White 151 618 93,2 138 044 93,2 
Black 2 694 1, 7 2471 1 ,7 
Coloured 2 674 1 , 6 2 386 1, 6 
Asiatic 5 685 3,5 5 157 3,5 
162 671 100,0 148 058 100,0 
The above underlines the prime importance of the Coloured COmmuIlity 
for although they are vastly inferiour in size t o Blacks they bought 
only average 0 ,1% fewer new cars than the total Black community. 
Overall 5 368 new cars (3 , 3% of total) were sold to Blacks and 'Coloureds 
in 1974/1975 with 4 857 (3,3% of total) bought by the same in 1975/1976 . 
Mini- Buses 1974 - 1975 1f 1975 - 1976 2f 
White 4 785 81 , 2 5 508 80,6 
Black 595 10,1 751 11, 0 
Coloured 170 2,9 244 3,6 
Asi atic 339 5, 8 330 4,8 
5 889 100 , 0 6 833 100,0 
Over t he period in question Coloureds bought a total of 414 new mini-
buses whilst Blacks bought 1 343. 
Commercial Vehicles 1974 - 1975 2f 1975 - 1976 2f 
White 52 007 85,2 49 211 84 ,3 
Black 1 336 2,2 1 254 2,1 
Coloured . 2 412 4,0 2 487 4,3 
Asiatic 5 279 8,6 5 425 9,3 
61 034 100 ,0 58 377 100,0 
i -
' . 
Appendix IV (cont ' d) 
Bl acks comprised the prime non- European market for commercial 
vehicles . Between 1974 - 1976 a total of 10 704 new commercial 
vehi cl es were sold to Blacks compared with 2 590 such uni ts to 
Col oureds. In total 13 294 new commercial vehi cles were bought 
by Bl acks and Coloureds between 1974 - 1976 . 
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